Chapter 7: Social Choice and Voting
Social Choice
Warm-up: The Condorcet Paradox
Each voter ranks the candidates. Every pair is decided by pairwise majority, and a candidate who beats every rival is the Condorcet winner.
- If every voter's ranking is consistent, must the group's preference be consistent too?
- If you set the order of the votes, could you make any candidate you like win?
Social Choice
Learning Outcomes
Social Choice
What Is Social Choice?
- Social choice studies rules that turn individual preferences into a collective decision or a social ranking.
- The goal is not one universal definition of fairness, but to understand which criteria a rule satisfies and what trade-offs it makes.
- Applications: elections, committee and club decisions, choosing a class event, sharing common resources, online polls.
Social Choice
A Sample Preference Profile
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
A preference profile; every rule in this chapter is run on it.
Voting Rules
Basic Voting Rules
| Rule | What does a voter report? | Winner |
|---|---|---|
| Majority | One candidate | Whoever gets more than half of the votes (otherwise no winner) |
| Plurality | One candidate | Most first-place votes; no majority needed |
| Borda count | Full ranking | With m candidates, positions score m−1, m−2, …, 0; highest total wins |
| Approval | Set of approved candidates | Most approvals |
| Instant-runoff (IRV) | Full ranking | Last place is eliminated and its votes transfer; repeat until a majority |
| Condorcet | Full ranking | The candidate who beats every rival head to head (may not exist) |
Note: "most votes wins" is plurality; majority requires more than 50% of the votes.
Voting Rules
Majority and Plurality Step by Step
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | votes |
|---|---|
| A | ? |
| B | ? |
| C | ? |
| D | ? |
Under majority and plurality each voter reports only a first choice; the rest of the ranking is ignored.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | first choice |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
Count first places: A = 4 + 2 = 6, C = 4, D = 3, B = 0.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | first choice |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
Majority: 6 < 7 ⇒ no winner. Plurality: A has the most votes and wins (with just 6/13).
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | runoff |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | — |
| C | 7 |
| D | — |
Two-round system (e.g. a presidential election): the top two, A and C, go to a runoff. A = 6, C = 7 ⇒ C wins.
Voting Rules
Borda Count Step by Step
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | total |
|---|---|
| A | 0 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 0 |
| D | 0 |
Borda with 4 candidates: 1st place gets 3, 2nd 2, 3rd 1, 4th 0 points. A group adds voters × points.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | G1 | total |
|---|---|---|
| A | 12 | 12 |
| B | 4 | 4 |
| C | 0 | 0 |
| D | 8 | 8 |
G1–G4: group contributions
Group 1 (4 voters, A ≻ D ≻ B ≻ C): A: 4×3 = 12, D: 4×2 = 8, B: 4×1 = 4, C: 4×0 = 0.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | G1 | G2 | total |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| B | 4 | 8 | 12 |
| C | 0 | 12 | 12 |
| D | 8 | 4 | 12 |
G1–G4: group contributions
Group 2 (4 voters, C ≻ B ≻ D ≻ A): C: 4×3 = 12, B: 4×2 = 8, D: 4×1 = 4, A: 4×0 = 0.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | G1 | G2 | G3 | total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 12 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| B | 4 | 8 | 6 | 18 |
| C | 0 | 12 | 3 | 15 |
| D | 8 | 4 | 9 | 21 |
G1–G4: group contributions
Group 3 (3 voters, D ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A): D: 3×3 = 9, B: 3×2 = 6, C: 3×1 = 3, A: 3×0 = 0.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | G1 | G2 | G3 | G4 | total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 12 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 18 |
| B | 4 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 22 |
| C | 0 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 17 |
| D | 8 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 21 |
G1–G4: group contributions
Group 4 (2 voters, A ≻ B ≻ C ≻ D): A: 2×3 = 6, B: 2×2 = 4, C: 2×1 = 2, D: 2×0 = 0.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | G1 | G2 | G3 | G4 | total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 12 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 18 |
| B | 4 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 22 |
| C | 0 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 17 |
| D | 8 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 21 |
Totals: B = 22, D = 21, A = 18, C = 17 ⇒ Borda winner B, yet nobody ranked B first!
Voting Rules
Approval Voting
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | approval |
|---|---|
| A | ? |
| B | ? |
| C | ? |
| D | ? |
In approval voting each voter marks every candidate they accept. Assume each voter approves their top two.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | approval |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 9 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 7 |
Approvals: A = 4 + 2 = 6, B = 4 + 3 + 2 = 9, C = 4, D = 4 + 3 = 7 ⇒ approval winner B (if everyone approves their top two, approval becomes 2-approval).
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | approval (1st only) |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
The result depends on the threshold: if everyone approved only their first choice, approval = plurality and A would win.
Voting Rules
Positional Scoring Rules
A positional scoring rule fixes a vector s = (s1 ≥ s2 ≥ … ≥ sm) for m candidates; a candidate in position k gets sk points. Plurality, k-approval, Borda and veto all belong to this family.
s = (1, 0, 0, 0) (plurality): A = 6, C = 4, D = 3, B = 0 ⇒ winner A. Orange cells are the scoring positions.
s = (1, 1, 0, 0) (2-approval): B = 9, D = 7, A = 6, C = 4 ⇒ winner B.
s = (3, 2, 1, 0) (Borda): B = 22, D = 21, A = 18, C = 17 ⇒ winner B.
s = (1, 1, 1, 0) (veto): B = 13, D = 11, C = 9, A = 6 ⇒ winner B.
s = (10, 5, 3, 0) (another vector): D = 62, A = 60, B = 57, C = 55 ⇒ winner D. This vector picks the Condorcet winner D.
Voting Rules
Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) Step by Step
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | round 1 |
|---|---|
| A | ? |
| B | ? |
| C | ? |
| D | ? |
Instant-runoff (ranked-choice) voting: each round counts every voter's top candidate still in the race; with no majority, the weakest is eliminated.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | round 1 |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
Round 1: A = 6, B = 0, C = 4, D = 3. No majority (7 needed).
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | round 1 |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
B has the fewest votes (0) and is eliminated. Nobody ranked B first, so no votes transfer.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | round 2 |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | — |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
Round 2: A = 6, C = 4, D = 3. No majority (7 needed).
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | round 2 |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | — |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
D has the fewest (3) and is eliminated. Its votes go to the next remaining choice: 3 votes D → C.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | round 3 |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | — |
| C | 7 |
| D | — |
Round 3: A = 6, C = 7. 7 ≥ 7 ⇒ C wins with a majority.
Voting Rules
Condorcet: Pairwise Comparisons Step by Step
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 0 | |||
| B | — | 0 | |||
| C | — | 0 | |||
| D | — | 0 |
Condorcet: for each pair, "how many voters prefer x to y?" Cell (x, y) = number of voters preferring x to y. 4 candidates ⇒ 6 comparisons.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 0 | ||
| B | 7 | — | 1 | ||
| C | — | 0 | |||
| D | — | 0 |
A – B: 6 prefer A, 7 prefer B ⇒ B wins.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 6 | 0 | |
| B | 7 | — | 1 | ||
| C | 7 | — | 1 | ||
| D | — | 0 |
A – C: 6 prefer A, 7 prefer C ⇒ C wins.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| B | 7 | — | 1 | ||
| C | 7 | — | 1 | ||
| D | 7 | — | 1 |
A – D: 6 prefer A, 7 prefer D ⇒ D wins.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| B | 7 | — | 9 | 2 | |
| C | 7 | 4 | — | 1 | |
| D | 7 | — | 1 |
B – C: 9 prefer B, 4 prefer C ⇒ B wins.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| B | 7 | — | 9 | 6 | 2 |
| C | 7 | 4 | — | 1 | |
| D | 7 | 7 | — | 2 |
B – D: 6 prefer B, 7 prefer D ⇒ D wins.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| B | 7 | — | 9 | 6 | 2 |
| C | 7 | 4 | — | 6 | 1 |
| D | 7 | 7 | 7 | — | 3 |
C – D: 6 prefer C, 7 prefer D ⇒ D wins.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| x ╲ y | A | B | C | D | wins |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | — | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| B | 7 | — | 9 | 6 | 2 |
| C | 7 | 4 | — | 6 | 1 |
| D | 7 | 7 | 7 | — | 3 |
D beats all three rivals 7–6: D is the Condorcet winner. A loses to everyone (the Condorcet loser), yet A won plurality!
Voting Rules
The Pairwise Majority Graph and Copeland
- Each candidate is a node; an arrow x → y means a majority prefers x to y (label: vote counts).
- The graph is a tournament: exactly one arrow between every pair (an odd number of voters rules out ties).
- Condorcet winner = the node with no incoming arrows (D). Condorcet loser = the node with only incoming arrows (A).
- Copeland rule: most outgoing arrows (wins) wins ⇒ D (3) ≻ B (2) ≻ C (1) ≻ A (0).
Voting Rules
One Profile, Four Different Winners
| Rule | Count | Winner |
|---|---|---|
| Majority | A 6 < 7 | none |
| Plurality | A 6, C 4, D 3, B 0 | A |
| Two-round system | C 7 – A 6 | C |
| Instant-runoff | C 7 – A 6 (round 3) | C |
| Borda | B 22, D 21, A 18, C 17 | B |
| 2-approval (top two) | B 9, D 7, A 6, C 4 | B |
| Condorcet | D 3 wins | D |
| Kemeny | D ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A (score 44) | D |
Voting Rules
Code Trace: borda(ballots)
ballots = 4 groups (rows). The score dict starts empty and accumulates points per candidate.
Group 1: 4 voters, ranking ADBC. m = 4 candidates: position k earns m − 1 − k.
k = 0: A is 1st ⇒ p = 4 × (3 − 0) = 12; A total 12.
k = 1: D is 2nd ⇒ p = 4 × (3 − 1) = 8; D total 8.
k = 2: B is 3rd ⇒ p = 4 × (3 − 2) = 4; B total 4.
k = 3: C is 4th ⇒ p = 4 × (3 − 3) = 0; C total 0.
Group 2 (4 × CBDA): the inner loop runs 4 times; C +12, B +8, D +4, A +0.
Group 3 (3 × DBCA): the inner loop runs 4 times; D +9, B +6, C +3, A +0.
Group 4 (2 × ABCD): the inner loop runs 4 times; A +6, B +4, C +2, D +0.
max: the top scorer is B (22), whom no voter ranked first. On ties max returns the first it sees; real rules need a tie-breaking rule.
Complexity: n voter groups, m candidates ⇒ O(n·m). Counting is easy; the hard part is the rule's properties.
def borda(ballots): score = {} for count, order in ballots: m = len(order) for k, cand in enumerate(order): p = count * (m - 1 - k) score[cand] = score.get(cand, 0) + p winner = max(score, key=score.get) return winner, score
Voting Rules
Code Trace: irv(ballots, cands)
All candidates are in the race. Each round: count, check for a majority, otherwise drop the weakest.
Round 1 begins: a zero counter for each remaining candidate.
ADBC: top remaining candidate A ⇒ tally[A] += 4.
CBDA: top remaining candidate C ⇒ tally[C] += 4.
DBCA: top remaining candidate D ⇒ tally[D] += 3.
ABCD: top remaining candidate A ⇒ tally[A] += 2.
leader = A: 2 × 6 = 12 ≤ 13 ⇒ no majority.
B has the fewest votes (0) and is dropped; remaining = {A, C, D}. On ties min and max return the first they see; real rules need a tie-break.
Round 2 begins: a zero counter for each remaining candidate.
Round 2 count: nobody ranked the eliminated B first, so the counts are unchanged.
leader = A: 2 × 6 = 12 ≤ 13 ⇒ no majority.
D has the fewest (3) and is dropped; remaining = {A, C}.
Round 3 begins: a zero counter for each remaining candidate.
DBCA: top remaining candidate C ⇒ tally[C] += 3. (D is out, so these votes move to C.)
leader = C: 2 × 7 = 14 > 13 ⇒ return C.
def irv(ballots, cands): remaining = list(cands) while True: tally = {a: 0 for a in remaining} for count, order in ballots: top = next(a for a in order if a in remaining) tally[top] += count leader = max(tally, key=tally.get) if 2 * tally[leader] > sum(tally.values()): return leader loser = min(tally, key=tally.get) remaining.remove(loser)
Condorcet Paradox
A Condorcet Cycle Step by Step
| rank | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
9 voters, 3 candidates. Each voter's ranking on its own is consistent (transitive).
| rank | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
A – B: 4 + 2 = 6 prefer A, 3 prefer B ⇒ majority A ≻ B.
| rank | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
B – C: 4 + 3 = 7 to 2 ⇒ majority B ≻ C. Transitivity would suggest A ≻ C.
| rank | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
C – A: 3 + 2 = 5 to 4 ⇒ majority C ≻ A!
| rank | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
A ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A: the social preference is cyclic; every candidate is beaten by some majority, so there is no Condorcet winner.
Condorcet Paradox
The Agenda Decides the Winner
Sequential pairwise voting on the same cyclic profile: two candidates face off first, and the winner meets the next one.
- A – B: 6 – 3 ⇒ A
- A – C: 4 – 5 ⇒ C
- B – C: 7 – 2 ⇒ B
- B – A: 3 – 6 ⇒ A
- A – C: 4 – 5 ⇒ C
- C – B: 2 – 7 ⇒ B
A faces B first (A wins); A then meets C and loses: C.
- A – B: 6 – 3 ⇒ A
- A – C: 4 – 5 ⇒ C
- B – C: 7 – 2 ⇒ B
- B – A: 3 – 6 ⇒ A
- A – C: 4 – 5 ⇒ C
- C – B: 2 – 7 ⇒ B
First B – C (B wins), then B – A: A wins 6–3: A.
- A – B: 6 – 3 ⇒ A
- A – C: 4 – 5 ⇒ C
- B – C: 7 – 2 ⇒ B
- B – A: 3 – 6 ⇒ A
- A – C: 4 – 5 ⇒ C
- C – B: 2 – 7 ⇒ B
First A – C (C wins), then C – B: B wins 7–2: B.
Condorcet Paradox
Back to the Warm-up: The Condorcet Paradox
The warm-up profile (A≻B≻C, B≻C≻A, C≻A≻B): A–B 2–1, B–C 2–1, C–A 2–1. The social preference is cyclic; there is no Condorcet winner, and the agenda setter picks the outcome.
| Agenda | First vote | Winner |
|---|---|---|
| (A–B), then C | A | C |
| (B–C), then A | B | A |
| (A–C), then B | C | B |
With three voters, three candidates and all rankings equally likely, 12 of the 63 = 216 profiles are cycles: 5.6%. As the number of voters grows, this rises to about 8.8% (Guilbaud, 1952).
In practice: Election and survey data show cycles even less often than this "random preferences" estimate; real preferences are not random but similar to one another (Regenwetter et al., 2006).
Condorcet Paradox
The Kemeny Rule: The Most Consistent Ranking
- Kemeny (1959): choose the social ranking that agrees most with the voters' pairwise preferences.
- The score of a ranking: for every pair where x comes before y, add the number of voters who prefer x to y.
- If a Condorcet winner exists, it goes first: on the main profile D ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A (44).
- It also decides cycles: it breaks the weakest majority ⇒ A ≻ B ≻ C (17).
- Finding the best ranking is NP-hard (Bartholdi, Tovey, Trick, 1989).
Condorcet Paradox
Code Trace: kemeny(ballots, cands)
ballots = [(4, "ABC"), (3, "BCA"), (2, "CAB")] (the cyclic profile). No best ranking yet; score −1.
order = A ≻ B ≻ C: agreeing voters over the 3 pairs 6 + 4 + 7 = 17.
17 > previous best ⇒ best = A ≻ B ≻ C.
order = A ≻ C ≻ B: agreeing voters over the 3 pairs 4 + 6 + 2 = 12.
12 ≤ 17: best unchanged.
order = B ≻ A ≻ C: agreeing voters over the 3 pairs 3 + 7 + 4 = 14.
14 ≤ 17: best unchanged.
order = B ≻ C ≻ A: agreeing voters over the 3 pairs 7 + 3 + 5 = 15.
15 ≤ 17: best unchanged.
order = C ≻ A ≻ B: agreeing voters over the 3 pairs 5 + 2 + 6 = 13.
13 ≤ 17: best unchanged.
order = C ≻ B ≻ A: agreeing voters over the 3 pairs 2 + 5 + 3 = 10.
10 ≤ 17: best unchanged.
Result A ≻ B ≻ C (17): only the weakest majority, C ≻ A (5–4), is overridden. With m candidates, all m! rankings are tried.
from itertools import permutations def kemeny(ballots, cands): best, best_score = None, -1 for order in permutations(cands): score = 0 for i, x in enumerate(order): for y in order[i + 1:]: score += sum(n for n, b in ballots if b.index(x) < b.index(y)) if score > best_score: best, best_score = order, score return best, best_score
Condorcet Paradox
Which Criteria Does Each Rule Satisfy?
| Rule | Elects the Condorcet winner | Never elects the Condorcet loser | Monotone | Strategy proof |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plurality | no | no (A) | yes | no |
| Borda | no (B) | yes | yes | no |
| Instant-runoff | no (C) | yes | no | no |
| Approval | no | no | yes | no |
| Condorcet (Copeland) | yes | yes | yes | no |
| Kemeny | yes | yes | yes | no |
- Monotonicity: raising the winner on a ballot should never make it lose. IRV can violate this: moving a candidate up changes the elimination order.
- In a cycle there is no Condorcet winner, so the bare rule cannot decide and needs an extension. The maximin (Simpson) rule takes each candidate's worst pairwise vote count; the highest wins: on the sample profile A 6, B 6, C 4, D 7 → D. It elects the Condorcet winner when one exists and still decides cycles.
- Strategyproof: no voter can get a better outcome by misreporting their ranking. The "no"s in the last column come from a general theorem (Gibbard–Satterthwaite).
Condorcet Paradox
IRV Violates Monotonicity
| rank | 6 voters | 6 voters | 5 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
| candidate | round 1 |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 6 |
| C | 5 |
17 voters, 9 votes for a majority. Round 1: A = 6, B = 6, C = 5 ⇒ no majority; C has the fewest and is eliminated.
| rank | 6 voters | 6 voters | 5 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
| candidate | round 2 |
|---|---|
| A | 11 |
| B | 6 |
| C | — |
C's 5 votes go to A: A = 11, B = 6 ⇒ A wins.
| rank | 6+2 voters | 4 voters | 5 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
| candidate | — |
|---|---|
| A | ? |
| B | ? |
| C | ? |
Before the election A campaigns: 2 of the 6 B ≻ C ≻ A voters move A to the top (A ≻ B ≻ C). A's support only grew.
| rank | 6+2 voters | 4 voters | 5 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
| candidate | round 1 |
|---|---|
| A | 8 |
| B | 4 |
| C | 5 |
New round 1: A = 8, B = 4, C = 5 ⇒ now B has the fewest and is eliminated (not C).
| rank | 6+2 voters | 4 voters | 5 voters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | C |
| 2. | B | C | A |
| 3. | C | A | B |
| candidate | round 2 |
|---|---|
| A | 8 |
| B | — |
| C | 9 |
B's 4 votes go to C: C = 9, A = 8 ⇒ C wins. A lost because it gained support: IRV is not monotone.
Strategic Voting
Tactical Voting under Plurality (Vote Splitting)
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | plurality |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
With sincere votes, A wins plurality. For group 3 (D ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A), A is the worst candidate!
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | plurality |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 4 |
| D | 3 |
Group 3's favorite D (3 votes) cannot win. The candidate who can stop A is C, and this group prefers C to A.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | C | A |
| 2. | D | B | D | B |
| 3. | B | D | B | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | plurality |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 0 |
| C | 7 |
| D | 0 |
Group 3 votes for C (ballot C ≻ D ≻ B ≻ A): C = 7, A = 6 ⇒ C wins, which this group likes better than A.
"Don't waste your vote": voters back a lesser evil who can win instead of their favorite (Duverger's law: plurality pushes toward two parties).
Strategic Voting
Strategic Voting under Borda Step by Step
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | sincere |
|---|---|
| A | 18 |
| B | 22 |
| C | 17 |
| D | 21 |
Sincere Borda count: B = 22, D = 21. Group 3 (D ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A) sees its favorite D losing by 1 point.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | C | B |
| 3. | B | D | B | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | sincere |
|---|---|
| A | 18 |
| B | 22 |
| C | 17 |
| D | 21 |
Manipulation by burying: the 3 voters push the main rival B from 2nd to 3rd place; ballot D ≻ C ≻ B ≻ A.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | C | B |
| 3. | B | D | B | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | sincere | change |
|---|---|---|
| A | 18 | 0 |
| B | 22 | −3 |
| C | 17 | +3 |
| D | 21 | 0 |
For each manipulator, B gets 1 point instead of 2 and C gets 2 instead of 1: B −3, C +3.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | C | B |
| 3. | B | D | B | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | sincere | strategic |
|---|---|---|
| A | 18 | 18 |
| B | 22 | 19 |
| C | 17 | 20 |
| D | 21 | 21 |
New totals: D = 21, C = 20, B = 19, A = 18 ⇒ D wins. Group 3 got its favorite elected by lying.
Strategic Voting
How Much Damage Does Strategic Voting Do?
Impossibility Theorems
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: The Conditions
Reasonable-looking conditions for a rule that outputs a social ranking (a social welfare function):
Impossibility Theorems
Borda and Irrelevant Alternatives
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | 4 candidates |
|---|---|
| A | 18 |
| B | 22 |
| C | 17 |
| D | 21 |
Borda with 4 candidates: B = 22 > D = 21; society ranks B above D.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | C | D | A |
| 2. | D | B | B | B |
| 3. | B | D | C | C |
| 4. | C | A | A | D |
| candidate | 4 candidates |
|---|---|
| A | 18 |
| B | 22 |
| C | 17 |
| D | 21 |
Now let C drop out. C was neither winning nor second: an "irrelevant" candidate for the B–D order.
| rank | 4 voters | 4 voters | 3 voters | 2 voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | A | B | D | A |
| 2. | D | D | B | B |
| 3. | B | A | A | D |
| candidate | 4 candidates | no C |
|---|---|---|
| A | 18 | 12 |
| B | 22 | 13 |
| C | 17 | |
| D | 21 | 14 |
New Borda (2, 1, 0): D = 14 > B = 13. No voter changed their B–D order (6 prefer B, 7 prefer D), yet the social order flipped: Borda violates IIA. Arrow's IIA can fail even with a fixed candidate set: if the 4-voter A ≻ D ≻ B ≻ C group only swaps C and B (A ≻ D ≻ C ≻ B), B drops from 22 to 18 while D stays at 21 (C rises to 21): the B–D order flips again.
Impossibility Theorems
What Arrow's Theorem Means in Practice
Impossibility Theorems
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
- The design goal is not to eliminate strategic behavior but to limit it: less information, computational hardness, a restricted preference domain.
Impossibility Theorems
May's Theorem: Simple Majority for Two Candidates
With two candidates (x, y), which rule is "fair"? May (1952) showed that only simple majority satisfies three conditions.
| Condition | Meaning | Violated by |
|---|---|---|
| Anonymity | Voter names don't matter; permuting the ballots leaves the outcome unchanged | Dictatorship; weighted voting |
| Neutrality | Candidate names don't matter; both candidates are treated symmetrically | "The status quo stays without ⅔" (supermajority) |
| Positive responsiveness | If x is tied or winning and one voter switches to x, x wins outright | "Always flip a coin"; "odd vote count wins" |
Impossibility Theorems
A Way Out: Single-Peaked Preferences
- Preferences are single-peaked if candidates lie on an axis (left–right, budget size, location), each voter has a favorite position (peak), and utility falls as a candidate moves away from the peak.
- Median voter theorem (Black, 1948): with an odd number of voters, the median voter's peak is the Condorcet winner; no cycles arise.
- "Report your peak, pick the median" is strategyproof: G–S no longer applies once the domain is restricted.
Impossibility Theorems
Four Results Side by Side
| Theorem | Assumptions | Conclusion | Way out |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arrow (1951) | ≥ 3 candidates, unrestricted domain, Pareto, IIA | The rule is a dictatorship | Restrict the domain (single-peaked); drop IIA; cardinal information (scores, intensity) instead of rankings |
| Gibbard–Satterthwaite (1973, 1975) | ≥ 3 candidates, unrestricted domain, onto (any candidate can win), strategyproof | The rule is a dictatorship | Single-peaked preferences; randomized rules (e.g. random dictator); money (VCG) |
| May (1952) | 2 candidates; anonymity, neutrality, positive responsiveness | The rule is simple majority (and conversely) | None needed: not an impossibility but a characterization |
| Single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948) | Candidates on an axis, each voter has one peak, odd number of voters | The median voter's peak is the Condorcet winner; the median rule is strategyproof | It is itself a way out: it restricts the domain |
Computational Social Choice
Computational Social Choice
Where computer science, economics and social choice meet: rules are judged not only by the criteria they satisfy but also by their computational cost.
Computational Social Choice
Judgment Aggregation: The Doctrinal Paradox
A three-judge court: the defendant pays damages only if p (the contract was valid) and q (the contract was breached).
| Judge | p | q | Verdict: p ∧ q (p and q) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judge 1 | yes | yes | yes |
| Judge 2 | yes | no | no |
| Judge 3 | no | yes | no |
| Majority | yes (2–1) | yes (2–1) | no (1–2) |
- Each judge is consistent, but voting premise by premise the majority says “p true, q true, p ∧ q false”: an inconsistent collective judgment (Kornhauser and Sager, 1986).
- Decide by the premises and the defendant pays; decide by the conclusion and they don't: the outcome again depends on procedure.
- List and Pettit (2002): no aggregation rule is anonymous, systematic and always consistent; Arrow's theorem for judgments.
Summary
Voting Rules in the Real World
Summary
Multiple Seats: Proportional Representation and D'Hondt
- S seats instead of one winner; seat shares should track vote shares (proportional representation).
- D'Hondt: divide each party's votes by 1, 2, 3, …; the S largest quotients win. Türkiye uses D'Hondt per district, plus a national threshold.
- Example: 6 seats; A 42,000, B 31,000, C 15,000, D 12,000 votes → A 3, B 2, C 1, D 0.
- A gets 50% of seats with 42% of votes; D gets none with 12%: D'Hondt favors large parties. Largest remainder (Hare): integer part of share × 6, leftovers to the largest fractions: A 2, B 2, C 1, D 1.
| Divisor | A | B | C | D |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ÷1 | 42,000 | 31,000 | 15,000 | 12,000 |
| ÷2 | 21,000 | 15,500 | 7,500 | 6,000 |
| ÷3 | 14,000 | 10,333 | 5,000 | 4,000 |
| ÷4 | 10,500 | 7,750 | 3,750 | 3,000 |
| Seats | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
Highlighted cells: the six largest quotients.
Summary
Which Voting Rule Can Be Called Fair?
- Fairness depends on criteria such as representation, majority support, protection of minorities and strategyproofness.
- Plurality is simple and fast, but can split votes and elect a winner without majority support (A: 6/13).
- Borda uses more preference information and favors the compromise candidate (B), but is open to strategic ranking.
- Instant-runoff seeks majority support, but is neither monotone nor strategyproof.
- Condorcet methods respect pairwise majorities, but a Condorcet winner does not always exist and cycles need an extension rule.
Summary
Summary
Summary
Sample Problems
- 9 voters: 4 × A ≻ B ≻ C, 3 × C ≻ B ≻ A, 2 × B ≻ C ≻ A. Who wins under plurality, IRV, Borda and Condorcet?
- In problem 1, what do the A voters achieve under Borda by burying B (A ≻ C ≻ B)?
- On the cyclic profile (4 ABC, 3 BCA, 2 CAB), what agenda makes B win?
- What is the Kemeny ranking of the profile in problem 1? (Compare the scores of all 6 rankings.)
- "The status quo changes only with ⅔ of the vote": which of May's conditions does this rule violate?
- 11 voters: 2 × ACB, 3 × BAC, 2 × BCA, 4 × CBA. Who is the Condorcet winner? Which rule s = (1, a, 0) (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) elects them?
Show answers
- Plurality A (4). IRV: B (2) is eliminated, its votes go to C ⇒ C 5 – A 4, C. Borda: B 11, A 8, C 8 ⇒ B. Condorcet: B (beats A 5–4, C 6–3).
- Scores A 8, B 7, C 12 ⇒ C wins, which is worse than B for the A voters. Burying can backfire.
- First A – C (C wins), then C – B (B wins 7–2).
- B ≻ C ≻ A (score 16 = 6 + 5 + 5); the Condorcet winner B comes first.
- Neutrality: the two candidates are not treated symmetrically.
- C (beats A and B 6–5). None: for every a, B = 5 + 4a > C = 4 + 4a.
Summary
References
- F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, A. D. Procaccia (eds.), Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Chapter 9).
- K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, 1951.
- A. Gibbard, "Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result", Econometrica 41(4), 1973.
- M. A. Satterthwaite, "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions", J. Economic Theory 10, 1975.
- K. O. May, "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision", Econometrica 20(4), 1952.
- D. Black, "On the rationale of group decision-making", J. Political Economy 56(1), 1948.
- J. J. Bartholdi, C. A. Tovey, M. A. Trick, "The computational difficulty of manipulating an election" and "Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election", Social Choice and Welfare 6, 1989 · M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Fair Representation, Yale University Press, 1982 (proportional representation).
- J. G. Kemeny, "Mathematics without numbers", Daedalus 88(4), 1959; C. Dwork, R. Kumar, M. Naor, D. Sivakumar, "Rank aggregation methods for the web", WWW 2001.
- A. Karlin, Y. Peres, Game Theory, Alive, AMS, 2017 (chapter on social choice and voting); D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (Chapter 23: Voting).
- Course pages: A. Procaccia, 15-896 (CMU) · N. Shah, CSC304 (Toronto).