Chapter 8: Network Design and Routing
Networks and Routing
Warm-up: Braess's Paradox
Each driver picks their own fastest route from S to T; travel time on a narrow road grows with the number of drivers on it, while a wide road always takes 45 minutes.
- If a zero-time shortcut from A to B opens, do trips get shorter?
- When everyone takes their own fastest route, is the average time minimized?
Networks and Routing
Learning Outcomes
Compute the equilibrium of a two-route network by equalizing delays; find the system optimum via marginal costs and compare.
Show with numbers why a new road can make everyone slower.
Compute Rosenthal's potential; prove that best-response dynamics must stop.
Check which networks are equilibria when players build the links.
Networks and Routing
Network Design and Routing
- Network design decides the nodes, links, capacities and costs.
- Routing decides which paths the flow takes from source to destination.
- Algorithmic game theory studies traffic and communication networks whose users each try to reduce their own cost.
- Key applications: city traffic, Internet backbones, power grids.
Networks and Routing
Basic Network Design Concepts
Node: an intersection, router or substation. Link: a road, fiber line or transmission line.
The flow a link can carry per unit time; beyond it, delay rises sharply.
Building cost (design) and usage cost: delay, energy, tolls (routing).
Tree/layered topology in a data center; a near-mesh road network in a city.
Networks and Routing
Classic Routing Algorithms
| Method | What it does | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Dijkstra | Single-source shortest paths with nonnegative weights | O((V + E) log V); the core of OSPF (Open Shortest Path First, a link-state protocol) |
| Bellman–Ford | Allows negative weights; updates by learning from neighbors | O(V·E); its distributed version is RIP (a distance-vector protocol) |
| Dynamic routing | Recomputes paths when link states and costs change | Adapts to traffic and failures |
| Load balancing | Spreads traffic over several paths or servers | E.g. ECMP (equal-cost multipath) |
Networks and Routing
Delay Depends on Load: ℓe(x)
- Each edge's delay is a nondecreasing function of its flow x: ℓe(x).
- Constant: a wide highway, ℓ = b.
- Linear: ℓ = a·x + b (the two-route and Braess examples).
- BPR (US Bureau of Public Roads): ℓ = t0(1 + 0.15 (x/c)4); t0: free-flow time, c: road capacity. Standard in traffic planning.
- Queueing delay in networks: ℓ = 1/(c − x), only for 0 ≤ x < c (single-server queue, M/M/1; c: packets served per second, x: packets arriving per second). As x approaches c, delay grows without bound; for x ≥ c the queue grows forever.
Selfish Routing
Selfish Routing
- Each user picks the route that minimizes their own delay.
- With many small users, flow is treated as splittable (nonatomic): a single user's effect is negligible.
- Individual route choices can drift away from the system optimum, which minimizes total delay.
- In Braess's paradox, adding a link can increase the equilibrium delay.
fP: flow on path P
fe: total flow on edge e
ℓP(f) = Σe∈P ℓe(fe)
Total delay
C(f) = Σe fe·ℓe(fe)
A path's delay is the sum of its edges' delays; total delay is flow × delay summed over edges.
Selfish Routing
Wardrop's Principles (1952)
1st principle: user equilibrium
- All used paths have equal, minimal delay.
- Unused paths are no faster.
- No single user can cut their travel time by switching.
2nd principle: system optimum
- Average (total) delay is minimal.
- The split a central planner would choose.
- Some users may be “sacrificed” to a slower road.
Selfish Routing
Step by Step: Wardrop Equilibrium on Two Routes
Setup: 3,000 cars travel from A to B. Route 1 is short but narrow (delay rises fast); Route 2 is long but wide.
Try 1: everyone on Route 1 → ℓ₁ = 35 min, while the empty Route 2 takes 20. Route 1 drivers want to switch: not an equilibrium.
Try 2: 1,500 / 1,500 → ℓ₁ = 20, ℓ₂ = 27.5 min. Now Route 2 drivers move to Route 1: still not an equilibrium.
Equilibrium condition: if both routes are used, their delays must be equal: 5 + x₁/100 = 20 + (3000 − x₁)/200.
×200: 1000 + 2x₁ = 4000 + 3000 − x₁ → 3x₁ = 6000 → x₁ = 2,000, x₂ = 1,000; both take 25 min.
Check: a driver who switches still faces ≈ 25 min → nobody gains. Total delay 3,000 × 25 = 75,000 car·min.
Selfish Routing
Equilibrium Is Not the System Optimum
C = x₁·ℓ₁(x₁) + x₂·ℓ₂(x₂)
At the equilibrium x₁ = 2,000 the total is 75,000 car·min. Is this the bottom of the curve?
C = x₁·ℓ₁(x₁) + x₂·ℓ₂(x₂)
Marginal cost: the extra total delay from adding one more car
Route 1: x₁·ℓ₁ = 5x₁ + x₁²/100 → derivative 5 + x₁/50
Route 2: x₂·ℓ₂ = 20x₂ + x₂²/200 → derivative 20 + x₂/100
One more car adds its own delay plus the x·ℓ′ delay it imposes on everyone else.
C = x₁·ℓ₁(x₁) + x₂·ℓ₂(x₂)
Marginal cost: the extra total delay from adding one more car
Route 1: x₁·ℓ₁ = 5x₁ + x₁²/100 → derivative 5 + x₁/50
Route 2: x₂·ℓ₂ = 20x₂ + x₂²/200 → derivative 20 + x₂/100
Equate: 5 + x₁/50 = 20 + (3000 − x₁)/100
→ 3x₁ = 4500 → x₁ = x₂ = 1,500
At the optimum, marginal costs are equal: traffic splits 1,500 / 1,500, total 71,250.
| x₁ / x₂ | ℓ₁ / ℓ₂ (min) | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equilibrium | 2,000 / 1,000 | 25 / 25 | 75,000 |
| Optimum | 1,500 / 1,500 | 20 / 27.5 | 71,250 |
At the optimum, Route 1 drivers take 20 min and Route 2 drivers 27.5; Route 2 drivers want to leave → the optimum is not an equilibrium.
Selfish Routing
Equilibrium and Optimum: Two Different Minimizations
Minimizes the Beckmann potential (Beckmann, McGuire, Winsten, 1956):
Φ(f) = Σe ∫0fe ℓe(t) dt
Derivative ℓe: the delay seen by the “last driver in”.
Minimizes total delay:
C(f) = Σe fe·ℓe(fe)
Derivative ℓe + fe·ℓ′e: the marginal cost.
Selfish Routing
Code Trace: find_eq(l1, l2, r)
Call: the two-route network (ℓ₁ = 5 + x/100, ℓ₂ = 20 + x/200), 3,000 cars. Goal: the x with ℓ₁(x) = ℓ₂(r − x).
Search interval [0, 3,000]: the equilibrium must lie here (at x = 0 Route 1 is faster, at x = r slower).
Round 1: x = 1,500 → ℓ₁ = 20 < ℓ₂ = 27.5. Route 1 is still faster, so more cars move to it: lo = 1,500.
Round 2: x = 2,250 → ℓ₁ = 27.5 ≥ ℓ₂ = 23.75. Route 1 is too crowded: hi = 2,250.
Round 3: x = 1,875 → ℓ₁ = 23.75 < ℓ₂ = 25.63. Route 1 is still faster, so more cars move to it: lo = 1,875.
Round 4: x = 2,062.5 → ℓ₁ = 25.63 ≥ ℓ₂ = 24.69. Route 1 is too crowded: hi = 2,062.5.
Round 5: x = 1,968.75 → ℓ₁ = 24.69 < ℓ₂ = 25.16. Route 1 is still faster, so more cars move to it: lo = 1,968.75.
Round 6: x = 2,015.63 → ℓ₁ = 25.16 ≥ ℓ₂ = 24.92. Route 1 is too crowded: hi = 2,015.63.
Width 46.88 ≤ 50 → stop. Result ≈ 1,992.19 (true equilibrium 2,000). Each round halves the interval: after k rounds the error is ≤ r/2k.
def find_eq(l1, l2, r, eps=50): if l1(0) >= l2(r): return 0 # route 1 unused if l1(r) <= l2(0): return r # all on route 1 lo, hi = 0, r while hi - lo > eps: x = (lo + hi) / 2 if l1(x) < l2(r - x): lo = x # route 1 faster: raise else: hi = x # route 1 slower: lower return (lo + hi) / 2
Since ℓ₁(x) − ℓ₂(r − x) is nondecreasing, its zero is the equilibrium; the first two lines catch the corner cases. In general networks the Beckmann potential is minimized by convex optimization (e.g. Frank–Wolfe).
Braess's Paradox
Step by Step: Braess's Paradox (4,000 Cars)
Setup: 4,000 cars from s to t. s→A and B→t are narrow roads (x/100 min); A→t and s→B are wide highways (always 45 min).
Symmetry: 2,000 / 2,000 → both paths take 2000/100 + 45 = 65 min. Switching doesn't help: a Wardrop equilibrium (and the optimum).
The city opens a very short, 0-minute link road from A to B. At first nobody uses it.
One driver tries s→A→B→t: 20 + 0 + 20 = 40 min < 65. Very profitable individually → they switch.
1,000 drivers have switched: 2,500 cars on the narrow roads → 25 min. Old paths 70, zigzag 50 min: switching continues.
Everyone zigzags: 40 + 0 + 40 = 80 min. Going back to an old path costs 40 + 45 = 85 min → nobody goes back: a new equilibrium.
Result: a road was added and everyone lost 15 min. More capacity + selfish choice = a worse equilibrium. The system optimum with the shortcut is ≈ 64.7 min (only 500 cars on the zigzag).
Braess's Paradox
Why Does Everyone Zigzag?
Braess's Paradox
Braess's Paradox: Lessons and Examples
- Adding a link to a network can increase the delay of all users because of selfish route choice (Braess, 1968).
- The new road looks attractive individually, but the traffic pattern users create together moves to a worse equilibrium.
- Conversely, closing a road can sometimes speed everyone up.
Traffic that worsened after a new road investment is often said to have improved once a street was closed (Knödel, 1969).
When 42nd Street was closed on Earth Day, the expected gridlock reportedly never came (Kolata, 1990).
A similar paradox appears in networks of springs and resistors (Cohen and Horowitz, 1991).
Braess's Paradox
Back to the Warm-up: Braess's Paradox
| Average time | Selfish equilibrium | Optimum |
|---|---|---|
| No shortcut | 20 + 45 = 65 | 65 |
| With shortcut | 40 + 0 + 40 = 80 | ≈ 64.7 |
With the shortcut everyone picks S→A→B→T. Going back to an old road costs 40 + 45 = 85, so nobody does: equilibrium 80. The optimum with the shortcut gives the zigzag a small share (1,750 / 1,750 / 500 cars → 258,750 / 4,000 ≈ 64.7).
In laboratory experiments, too, subjects drifted over time toward the slower equilibrium the paradox predicts once the shortcut was added (Rapoport et al., 2009).
In cities: besides Stuttgart and New York, removing the elevated highway over Seoul's Cheonggyecheon in the early 2000s is often said not to have worsened traffic as feared. Real networks are far more complex; these cases are not proof, only signs that the paradox is possible.
Braess's Paradox
Code Trace: best_subnet(net, r)
Call: the Braess network, 5 edges, 4,000 cars. Question: closing which edge cuts the equilibrium time the most?
Equilibrium of the full network: everyone zigzags, 80 min. Removing nothing is the initial candidate.
Close s→A: only s→B→t remains: 40 + 45 = 85 min.
85 < 80 is false → candidate unchanged.
Close A→t: the zigzag and the lower path remain; the zigzag dominates: 80 min.
80 < 80 is false → candidate unchanged.
Close s→B: the upper path and the zigzag remain; the zigzag dominates: 80 min.
80 < 80 is false → candidate unchanged.
Close B→t: only s→A→t remains: 40 + 45 = 85 min.
85 < 80 is false → candidate unchanged.
Close A→B: the pre-Braess network: 2,000 / 2,000, 20 + 45 = 65 min.
65 < previous best → update: new best subnetwork “A→B closed”.
Result: close A→B; equilibrium 80 → 65 min. The designer asks “which edges should stay open?”; in general networks this choice is hard.
def best_subnet(net, r): best, cut = eq_time(net, r), None for e in net: sub = [k for k in net if k != e] d = eq_time(sub, r) # inf if no path if d < best: best, cut = d, e return cut, best
eq_time(net, r): the common time of the used paths in the subnetwork's Wardrop equilibrium (computed in the script by minimizing the Beckmann potential). The code only tries removing one edge; a full search needs 2m subnetworks.
Braess's Paradox
Network Design for Selfish Users
Which subnetwork of a given network, left open, minimizes the Wardrop equilibrium time? Closing a road, not only building one, is a design decision.
Choosing the best edges to close is hard in general: with linear delays, closing nothing is at most 4/3 times worse than the best choice, and guaranteeing anything better efficiently is NP-hard (Roughgarden, 2006).
In networks built from parallel paths and their series connections (series-parallel), Braess's paradox never occurs; other networks can show it with suitable delays (Milchtaich, 2006).
Congestion Games
Congestion Games
- n players, a set of resources E (edges). Each player's strategy is a subset of resources (e.g. an s–t path).
- A resource's cost ce(ne) depends only on the number of players using it and grows with that load.
- A player's cost: the sum of the costs of the chosen resources.
- As players try to cut their own delay, the total network cost can rise.
| Atomic | Nonatomic | |
|---|---|---|
| Players | finite, n players | continuous flow |
| Effect | one player adds 1 to the load | one player is negligible |
| Equilibrium | pure Nash | Wardrop |
| Potential | Rosenthal (sum) | Beckmann (integral) |
Congestion Games
Rosenthal's Potential Function
On each edge, add the costs from 1 up to the number of users ne (this is not the total cost).
Congestion Games
Step by Step: Best-Response Dynamics and Φ
Edge costs: k (number of users) on s→A and B→t, 4 on s→B and A→t, 0 on A→B. Everyone on s→A→t: cost 4 + 4 = 8, Φ = 26.
Driver 1's options: top 8, bottom 4 + 1 = 5, zig 4 + 0 + 1 = 5. Ties go to the first → bottom (8 → 5). Φ: 26 → 23 (Δ = −3).
Driver 2: top 7, bottom 4 + 2 = 6, zig 3 + 0 + 2 = 5 → zig (7 → 5). Φ: 23 → 21 (Δ = −2).
Driver 3: top 7, bottom 4 + 3 = 7, zig 3 + 0 + 3 = 6 → zig (7 → 6). Φ: 21 → 20 (Δ = −1).
Driver 4 (top, 7): bottom 4 + 4 = 8, zig 3 + 0 + 4 = 7 → nothing better, stays. Each drop in Φ equaled the mover's gain.
In the second round nobody can improve → pure Nash equilibrium (Φ = 20). Total 7 + 6 + 6 + 7 = 26; without A→B a 2+2 split would give 24: atomic Braess!
Congestion Games
Potential Games: What Do We Gain?
A state minimizing Φ is a pure Nash equilibrium; an equilibrium always exists.
No sequence of improving moves is infinite (the finite improvement property): best-response dynamics with strict improvements always stop (a player already best-responding stays put).
Stopping is guaranteed, speed is not: for some congestion games no fast method for finding an equilibrium is known (Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, Talwar, 2004).
Every (exact) potential game is equivalent to a congestion game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
If players best-respond in turn, they reach an equilibrium.
The equilibrium minimizing Φ is one way to select a good equilibrium among many, but it is no guarantee.
Network Formation
Network Externalities: Negative and Positive
- Externality: a user's decision changes others' costs or benefits, but the user ignores this in their own calculation.
Negative: congestion
- Each extra driver imposes a total delay of x·ℓ′(x) on the x others on the same road.
- In the two-route example, with 2,000 cars on Route 1: 2,000 × 1/100 = 20 car·min.
- Result: the busy road is overused; the remedy is a congestion toll.
Positive: network effects
- The value of joining grows with the number of members: phones, messaging, social networks.
- n users have n(n − 1)/2 possible connections; the claim that value grows like n² (Metcalfe) is a heuristic.
- A new user ignores the benefit they bring others: adoption stays slow until a critical mass is reached.
Network Formation
Network Formation Games
- So far the network was given; now the players build it themselves: Internet peering, social networks, P2P networks.
- Every link has a building cost; being well connected (short distances) is valuable. The tension: link cost ↔ reach.
Player i buys links to any nodes (α each). Cost: α·(links bought) + Σj dist(i, j). Equilibrium: Nash.
A link needs both sides' consent to form; either side can cut it. Solution concept: pairwise stability.
Network Formation
Bilateral Links: Pairwise Stability (n = 4)
- Benefit: 4 from each player at distance 1, 2.2 at distance 2, 1 at distance 3.
- Each link costs 2 to each of its two endpoints.
- Pairwise stable: (i) no player gains by cutting one of their links; (ii) no missing link would benefit both endpoints together.
| Network | Payoffs | Total | Pairwise stable? |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | 5.2/6.2/6.2/5.2 | 22.8 | No: A–D is added (+3 benefit, −2 cost each) |
| cycle | 6.2 (all) | 24.8 | Yes |
| star | 6/6.4/6.4/6.4 | 25.2 | Yes; highest total |
| complete graph | 6 (all) | 24 | No: cutting a link gains 2, loses 1.8 |
In the star, two leaves linking would each gain 1.8 but pay 2, so they don't.
Network Formation
Step by Step: A Network Formation Game (n = 4, α = 1.5)
Each player chooses which links to buy themselves; everyone may use a link, whoever bought it.
Path network: 1 buys one link (1.5) and its distances are 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 → 7.5. The end players are far from everyone.
If player 1 buys a second link to 4, its distances drop from 6 to 4: 3 + 4 = 7 < 7.5 → a profitable deviation.
The complete graph is socially cheapest (21). But a player who bought a link saves 1.5 by dropping it and loses only 1 in distance → not an equilibrium.
Star: a new link saves a leaf only 1 in distance (1 < 1.5); if the center drops a link the network splits → nobody deviates.
Brute-force search: at α = 1.5 the equilibria are the star (22.5) and the 4-cycle (22); the optimum (21) is not an equilibrium.
Network Formation
Code Trace: cost(i, links, alpha)
Path network 1–2–3–4; 1 has bought only link (1, 2). BFS starts at i = 1: dist = {1: 0}.
u = 1 leaves the queue; new neighbor 2 → distance 1.
u = 2 leaves the queue; new neighbor 3 → distance 2.
u = 3 leaves the queue; new neighbor 4 → distance 3.
u = 4 leaves the queue; all its neighbors are already visited.
Everyone is reachable. bought = 1 → cost 1.5·1 + 6 = 7.5. Now let's try buying one more link.
Deviation: 1 also buys link (1, 4) (orange). Same computation again. BFS starts at i = 1: dist = {1: 0}.
u = 1 leaves the queue; new neighbors 2, 4 → distance 1.
u = 2 leaves the queue; new neighbor 3 → distance 2.
u = 4 leaves the queue; all its neighbors are already visited.
u = 3 leaves the queue; all its neighbors are already visited.
Everyone is reachable. bought = 2 → cost 1.5·2 + 4 = 7. 7 < 7.5 → a profitable deviation: the path is not a Nash equilibrium.
def cost(i, links, alpha): dist = {i: 0}; queue = [i] while queue: u = queue.pop(0) for v in nbrs(links, u): if v not in dist: dist[v] = dist[u] + 1 queue.append(v) bought = sum(1 for (a, b) in links if a == i) return alpha * bought + sum(dist.values())
nbrs(links, u): neighbors regardless of who bought the link (everyone uses links); the network is assumed connected. A player pays only for the links they bought.
Network Formation
Equilibrium and Optimum as the Link Price Changes
| α | Optimum | Equilibria (script) |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5 | compl. (15) | compl. (15) |
| 1.5 | compl. (21) | cycle 22, star 22.5 |
| 2.5 | star (25.5) | star 25.5 · path 27.5 |
For n = 4 the star costs 3α + 18 and the complete graph 6α + 12: for α < 2 the complete graph is cheaper, for α > 2 the star. For general n the optimum is likewise the complete graph for α ≤ 2 and the star for α ≥ 2 (Fabrikant et al., 2003).
Control and Incentives
Routing in Networks: Centralized or Distributed?
| Centralized routing | Distributed (selfish) routing | |
|---|---|---|
| Who decides? | A traffic control center, an SDN (software-defined networking) controller, ISP traffic engineering | Each driver / each router (navigation apps, BGP: the inter-domain routing protocol) |
| Goal | Minimum total delay C(f) (Wardrop's 2nd principle) | Minimum own delay (Wardrop's 1st principle) |
| Two-route example | 1,500 / 1,500 → 71,250 car·min | 2,000 / 1,000 → 75,000 car·min |
| Requires | Full demand and delay information; users must comply | Only local information; no compliance problem |
| Weakness | At the optimum some are on the slower road → urge to deviate; a single point of failure | Inefficient equilibria such as Braess's |
Control and Incentives
Incentives, Load Balancing and Real Life
Right incentives
- Steer users toward balanced use of network resources → efficiency improves.
- Traffic: tolls or warnings reduce congestion.
- Smart grid: time-of-use pricing balances load at peak hours.
Wrong incentives
- Strategic, selfish behavior grows → congestion and low efficiency.
- An app sending everyone the same “fastest” route can flood side streets.
- A badly chosen toll shifts traffic to another bottleneck.
ISPs route data packets; BGP picks routes between networks.
Route optimization, smart signals, navigation apps.
Energy distribution and load shifting in smart grids.
Control and Incentives
Efficiency vs. Fairness: Sharing Bandwidth
Two links have capacity 1. Flow A uses both, B only link 1, C only link 2: xA + xB ≤ 1, xA + xC ≤ 1. Which allocation should we pick?
| Criterion | What is optimized? | (xA, xB, xC) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum total flow | Σ xi | (0, 1, 1) | 2 (A starves) |
| Max-min fairness (egalitarian) | Raise the smallest share as far as possible, then the next | (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) | 1.5 |
| Proportional fairness (Nash social welfare) | Maximize the product of shares (Kelly, 1997) | (1/3, 2/3, 2/3) | ≈ 1.67 |
Control and Incentives
Discussion Questions
- When navigation apps suggest the “fastest” route to everyone, do we approach the Wardrop equilibrium or the system optimum? Why?
- A city plans a new bridge. To foresee a Braess effect, how do we compute the equilibrium drivers will reach once it opens?
- Are Internet routers (BGP) selfish agents? Whose cost do they minimize?
Review
Summary
| Concept | Core idea | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Selfish routing | Everyone minimizes their own delay | 3,000 cars, two routes |
| Wardrop equilibrium | Used routes are equal and fastest | 2,000 / 1,000, 25 min |
| System optimum | Marginal costs are equal | 1,500 / 1,500, 71,250 car·min |
| Braess's paradox | New road → everyone slower | 65 → 80 min |
| Rosenthal's potential | ΔΦ = the mover's cost change | Φ: 26 → 23 → 21 → 20 |
| Network formation | Link cost ↔ reach | α = 1.5: star / cycle equilibria, complete graph optimal |
Review
Sample Problems
- 6,000 cars; Route 1: ℓ₁ = 10 + x₁/200, Route 2: ℓ₂ = 25 + x₂/100. Wardrop equilibrium?
- System optimum of the same network?
- Braess network (x/100 and 45 min), 6,000 cars: equilibrium time before and after the new road?
- Φ at the atomic example's equilibrium (bottom, zig, zig, top)? Change if driver 4 switches to zig?
- n = 4, α = 0.5: is the complete graph an equilibrium? The star?
- Problem 1: which x does
find_eqtry in two rounds, and the interval?
Show answers
- 10 + x₁/200 = 25 + (6000 − x₁)/100 → 3x₁ = 15,000 → x₁ = 5,000, x₂ = 1,000; both 35 min.
- Marginal: 10 + x₁/100 = 25 + x₂/50 → x₁ = 4,500, x₂ = 1,500 (ℓ₁ = 32.5, ℓ₂ = 40).
- Before: 3,000 / 3,000: 30 + 45 = 75 min. After: 3,000 zigzag, 1,500 per old path; s→A load 4,500 → every path 90 min.
- (1 + 2 + 3) + (1 + 2 + 3) + 4 + 4 + 0 = 20. Driver 4's cost goes 7 → 7, so ΔΦ = 0.
- Complete: dropping a link saves 0.5, costs 1 → equilibrium. Star: a leaf buying a link pays 0.5, gains 1 → not.
- x = 3,000: ℓ₁ = 25 < ℓ₂ = 55 → lo = 3,000; x = 4,500: 32.5 < 40 → lo = 4,500. Interval [4,500, 6,000] (equilibrium 5,000).
Review
References
- T. Roughgarden, Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, MIT Press, 2005.
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Chapters 18–19).
- J. G. Wardrop, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research”, Proc. Institution of Civil Engineers, 1952.
- D. Braess, “Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung”, Unternehmensforschung, 1968.
- R. W. Rosenthal, “A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria”, Int. J. Game Theory, 1973.
- D. Monderer, L. Shapley, “Potential Games”, Games and Economic Behavior, 1996.
- A. Fabrikant et al., “On a Network Creation Game”, PODC, 2003. · M. Jackson, A. Wolinsky, “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks”, J. Economic Theory, 1996.
Review
References: Papers, Books and Courses
- A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, “The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria”, STOC, 2004. · M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, C. B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, 1956.
- A. Rapoport, T. Kugler, S. Dugar, E. J. Gisches, “Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox”, Games and Economic Behavior 65(2), 2009. · W. Knödel, Graphentheoretische Methoden und ihre Anwendungen, Springer, 1969. · G. Kolata, “What if They Closed 42d Street and Nobody Noticed?”, The New York Times, December 25, 1990.
- I. Milchtaich, “Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium”, Games and Economic Behavior 57, 2006. · T. Roughgarden, “On the Severity of Braess's Paradox”, J. Computer and System Sciences 72, 2006.
- F. Kelly, “Charging and Rate Control for Elastic Traffic”, European Trans. Telecommunications 8, 1997. · F. Kelly, A. Maulloo, D. Tan, J. Operational Research Society 49, 1998.
- D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (Chapter 8: traffic networks and Braess; Chapter 17: network effects).
- A. R. Karlin, Y. Peres, Game Theory, Alive, American Mathematical Society, 2017 (Price of Anarchy and traffic routing).
- Course pages: T. Roughgarden, CS364A (Stanford) · M. Hoefer, AGT (Frankfurt) · M. Dinitz, AGT (Johns Hopkins)