Chapter 9: The Price of Anarchy
Basic Concepts
Warm-up: The Load Balancing Game
Jobs arrive one by one and each joins server A, B or C; a job's completion time is the server's total load divided by its speed.
- If every job minimizes its own completion time, is the system's total cost minimized too?
- How much worse than the best assignment can an equilibrium of selfish jobs be?
Basic Concepts
Learning Outcomes
Define the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS); show the difference with an example.
Find equilibrium and optimal costs in the Pigou, Braess and load balancing examples and compute the ratio.
Explain the intuitive proof of PoA ≤ 4/3 for linear latencies and why it is tight.
Show how a congestion toll turns the optimum into an equilibrium in the two-route network and Pigou's network.
Basic Concepts
The Price of Anarchy: The Bill for Selfishness
- The Price of Anarchy (PoA) measures the efficiency lost between the worst equilibrium that selfish behavior produces and the social optimum.
- In cost problems, the social optimum minimizes total cost.
- In a traffic network, total delay can rise while each user tries to cut their own travel time.
- Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) introduced the idea as the “coordination ratio”; Papadimitriou (2001) named it the “Price of Anarchy”: the cost of everyone deciding alone (anarchy) instead of a central “dictator”.
Basic Concepts
Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum
Nash equilibrium (individual)
- No player can improve their outcome by changing strategy unilaterally.
- Reflects individual incentives.
- There may be several, good and bad.
Social optimum (system)
- Minimizes total cost or maximizes social welfare.
- Reflects the system's common goal.
- Usually not an equilibrium: someone wants to deviate.
Basic Concepts
Definitions: PoA and PoS
PoA = maxs ∈ NE C(s) / C(OPT)
worst equilibrium: a pessimistic guarantee
PoS = mins ∈ NE C(s) / C(OPT)
best equilibrium: the optimistic scenario
NE: the game's Nash equilibria; C(s): total cost of state s; OPT: the state of minimum total cost (social optimum). PoA = cost of the worst equilibrium ÷ cost of the optimum; PoS = cost of the best equilibrium ÷ cost of the optimum.
- With C(OPT) > 0, always 1 ≤ PoS ≤ PoA. With a unique equilibrium they are equal.
- In payoff (welfare) problems the ratio is flipped: SW(OPT) / SW(equilibrium) (SW: social welfare), so a larger value still means worse efficiency.
Basic Concepts
Measuring and Reading Efficiency
- Total cost: the sum of all users' delay or resource-use costs.
- In cost problems, the PoA is the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost to the social optimum cost.
- A PoA of 1 means no efficiency loss.
- The larger the ratio, the more strategic behavior costs.
| PoA | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | no loss | Braess, before the new road |
| 4/3 | 33% extra cost | Pigou, the linear bound |
| 2 − 2/(m+1) | < 2 times | load balancing |
| unbounded | no guarantee | steep latency (xp) |
Basic Concepts
Two Worst-Case Ratios: What Is Missing?
| Ratio | What blocks the optimum | Numerator / denominator |
|---|---|---|
| Approximation ratio | computational power: a problem not solvable in polynomial time (NP-hard) | solution found by a fast algorithm ÷ optimum |
| Price of Anarchy | coordination: no central authority, everyone pursues their own interest | worst equilibrium / optimum |
Makespan on m identical machines: Graham's greedy list algorithm is at most 2 − 1/m times worse; a pure equilibrium of selfish jobs at most 2 − 2/(m+1) times. For m = 2: 3/2 and 4/3.
Real players are not purely selfish: trust, social norms, reputation and repeated interaction can foster cooperation. So the PoA is a pessimistic guarantee, not a prediction.
Pigou's Network
Step by Step: The Price of Anarchy in Pigou's Network
Setup (Pigou, 1920): 1 unit of traffic, many small drivers. Top road: delay x (the share on top); bottom road: always 1.
Equilibrium: the top road is never slower than the bottom (x ≤ 1) → everyone switches to the top. x = 1, everyone takes 1 min: C(eq) = 1.
Total cost: share x on top takes x min, share 1 − x on the bottom takes 1 min → C(x) = x·x + (1 − x)·1 = x² − x + 1.
Minimum: C′(x) = 2x − 1 = 0 → x = 1/2. Half the traffic is “sacrificed” to the bottom road.
C(1/2) = 1/4 + 1/2 = 3/4. Top drivers take 1/2 min, bottom drivers 1 min; the bottom drivers want to switch → the optimum is not an equilibrium.
PoA = C(eq) / C(opt) = 1 / (3/4) = 4/3 ≈ 1.33: selfish routing produces 33% more total delay.
Pigou's Network
Why the Difference? Private vs. Marginal Cost
- A driver looks at their private cost: compares x with 1 → x = 1.
- Society looks at marginal cost: the top road's total cost is x·x with derivative 2x; 2x = 1 → x = 1/2.
- The gap is x·ℓ′(x): the delay one driver imposes on the others (an externality).
Linear Latency and Braess
Steeper Latency, Larger PoA
| p (ℓ = xp) | xOPT | C(OPT) | PoA |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.5 | 0.75 | 1.333 |
| 2 | 0.577 | 0.615 | 1.626 |
| 4 | 0.669 | 0.465 | 2.151 |
| 8 | 0.76 | 0.325 | 3.081 |
| 16 | 0.838 | 0.212 | 4.727 |
Linear Latency and Braess
Latency Exponent and PoA in Pigou's Network
As the latency function gets steeper, the optimum improves, the equilibrium cost stays at 1 and the PoA grows without bound; with linear latency (p = 1), PoA = 4/3.
Linear Latency and Braess
Code Trace: pigou_poa(p)
p = 1 (Pigou): C(x) = x² + 1 − x, C′(x) = 2x − 1 = 0 ⇒ xOPT = 2−1 = 0.5.
C(OPT) = 0.25 + 0.5 = 0.75 ⇒ PoA = 4/3: Pigou's classic result.
p = 2: C(x) = x·x2 + (1 − x)·1, C′(x) = 3x2 − 1 = 0 ⇒ xOPT = 3−1/2 ≈ 0.577.
The curve got steeper: the optimum fell to 0.615 while the equilibrium is still 1 ⇒ PoA 1.626.
p = 4: C(x) = x·x4 + (1 − x)·1, C′(x) = 5x4 − 1 = 0 ⇒ xOPT = 5−1/4 ≈ 0.669.
p = 4: at the optimum 67% of the traffic is on top; PoA 2.151 > 2.
p = 8: C(x) = x·x8 + (1 − x)·1, C′(x) = 9x8 − 1 = 0 ⇒ xOPT = 9−1/8 ≈ 0.76.
PoA 3.081: slow growth, but unbounded.
p = 16: C(x) = x·x16 + (1 − x)·1, C′(x) = 17x16 − 1 = 0 ⇒ xOPT = 17−1/16 ≈ 0.838.
p = 16: PoA 4.727. The 4/3 guarantee holds only for linear latency.
def pigou_poa(p): # top x**p, bottom 1 x = (p + 1) ** (-1 / p) # where C'(x) = 0 opt = x ** (p + 1) + (1 - x) return 1 / opt # eq. cost is 1 for p in [1, 2, 4, 8, 16]: print(p, round(pigou_poa(p), 3))
Linear Latency and Braess
The 4/3 Upper Bound for Linear Latency
Linear Latency and Braess
The 4/3 Bound: Edge Inequality and Summation
Linear Latency and Braess
Testing the 4/3 Bound
| Example | Equilibrium | Optimum | Observed ratio | Upper bound |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pigou (x and 1) | 1 | 3/4 | 4/3 (tight) | 4/3 |
| Braess (4,000 cars) | 320,000 | 258,750 | 80 / 64.69 ≈ 1.237 | 4/3 |
| Braess normalized (x, 1, 1, x, 0) | 2 | 3/2 | 4/3 (tight) | 4/3 |
| Two routes, 3,000 cars | 75,000 | 71,250 | 1.053 | 4/3 |
| 20,000 random parallel linear networks | — | — | max 1.33 | 4/3 |
| Load Balancing Game, Level 2 | 13 | 12.5 | 1.04 | 5/2 (atomic) |
Linear Latency and Braess
One Recipe: Smoothness
Linear Latency and Braess
From Smoothness to a PoA Bound: Four Steps
Linear Latency and Braess
Atomic Congestion Games: PoA ≤ 5/2
Cell: 3 × (right − left), avoiding fractions. No negative cells: it holds (checked for y, z ≤ 60); orange 0s mark equality.
- Each player is one unit of load; edge cost ce(x) = aex + be.
- ze, ye: players on e at equilibrium and at the optimum. A lone switcher to their optimal path meets at most ze + 1 players on e.
- Key inequality (integers): y(z + 1) ≤ 5/3·y² + 1/3·z². With c(x) = x: left is the trial cost; y², z² the optimal and equilibrium costs.
- ⇒ (5/3, 1/3)-smooth ⇒ PoA ≤ (5/3)/(2/3) = 5/2; the bound is tight (Awerbuch–Azar–Epstein; Christodoulou–Koutsoupias, 2005).
Linear Latency and Braess
Step by Step: PoA in the Braess Network
Once A→B opens everyone zigzags, 80 min each. Total 320,000 car·min.
A common comparison is 80/65 ≈ 1.23. But the PoA's denominator is the optimum of the same network; can the new network do better than 65?
On s→A with 2,000 cars the delay is 20 min; marginal cost ℓ + x·ℓ′ = 20 + 2,000·(1/100) = 40 min. The zigzag uses two such edges: 40 + 0 + 40 = 80; an old path 40 + 45 = 85. 80 < 85: even a planner sends some cars on the zigzag.
Optimum: 1,750 on each old path, 500 on the zigzag (marginal costs equal at 90). Average ≈ 64.69 min; the script searched all splits.
PoA = 320,000 / 258,750 ≈ 1.237 ≤ 4/3. In the classic normalized Braess network (x, 1, 1, x, 0) the ratio is exactly 2 / (3/2) = 4/3.
Load Balancing
The Load Balancing Game
- n jobs (players), m identical machines; job j has size wj.
- Each job picks a machine; its cost is that machine's total load (its completion time).
- Social cost: the makespan (maximum load), i.e. when all jobs are done.
- Applications: server clusters, cloud task placement, processor cores. Koutsoupias–Papadimitriou first defined the PoA in this model (1999).
Load Balancing
Step by Step: PoA in the Load Balancing Game
The load balancing game: each job (player) picks a machine and wants to minimize its completion time, i.e. its machine's total load.
Social optimum: total work 6 on two machines → best possible 3 and 3. Makespan 3.
Another assignment: both big jobs on M1 (load 4), both small jobs on M2 (load 2). Can this be an equilibrium?
Deviation check: a big job moving to M2 still waits 4; a small job moving to M1 waits 5. Nobody gains → a Nash equilibrium.
Here PoA = 4/3 and PoS = 1: the optimum is an equilibrium, but so is a bad assignment.
General result (Finn–Horowitz, 1979; Koutsoupias–Papadimitriou, 1999): for pure equilibria PoA = 2 − 2/(m+1) < 2. For mixed equilibria the PoA grows very slowly but without bound in m (Koutsoupias–Mavronicolas–Spirakis, 2003; Czumaj–Vöcking, 2002).
Load Balancing
Code Trace: is_nash(sizes, assign, m)
Call: job sizes and each job's machine (0 = M1, 1 = M2).
The load array is zeroed.
j = 0: i1 (size 2) is added to M1 → load = [2, 0].
j = 1: i2 (size 2) is added to M1 → load = [4, 0].
j = 2: i3 (size 1) is added to M2 → load = [4, 1].
j = 3: i4 (size 1) is added to M2 → load = [4, 2].
j = 0, h = 1: if i1 moves to M2, 2 + 2 = 4; now 4. 4 < 4? No.
j = 1, h = 1: if i2 moves to M2, 2 + 2 = 4; now 4. 4 < 4? No.
j = 2, h = 0: if i3 moves to M1, 4 + 1 = 5; now 2. 5 < 2? No.
j = 3, h = 0: if i4 moves to M1, 4 + 1 = 5; now 2. 5 < 2? No.
No job could escape to a better machine → True: {2, 2} | {1, 1} is a Nash equilibrium (makespan 4).
def is_nash(sizes, assign, m): load = [0] * m for j, k in enumerate(assign): load[k] += sizes[j] for j, k in enumerate(assign): for h in range(m): if load[h] + sizes[j] < load[k]: return False # j moves return True # nobody moves
For h = k (its own machine) the condition is always false; the steps show only h ≠ k.
Load Balancing
Brute Force: All 16 Assignments
| Split (M1 | M2, symmetric) | Assignments | Makespan | Nash? |
|---|---|---|---|
| {2, 1} | {2, 1} | 4 | 3 | ✓ eq. |
| {2, 1, 1} | {2} | 4 | 4 | ✗ |
| {2, 2} | {1, 1} | 2 | 4 | ✓ eq. |
| {2, 2, 1} | {1} | 4 | 5 | ✗ |
| {2, 2, 1, 1} | { } | 2 | 6 | ✗ |
Best-response dynamics in this game always stop at an equilibrium: every profitable move shrinks the sorted load list. Which equilibrium is reached depends on the start and the order of moves.
Load Balancing
Code Trace: PoA and PoS by Trying All Assignments
(0, 0, 0, 0): all on M1, loads [6, 0]; i1 moving to M2 gets 2 < 6 ⇒ not an equilibrium. opt is 6 for now.
(0, 0, 0, 1): loads [5, 1]; i1 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 5 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(0, 0, 1, 0): loads [5, 1]; i1 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 5 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(0, 0, 1, 1): loads [4, 2], nobody can escape ⇒ equilibrium; makespan 4 is added to the list.
(0, 1, 0, 0): loads [4, 2]; i3 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 4 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(0, 1, 0, 1): loads [3, 3], nobody can escape ⇒ equilibrium; makespan 3 is added to the list.
(0, 1, 1, 0): loads [3, 3], nobody can escape ⇒ equilibrium; makespan 3 is added to the list.
(0, 1, 1, 1): loads [2, 4]; i3 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 4 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(1, 0, 0, 0): loads [4, 2]; i3 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 4 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(1, 0, 0, 1): loads [3, 3], nobody can escape ⇒ equilibrium; makespan 3 is added to the list.
(1, 0, 1, 0): loads [3, 3], nobody can escape ⇒ equilibrium; makespan 3 is added to the list.
(1, 0, 1, 1): loads [2, 4]; i3 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 4 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(1, 1, 0, 0): loads [2, 4], nobody can escape ⇒ equilibrium; makespan 4 is added to the list.
(1, 1, 0, 1): loads [1, 5]; i1 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 5 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(1, 1, 1, 0): loads [1, 5]; i1 moving to the other machine gets 3 < 5 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
(1, 1, 1, 1): loads [0, 6]; i1 moving to the other machine gets 2 < 6 ⇒ not an equilibrium.
Equilibria [4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4] ⇒ PoA = 4/3, PoS = 3/3 = 1. There are mn assignments: exponential for large games.
from itertools import product def poa_pos(sizes, m): opt, eqs = float("inf"), [] for assign in product(range(m), repeat=len(sizes)): load = [0] * m for j, k in enumerate(assign): load[k] += sizes[j] opt = min(opt, max(load)) if is_nash(sizes, assign, m): # eq. test eqs.append(max(load)) return max(eqs) / opt, min(eqs) / opt r = poa_pos([2, 2, 1, 1], 2) print(round(r[0], 3), r[1])
Load Balancing
Machines with Different Speeds (Related Machines)
- Machine i has speed si; a job's completion time is its machine's total load divided by si. A pure Nash equilibrium still always exists.
- Example: speeds A = 2, B = 1, C = 1; job sizes 2, 1, 1. Social cost: the maximum completion time.
| Assignment | Times (A, B, C) | Max | Nash? |
|---|---|---|---|
| A {2}, B {1}, C {1} | 1, 1, 1 | 1 | yes (optimum) |
| A {1, 1}, B {2}, C { } | 1, 2, 0 | 2 | yes |
In the second assignment, the size-2 job would wait (2 + 2)/2 = 2 on A or 2/1 = 2 on C; a size-1 job moving to C still waits 1: nobody gains. Ratio 2/1 = 2, above the bound 2 − 2/4 = 1.5 for three identical machines.
Load Balancing
Back to the Warm-up: The Load Balancing Game
Here social cost is the sum of completion times, not the makespan. Level 2, CPU Scheduling: 7 units, speeds 2, 1, 1.
| Loads (A, B, C) | Total time | Nash? |
|---|---|---|
| (3, 2, 2) | 3·1.5 + 2·2 + 2·2 = 12.5 | yes (optimum) |
| (4, 2, 1) | 4·2 + 2·2 + 1·1 = 13 | yes (worst) |
PoA = 13 / 12.5 = 1.04. In (4, 2, 1), a job moving from A to C still waits 2: nobody gains. The mirror (4, 1, 2) costs 13 too.
If each arriving job picks its fastest server (ties alphabetical), the order is A, A, B, C, A, A, B: exactly the worst equilibrium (4, 2, 1). The game's selfish view uses this greedy placement.
Level 1 (6 jobs, identical servers): the only equilibrium (2, 2, 2) is optimal, PoA = 1. Loss appears once servers differ.
The Price of Stability
PoA ≠ PoS in the Same Game
4 players rent a link from s to t: A costs 2 TL, B costs 6 TL; users split the cost equally (fair cost sharing). Thickness: number of players on the link.
All on A: each pays 0.5; one moving alone to B would pay 6 ⇒ nobody moves. Equilibrium, total 2 = optimum.
All on B: each pays 1.5; one moving alone to A would pay 2 (2 > 1.5) ⇒ nobody moves. Also an equilibrium, total 6.
Split profile (1 A, 3 B): a player on B moving to A pays 1 < 2 ⇒ not an equilibrium. The script checked all 16 profiles: only "all A" and "all B" are equilibria.
PoA = 6/2 = 3 (worst equilibrium), PoS = 1 (best equilibrium). A coordination problem: if players can be steered to the good equilibrium there is no loss; the PoS measures this optimistic scenario.
The Price of Stability
Step by Step: The Price of Stability (The Hn Example)
Each player reaches t by one of two paths: a private path of cost 1/i used only by them, or a shared path of cost 1 + ε = 1.1 (ε: a small extra cost) whose cost users split equally. Optimum: everyone shares, total 1.1, 0.275 each.
Player 4: own path 1/4 = 0.25 < 0.275 → leaves. The remaining three now pay 1.1/3 ≈ 0.367.
Player 3: 1/3 ≈ 0.333 < 0.367 → leaves. The remaining two pay 0.55.
Player 2: 1/2 = 0.5 < 0.55 → leaves. Player 1 pays for the shared path alone: 1.1.
Player 1: own path 1 < 1.1 → leaves. Everyone on their own path: 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 = 25/12 ≈ 2.083.
Script: this is the only equilibrium of the 16 profiles → PoS = PoA = (25/12) / 1.1 = 125/66 ≈ 1.894. As ε → 0 with n players, PoS → Hn = 1 + 1/2 + … + 1/n.
The Price of Stability
Why PoS ≤ Hn? Potential and Cost
The Price of Stability
PoS ≤ Hn: Walking from the Optimum to an Equilibrium
Reducing the PoA
Step by Step: A Congestion Toll Shifts the Equilibrium
Two-route network: ℓ₁ = 5 + x₁/100, ℓ₂ = 20 + x₂/200, 3,000 cars in total. No toll (τ = 0): equilibrium ℓ₁ = ℓ₂ → x₁ = 2,000, total 75,000 car·min. Drivers count the toll as an extra cost in minutes.
τ = 2.5: the Route 1 curve shifts up and the crossing moves left: x₁ ≈ 1,833, total ≈ 72,917. A toll is a transfer; it is not added to total delay.
τ = 5: x₁ ≈ 1,667, total ≈ 71,667. Each increase pushes some drivers onto the wide Route 2.
τ = 7.5: x₁ = 1,500 → the system optimum (71,250) is now an equilibrium. Marginal-cost tolls are x₁ℓ′₁ = 15 min on Route 1 and x₂ℓ′₂ = 7.5 on Route 2; what matters is the difference: 7.5.
τ = 10: too high a toll overshoots: x₁ ≈ 1,333, total again ≈ 71,667. The right toll equals the externality; it is not “the more the better”.
Reducing the PoA
Step by Step: A Congestion Toll Fixes Pigou
Start: no toll, everyone on top (x = 1), total delay 1. Goal: make the optimum (x = 1/2) an equilibrium.
Marginal-cost toll τe = fe·ℓ′e(fe): on top ℓ′ = 1 → τ = x; on the bottom ℓ′ = 0 → no toll. A driver on top sees x + x = 2x.
New equilibrium: 2x = 1 → x = 1/2. Selfish drivers choose the optimal split on their own; delay 3/4.
Tolls collected: 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/4. Drivers pay 3/4 + 1/4 = 1 in total: unless the revenue is returned, drivers gain nothing and the gain goes to society.
A fixed toll gives the same result: τ = 1/2 on top → x + 1/2 = 1 → x = 1/2. General theorem: marginal-cost tolls make the optimum an equilibrium in every network.
Reducing the PoA
Other Ways to Reduce the PoA
Brings the external cost users impose on others into their decision (London, Stockholm, Singapore).
A center routes part of the traffic, the rest choose selfishly; as the controlled share grows, the ratio approaches 1.
Roughgarden–Tardos: the selfish equilibrium for r units of traffic costs no more than the optimal routing of 2r units. Adding capacity can substitute for tolls.
Recommendations can steer the equilibrium to a lower total cost, but compliance is voluntary.
Set the rules so that the good outcome is the unique equilibrium.
Weigh an intervention's information, enforcement and fairness costs against the efficiency it gains.
Reducing the PoA
Real Life and Discussion
Discussion questions
- Why don't individual interests always reach the social optimum? What externality is at work in Pigou's example?
- Which incentives could reduce the PoA (tolls, bonuses, central routing)? Which is fairer?
- Where might Braess's paradox show up in daily life? When does closing a road make sense?
Review
Summary
| Example | Equilibrium | Optimum | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two routes, 3,000 cars | 75,000 | 71,250 | PoA ≈ 1.053 |
| Pigou (x and 1) | 1 | 3/4 | PoA = 4/3 |
| Linear latency, any network | — | — | PoA ≤ 4/3 (tight) |
| Pigou, ℓ = xp | 1 | → 0 | PoA → ∞ |
| Atomic congestion, linear | — | — | PoA ≤ 5/2 (tight) |
| Braess, 4,000 cars | 320,000 | 258,750 | PoA ≈ 1.237 |
| Load balancing {2, 2, 1, 1} | 4 (worst) | 3 | PoA = 4/3, PoS = 1 |
| Fair sharing, Hn example | 25/12 | 1.1 | PoS ≈ 1.894 (≤ Hn) |
| Pigou + toll τ = x | 3/4 | 3/4 | 1 |
Review
Sample Problems
- In Pigou's network let the top road's delay be x². What are the equilibrium cost, the optimum and the PoA?
- Jobs {3, 3, 2, 2, 2}, 2 identical machines. What is the optimal makespan? Find a Nash equilibrium with makespan 7.
- What is the PoA in the normalized Braess network (s→A: x, A→t: 1, s→B: 1, B→t: x, A→B: 0; 1 unit of traffic)?
- Build the Hn example for n = 3 (small ε). What does the PoS approach?
- In a Pigou network with top road 2x and bottom road 1, what is the PoA, and what fixed toll makes the optimum an equilibrium?
Show answers
- Equilibrium 1 (everyone on top). C(x) = x³ + 1 − x → xOPT = 1/√3 ≈ 0.577, C(OPT) ≈ 0.615 → PoA ≈ 1.626.
- Optimum 6 ({3, 3} | {2, 2, 2}). Equilibrium: {3, 2, 2} | {3, 2} → 7 and 5; a size-2 job moving gets 5 + 2 = 7, no gain; a size-3 job gets 8 → equilibrium. Ratio 7/6.
- Equilibrium: everyone zigzags, 1 + 0 + 1 = 2. Optimum: half and half, 1/2 + 1 = 3/2. PoA = 4/3.
- H3 = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 = 11/6 ≈ 1.83; optimum 1 + ε → PoS → 11/6.
- Equilibrium x = 1/2 (2x = 1), C = 1. Optimum C = 2x² + 1 − x → x = 1/4, C = 7/8 → PoA = 8/7. Toll: 2·(1/4) + τ = 1 → τ = 1/2.
Review
Exercises: Traces and New Topics
- What does
pigou_poa(3)return? (xOPT = 4−1/3) - Jobs (4, 3, 3, 2) start on M1; each step, the first job that gains moves to the least loaded machine. Final makespan? Optimum?
- (1, ½)-smooth: what PoA bound? Compare with Pigou's (1, ¼).
- PoA ≠ PoS game, A costs 3 TL, B 8 TL, 4 players: equilibria, PoA, PoS?
- Verify y(z + 1) ≤ 5/3·y² + 1/3·z² for y = 2, z = 3.
- What does
poa_pos([3, 2, 2, 1], 2)return?
Show answers
- xOPT ≈ 0.63, C(OPT) ≈ 0.528 ⇒ PoA ≈ 1.896 (between p = 2 and 4).
- The size-4 job moves to M2 (loads 8, 4), then a size-3 job (5, 7); now nobody gains: makespan 7. Optimum 6 ({4, 2} | {3, 3}) ⇒ ratio 7/6.
- PoA ≤ 1/(1 − ½) = 2; Pigou's (1, ¼) gives 4/3. The smaller μ, the better the bound.
- All on A (0.75 each; moving to B costs 8) and all on B (2 each; moving to A costs 3). PoA = 8/3, PoS = 1.
- Left 8, right 20/3 + 3 = 29/3 ≈ 9.67 ⇒ holds (gap 5/3).
- (1.25, 1.0): optimum 4 ({3, 1} | {2, 2}), but {3, 2} | {2, 1} (loads 5 and 3) is also an equilibrium ⇒ PoA = 5/4, PoS = 1.
Review
References
- T. Roughgarden, Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Lectures 11–15).
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Chapters 17–20).
- E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, “Worst-case Equilibria”, STACS, 1999.
- T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, “How Bad Is Selfish Routing?”, Journal of the ACM, 2002.
- T. Roughgarden, “The Price of Anarchy Is Independent of the Network Topology”, J. Computer and System Sciences, 2003.
- E. Anshelevich et al., “The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation”, FOCS, 2004.
- T. Roughgarden, “Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy”, STOC, 2009.
- G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, “The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games”, STOC, 2005.
- B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, A. Epstein, “The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow”, STOC, 2005.
- A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, 1920.
- A. R. Karlin, Y. Peres, Game Theory, Alive, AMS, 2017 (Chapter 8: Price of Anarchy); D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge, 2010 (Chapter 8: traffic and Braess).
- Course page: T. Roughgarden, CS364A (Stanford, 2013), notes for Lectures 11–15.
Review
References (2/2)
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- R. L. Graham, “Bounds for Certain Multiprocessing Anomalies”, Bell System Technical Journal 45(9), 1966.
- G. Finn, E. Horowitz, “A Linear Time Approximation Algorithm for Multiprocessor Scheduling”, BIT 19, 1979.
- E. Koutsoupias, M. Mavronicolas, P. Spirakis, “Approximate Equilibria and Ball Fusion”, Theory of Computing Systems 36(6), 2003.
- A. Czumaj, B. Vöcking, “Tight Bounds for Worst-Case Equilibria”, SODA, 2002.
- T. Roughgarden, “Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies”, SIAM Journal on Computing 33(2), 2004.