Chapter 6: Online Platforms
Platforms and Markets
Warm-up Game: The Sponsored Search Auction
Advertisers bid per click; ads are ranked into three slots by bid × quality score, and higher slots get more clicks.
- If a click earns you 8 TL, is bidding 8 TL best?
- Does the highest bidder always get the top slot?
Platforms and Markets
Learning Outcomes
Describe two-sided markets, cross-side network effects, and the platform as a mechanism designer.
Find the equilibria, the threshold and the “tipping” dynamics in a simple adoption model.
Show in a two-sided numerical example which side is subsidized, and why.
Compute GSP and VCG payments from the same bids; show why truthful bidding is not an equilibrium of GSP.
Rank with Bayesian averages; compute when fake reviews pay off.
Interpret how tipping, switching costs, multi-homing and regulation (the EU Digital Markets Act, DMA) affect platform competition.
Platforms and Markets
What Is an Online Platform?
- An online platform: a digital ecosystem (an intermediary) that brings users, sellers and service providers together.
- The value comes less from the platform itself than from the sides' access to each other: a two-sided market.
- The platform sets the rules: who joins, who sees whom, who pays what → a mechanism.
| Type | Side 1 | Side 2 | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| E-commerce marketplace | buyers | sellers | Trendyol, Hepsiburada, Amazon |
| Sharing economy | guests / riders | hosts / drivers | Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, Uber |
| Social media | users | advertisers, creators | Instagram, TikTok, Facebook |
| Search engine | searchers | advertisers | Google, Bing |
Platforms and Markets
Two-Sided Markets and Cross-Side Network Effects
The number of participants on one side determines the value the other side gets (more sellers → more choice for buyers).
The platform chooses not only the total price but how the fee is split between the sides (pA, pB).
No sellers, no buyers; no buyers, no sellers: one side has to be “pulled in” first.
Platforms and Markets
The Platform Is a Mechanism, Users Are Players
- Platform design (fees, ranking and rating rules) steers users' strategic behavior.
- Users choose strategies according to incentives; the resulting behavior is a Nash equilibrium under the rules.
The platform's incentives
- Bonuses: extra pay for drivers in busy areas (Uber)
- Discounts, coupons, free trials
- Ranking and recommendation algorithms → visibility
- Ratings and badges (trusted seller)
Users' strategic responses
- Fake reviews and rating inflation
- Multiple accounts, bonus abuse
- Gaming the algorithm (click farms)
- Retaliatory negative reviews
Network Effects
Types of Network Effects
WhatsApp: the more of your friends use it, the more valuable it is to you.
Uber: more drivers → shorter waits → more riders → more work for drivers.
Crowding → congestion, information overload; sellers on the same side compete with each other.
Value comes from your neighborhood (city, circle of friends), not from all users; competition is won locally.
Network Effects
A Simple Adoption Model
- N = 1000 potential users; user i's type θi ~ U[0, 1] measures how much they care about the platform.
- If a fraction x of the population joins, i's utility is θi·x − p, where p = 0.16 (a fee or the effort of joining).
- A user joins ⟺ θi·x ≥ p ⟺ θi ≥ p/x. Since θ is uniform on [0, 1], the fraction with θ above p/x is 1 − p/x.
- Equilibrium: a self-fulfilling expectation, F(x) = x.
- Dynamics: this period's adopters set next period's expectation, xt+1 = F(xt).
A simplified version of the network-effects model in Easley and Kleinberg (2010, Chapter 17).
Network Effects
Step by Step: Critical Mass and Tipping
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | ||
| 1 | ||
| 2 | ||
| 3 | ||
| 4 | ||
| 5 | ||
| 6 |
The curve F(x) = 1 − 0.16/x: the fraction who actually join when “a fraction x will join” is expected. Nobody joins while x ≤ 0.16.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | ||
| 1 | ||
| 2 | ||
| 3 | ||
| 4 | ||
| 5 | ||
| 6 |
Equilibria satisfy F(x) = x: multiplying 1 − 0.16/x = x by x gives x² − x + 0.16 = 0 → x = 0.2 and x = 0.8; also x = 0 (nobody). The hollow point is an unstable equilibrium: a small deviation pushes the dynamics away from it.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | |
| 1 | 0.36 | |
| 2 | ||
| 3 | ||
| 4 | ||
| 5 | ||
| 6 |
250 users are expected (x₀ = 0.25): those with θ ≥ 0.16/0.25 = 0.64 join → x₁ = 0.36.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | |
| 1 | 0.36 | |
| 2 | 0.556 | |
| 3 | ||
| 4 | ||
| 5 | ||
| 6 |
Adoption beat expectations; with the new expectation 0.36, those with θ ≥ 0.444 join → x₂ = 0.556.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | |
| 1 | 0.36 | |
| 2 | 0.556 | |
| 3 | 0.712 | |
| 4 | ||
| 5 | ||
| 6 |
The feedback continues: x₃ = 1 − 0.16/0.556 = 0.712.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | |
| 1 | 0.36 | |
| 2 | 0.556 | |
| 3 | 0.712 | |
| 4 | 0.775 | |
| 5 | ||
| 6 |
x₄ = 0.775; the steps shrink as the path approaches the stable equilibrium.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | |
| 1 | 0.36 | |
| 2 | 0.556 | |
| 3 | 0.712 | |
| 4 | 0.775 | |
| 5 | 0.794 | |
| 6 | 0.798 |
x₆ ≈ 0.798 → 0.8: the market has tipped in the platform's favor (800 users).
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | 0.19 |
| 1 | 0.36 | 0.158 |
| 2 | 0.556 | |
| 3 | 0.712 | |
| 4 | 0.775 | |
| 5 | 0.794 | |
| 6 | 0.798 |
Start just below the threshold: x₀ = 0.19 → x₁ = 1 − 0.16/0.19 = 0.158. Adoption fell short of expectations.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | 0.19 |
| 1 | 0.36 | 0.158 |
| 2 | 0.556 | 0 |
| 3 | 0.712 | |
| 4 | 0.775 | |
| 5 | 0.794 | |
| 6 | 0.798 |
x₁ = 0.158 ≤ p = 0.16 → x₂ = 0: nobody joins and the platform collapses.
| t | x₀ = 0.25 | x₀ = 0.19 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.25 | 0.19 |
| 1 | 0.36 | 0.158 |
| 2 | 0.556 | 0 |
| 3 | 0.712 | |
| 4 | 0.775 | |
| 5 | 0.794 | |
| 6 | 0.798 |
Result: 0 and 0.8 are stable, 0.2 is unstable. Critical mass is 0.2 (200 users): above it the market goes to 0.8, below it to 0.
Network Effects
Reaching Critical Mass: Design Lessons
| p | equilibria | threshold |
|---|---|---|
| 0.09 | 0, 0.1, 0.9 | 0.1 |
| 0.16 | 0, 0.2, 0.8 | 0.2 |
| 0.21 | 0, 0.3, 0.7 | 0.3 |
| 0.25 | 0 and 0.5 (tangent) | 0.5 |
| 0.3 | only 0 | — |
A lower fee means a lower threshold. For x² − x + p = 0 to have real roots, the discriminant 1 − 4p ≥ 0, i.e. p ≤ 0.25; if p > 0.25 the market never forms.
Free periods, bonuses: p falls, and so does the critical mass.
The platform supplies the first content, sellers or drivers itself.
An “everyone's here” perception lifts x₀ above the threshold.
Start with a tool that is useful without the network; build the network later.
Platform Pricing
Principles of Two-Sided Pricing
- Besides the overall price level, the platform chooses the price structure: which side pays, and how much? (Rochet and Tirole, 2003)
- The side that adds more value to the other side, or is more price-sensitive, gets a lower price — even a subsidy (a negative price).
- The loss is recovered from fees on the other side, which the subsidized side attracts.
Users are free; advertisers pay.
Rewards for cardholders, fees from merchants.
Coupons for buyers, commissions from sellers.
Commissions, subscriptions, ads, per-transaction fees.
Platform Pricing
A Numerical Example: A Marketplace Model
- n: participants (thousands), p: monthly fee (TL). Serving one more participant costs the platform nothing (marginal cost 0).
- Buyers are very valuable to sellers (eB = 0.75); seller variety matters less to buyers (eA = 0.25).
nB = 80 + 0.75·nA − pB
Π = pA·nA + pB·nB
Question: which (pA, pB) maximizes profit? Which side is subsidized?
Platform Pricing
Step by Step: Which Side Gets Subsidized?
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Choosing participation instead of prices simplifies the algebra: each (nA, nB) pair corresponds to exactly one price pair.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Substitute into profit. The nAnB term shows that the platform can capture the value the two sides add to each other.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hold nB fixed and differentiate Π with respect to nA (a partial derivative, written ∂); at the optimum both derivatives are 0: two linear equations.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optimum | 0.25 / 0.75 | −5 | 50 | 40 | 60 | 2800 |
Solution: buyers are paid 5 TL (pA = −5), sellers pay 50 TL. Profit Π = −200 + 3000 = 2800.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optimum | 0.25 / 0.75 | −5 | 50 | 40 | 60 | 2800 |
| Free for buyers | 0.25 / 0.75 | 0 | 47.5 | 34.6 | 58.5 | 2776.9 |
Compare: if buyers are free (pA = 0), the best pB ≈ 47.5; fewer buyers, profit 2776.9 < 2800.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optimum | 0.25 / 0.75 | −5 | 50 | 40 | 60 | 2800 |
| Free for buyers | 0.25 / 0.75 | 0 | 47.5 | 34.6 | 58.5 | 2776.9 |
| Buyers pay 10 TL | 0.25 / 0.75 | 10 | 42.5 | 23.8 | 55.4 | 2592.3 |
Charging buyers 10 TL cuts them to 23.8 thousand, and sellers shrink too: profit 2592.3.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optimum | 0.25 / 0.75 | −5 | 50 | 40 | 60 | 2800 |
| Free for buyers | 0.25 / 0.75 | 0 | 47.5 | 34.6 | 58.5 | 2776.9 |
| Buyers pay 10 TL | 0.25 / 0.75 | 10 | 42.5 | 23.8 | 55.4 | 2592.3 |
Why? One extra buyer adds 0.75·60 = 45 TL of value for sellers, which the platform recovers through pB. 45 > 40 (the markup) → subsidy.
| Scenario | eA / eB | pA | pB | nA | nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optimum | 0.25 / 0.75 | −5 | 50 | 40 | 60 | 2800 |
| Free for buyers | 0.25 / 0.75 | 0 | 47.5 | 34.6 | 58.5 | 2776.9 |
| Buyers pay 10 TL | 0.25 / 0.75 | 10 | 42.5 | 23.8 | 55.4 | 2592.3 |
| Effects reversed | 0.75 / 0.25 | 25 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 2800 |
Counterfactual: with the cross effects reversed (buyers adding little value for sellers), pA = 25 and pB = 30; the subsidy disappears.
A script scanned the (pA, pB) grid in 0.5 TL steps: the profit peaks at (−5, 50).
Platform Pricing
Code Trace: participation(pA, pB)
Call with the optimal prices pA = −5, pB = 50. Instead of solving for participation “by hand”, let the sides respond to each other.
Start: the platform is empty, nA = nB = 0.
Round 1: buyers respond to the current number of sellers: nA = 20 + 0.25·0 + 5 = 25.
Sellers respond to the new number of buyers: nB = 80 + 0.75·25 − 50 = 48.8. The buyer subsidy drew in sellers.
Round 2: buyers respond to the current number of sellers: nA = 20 + 0.25·48.8 + 5 = 37.2.
Sellers respond to the new number of buyers: nB = 80 + 0.75·37.2 − 50 = 57.9. The cross effect grows both sides together.
Round 3: buyers respond to the current number of sellers: nA = 20 + 0.25·57.9 + 5 = 39.5.
Sellers respond to the new number of buyers: nB = 80 + 0.75·39.5 − 50 = 59.6. The cross effect grows both sides together.
Round 4: nA = 39.9, nB = 59.9. The change shrinks by a factor of ≈ 0.25·0.75 ≈ 0.19 each round.
Round 5: nA = 40, nB = 60. The change shrinks by a factor of ≈ 0.25·0.75 ≈ 0.19 each round.
Round 6: nA = 40, nB = 60. The change shrinks by a factor of ≈ 0.25·0.75 ≈ 0.19 each round.
Round 7: nA = 40, nB = 60. The change shrinks by a factor of ≈ 0.25·0.75 ≈ 0.19 each round.
Round 8: nA = 40, nB = 60. The change shrinks by a factor of ≈ 0.25·0.75 ≈ 0.19 each round.
Fixed point (40, 60). Profit = −5·40 + 50·60 = 2,800. This is the participation equilibrium where each side's expectations confirm the other's.
def participation(pA, pB, rounds=8): nA, nB = 0, 0 for t in range(rounds): nA = 20 + 0.25 * nB - pA # buyers nB = 80 + 0.75 * nA - pB # sellers return nA, nB
Convergence condition: the product of the cross effects eA·eB = 0.1875 < 1. If it exceeded 1, participation would explode or collapse: the network effect is too strong (tipping).
Platform Pricing
A Richer Model: Two-Sided Platform Pricing
Model: nA = baseA − sA·pA + eA·nB, nB = baseB − sB·pB + eB·nA.
- base: users who join at a zero fee when the other side is empty.
- s: price sensitivity (marketplace: sA = 11, sB = 5); s = 1 in the numerical model.
- Participation is capped at 0–100 users; fees are integers from −5 to 10.
- Profit Π = pA·nA + pB·nB; participation is again the fixed point of mutual responses.
| Level | eA / eB | Most profitable (pA, pB) | nA / nB | Π |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.10 / 0.30 | (2, 4) | 25.3 / 22.6 | 140.8 |
| 2 | 0.15 / 0.60 | (0, 6) | 50.3 / 35.2 | 211.0 |
| 3 | 0.20 / 0.85 | (−2, 9) | 78.3 / 56.6 | 352.5 |
Marketplace scenario (base 45 / 35). At level 3, fees of (3, 3) earn only 167.0: subsidizing A and charging B a high fee more than doubles the profit.
Sponsored Search
Sponsored Search Auctions
- Every search query triggers an auction among the advertisers bidding on that keyword.
- m slots with click counts α1 > α2 > … from top to bottom (here 300, 200, 100 per 1000 impressions).
- Advertiser i values a click at vi, bids bi per click, and in slot j pays pj per click.
- The utility of the advertiser in slot j: αj·(vi − pj).
Sponsored Search
Two Payment Rules: GSP and VCG
Rank by bid (b(k): the k-th highest bid). The advertiser in slot j pays the next bid down per click:
pj = b(j+1)
With one slot it equals Vickrey; with several slots truthfulness is lost.
Same ranking. Each advertiser pays the loss its presence imposes on others:
αj·pj = Σk≥j (αk − αk+1)·b(k+1)
Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy.
Sponsored Search
Step by Step: GSP and VCG Payments from the Same Bids
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | ||||
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | ||||
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | ||||
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | ||||
| Revenue |
Both rules get the same bids (= values); only the payments differ.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | ||
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | ||||
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | ||||
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | ||
| Revenue |
Under GSP each slot pays the next bid down, per click.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | ||
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | 5 | 1000 | ||
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | ||||
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | ||
| Revenue |
The second slot.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | ||
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | 5 | 1000 | ||
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | 2 | 200 | ||
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | ||
| Revenue | 3600 |
GSP done.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | ||
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | 5 | 1000 | ||
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | 2 | 200 | 200 | 2 |
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | 0 | — |
| Revenue | 3600 |
VCG payment = others' welfare “if it were absent” − others' welfare with it present. Those above are unaffected; only those below count.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | ||
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | 5 | 1000 | 700 | 3.5 |
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | 2 | 200 | 200 | 2 |
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | 0 | — |
| Revenue | 3600 |
Removing B would move C up one slot and bring D into slot 3.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | 1500 | 5 |
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | 5 | 1000 | 700 | 3.5 |
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | 2 | 200 | 200 | 2 |
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | 0 | — |
| Revenue | 3600 | 2400 |
The formula gives the same: (300−200)·8 + (200−100)·5 + 100·2 = 1500.
| Slot | Clicks | Advertiser | GSP /click | GSP total | VCG total | VCG /click |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | A (b = 10) | 8 | 2400 | 1500 | 5 |
| 2 | 200 | B (b = 8) | 5 | 1000 | 700 | 3.5 |
| 3 | 100 | C (b = 5) | 2 | 200 | 200 | 2 |
| — | 0 | D (b = 2) | — | 0 | 0 | — |
| Revenue | 3600 | 2400 |
Revenue: GSP 3600, VCG 2400. But the comparison is unfair: under GSP the bids change.
Sponsored Search
Code Trace: gsp_vcg(bids, ctr)
m = 3 slots.
Sort bids from high to low and append m zeros so that a “next bid down” always exists.
Append a dummy (m+1)-th slot with 0 clicks to a: αm+1 = 0.
Zero the result arrays; vcg's extra last element is the recursion's starting value.
gsp[0] = a[0]·b[1] = 300·8 = 2400: slot 1 pays the next bid down, per click.
gsp[1] = a[1]·b[2] = 200·5 = 1000: slot 2 pays the next bid down, per click.
gsp[2] = a[2]·b[3] = 100·2 = 200: slot 3 pays the next bid down, per click.
extra = (100 − 0)·2 = 200: the click value lost by the advertiser below, stuck in slot 4 instead of 3.
vcg[2] = 0 + 200 = 200: losses imposed further down carry upward too.
extra = (200 − 100)·5 = 500: the click value lost by the advertiser below, stuck in slot 3 instead of 2.
vcg[1] = 200 + 500 = 700: losses imposed further down carry upward too.
extra = (300 − 200)·8 = 800: the click value lost by the advertiser below, stuck in slot 2 instead of 1.
vcg[0] = 700 + 800 = 1500: losses imposed further down carry upward too.
Result: GSP [2400, 1000, 200] (total 3600), VCG [1500, 700, 200] (total 2400).
def gsp_vcg(bids, ctr): m = len(ctr) b = sorted(bids, reverse=True) + [0]*m a = ctr + [0] # dummy slot: 0 clicks gsp, vcg = [0]*m, [0]*(m + 1) for j in range(m): gsp[j] = a[j] * b[j+1] # next bid for j in range(m-1, -1, -1): # bottom up extra = (a[j] - a[j+1]) * b[j+1] vcg[j] = vcg[j+1] + extra return gsp, vcg[:m]
Sponsored Search
Step by Step: Truthful Bidding Is Not an Equilibrium of GSP
| Adv. | v | bid | slot | pays/click | utility |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 10 | 10 | 1 | 8 | 600 |
| B | 8 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 600 |
| C | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 300 |
| D | 2 | 2 | — | — | 0 |
| Platform revenue | 3600 | ||||
Everyone bids their value. A is in slot 1 and pays B's bid (8): utility 300·(10 − 8) = 600.
| Adv. | v | bid | slot | pays/click | utility |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 10 | 10 | 1 | 8 | 600 |
| B | 8 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 600 |
| C | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 300 |
| D | 2 | 2 | — | — | 0 |
| Platform revenue | 3600 | ||||
A's utility is a step function of its bid: 2–5 gives slot 3 (800), 5–8 gives slot 2 (1000), above 8 slot 1 (600).
| Adv. | v | bid | slot | pays/click | utility |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | 8 | 8 | 1 | 6 | 600 |
| A | 10 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 1000 |
| C | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 300 |
| D | 2 | 2 | — | — | 0 |
| Platform revenue | 3000 | ||||
If A bids 6, it drops to slot 2 and pays C's 5: 200·(10 − 5) = 1000 > 600. Truthful bidding is not a best response → not an equilibrium.
| Adv. | v | bid | slot | pays/click | utility |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 10 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 1500 |
| B | 8 | 5 | 2 | 3.5 | 900 |
| C | 5 | 3.5 | 3 | 2 | 300 |
| D | 2 | 2 | — | — | 0 |
| Platform revenue | 2400 | ||||
An equilibrium: B bids 5, C 3.5, D 2. A's best is still slot 1 (1500); a script tried every deviation, and nobody gains.
| Adv. | v | bid | slot | pays/click | utility |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 10 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 1500 |
| B | 8 | 5 | 2 | 3.5 | 900 |
| C | 5 | 3.5 | 3 | 2 | 300 |
| D | 2 | 2 | — | — | 0 |
| Platform revenue | 2400 | ||||
In this equilibrium the per-click payments 5 / 3.5 / 2 are the VCG payments, revenue 2400. It is the lowest-revenue locally envy-free equilibrium of GSP. Locally envy-free: no advertiser would rather take the slot just above at that slot's current per-click price.
Sponsored Search
Code Trace: profitable_dev(i, b, v, ctr, cands)
Truthful bids b = v = [10, 8, 5, 2]. Should A (i = 0) deviate? Candidate bids 9, 6, 4, 3, 1.
Currently A is in slot 1 and pays the next bid down (8): old = 300·(10 − 8) = 600.
x = 9: slot 1, u = 600 ≤ 600.
x = 6: A drops to slot 2 and pays less: u = 1,000 > 600 → profitable deviation found; return (x, u).
Now the proposed equilibrium: B bids 5, C 3.5, D 2. Same candidate list for A.
Currently A is in slot 1 and pays the next bid down (5): old = 300·(10 − 5) = 1,500.
x = 9: slot 1, u = 1,500 ≤ 1,500.
x = 6: slot 1, u = 1,500 ≤ 1,500.
x = 4: slot 2, u = 1,300 ≤ 1,500.
x = 3: slot 3, u = 800 ≤ 1,500.
x = 1: the ad is left out, u = 0 ≤ 1,500.
No candidate is profitable → None. A script ran the same test for all four advertisers on a bid grid with step 0.25: nobody gains, so this profile is a Nash equilibrium.
def profitable_dev(i, b, v, ctr, cands): old = gsp_utility(i, b, v, ctr) for x in cands: b2 = b[:]; b2[i] = x # only i changes u = gsp_utility(i, b2, v, ctr) if u > old: return x, u # profitable return None # no deviation
gsp_utility(i, b, v, ctr): sort the bids; if i is in slot j, ctr[j]·(v[i] − the next bid down), and 0 if it gets no slot. Bids are assumed distinct.
Sponsored Search
GSP and VCG Compared
| GSP | VCG | |
|---|---|---|
| Is truthful bidding dominant? | No (A bids 6 instead of 10) | Yes |
| Revenue with the same bids | 3600 (≥ VCG in every slot) | 2400 |
| Revenue in equilibrium | ≥ 2400 in locally envy-free equilibria; the lowest equals VCG | 2400 (with truthful bids) |
| Explaining it | Easy: “the next bid down” | A sum of externalities, harder |
| In practice | Long the norm in search ads (with quality scores) | Used in Facebook's ad auction (Varian and Harris, 2014) |
In practice, ranking uses the ad's click quality (its quality score) together with the bid.
The name “second price” does not guarantee truthfulness: what holds for one item can break with many slots.
Sponsored Search
A Given Bid Profile ≠ Equilibrium Bids
GSP outcomes are computed for given bids. 3600 is the revenue when everyone bids truthfully — but truthful bidding is not a dominant strategy in GSP. Click counts 300, 200, 100; values A 10, B 8, C 5, D 2.
| Profile | Bids (A, B, C, D) | A's slot and utility | Platform revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful | 10, 8, 5, 2 | slot 1: 300·(10 − 8) = 600 | 3600 |
| A bids lower | 6, 8, 5, 2 | slot 2: 200·(10 − 5) = 1000 | 3000 |
| Locally envy-free equilibrium | 10, 5, 3.5, 2 | slot 1: 300·(10 − 5) = 1500 | 2400 = VCG |
- In a lower slot A gets fewer clicks but pays less per click: 1000 > 600.
- Locally envy-free equilibrium (Edelman, Ostrovsky, Schwarz, 2007): no advertiser wants the slot just above at that slot's current price. B in slot 2 gets 200·(8 − 3.5) = 900; taking slot 1 at 5 would give 300·(8 − 5) = 900: no gain.
Sponsored Search
Budgets and Online Allocation
- Advertisers have daily budgets; searches arrive one by one, and the platform must assign each to an advertiser immediately, without knowing the future (an online decision).
- Example: A and B each have a 100 TL budget. Both bid 1 TL on “running shoes”; only A bids 1 TL on “gym bag”. First 100 shoe searches arrive, then 100 bag searches.
| Rule | Shoe searches | Bag searches | Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greedy (highest bid, ties to A) | all 100 to A; A's budget runs out | A has no money left: 0 | 100 |
| Balance: to the larger remaining budget | A 50, B 50 | A's remaining 50 | 150 |
| Optimum knowing the future | all 100 to B | all 100 to A | 200 |
“Always picking the highest bid is best.” With budgets, the greedy rule exhausts the flexible advertiser early; in the worst case it guarantees only 1/2 of the optimum.
When bids are small relative to budgets, the MSVV rule — weighting bids by remaining budget — earns at least 1 − 1/e ≈ 63% of the optimum in any search order (Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani and Vazirani, 2007).
Sponsored Search
Step by Step: GSP with Quality Scores
The same four advertisers. Clicks depend on slot and ad quality: i gets αj·qi clicks in slot j (α = 300, 200, 100).
Quality q: how likely the ad is to be clicked (e.g. A 0.4, B 0.8). The platform ranks by the score b·q: expected revenue per impression.
Ranked by score: B (6.4) > A (4) > C (3) > D (2). A, the highest bidder, is no longer first.
Payment: the lowest bid that keeps the position. biqi ≥ the score below ⟺ bi ≥ scorej+1/qi.
No payment exceeds the bid (5 ≤ 8, 7.5 ≤ 10, 3.33 ≤ 5). A high-quality ad gets the same slot for less: quality is rewarded.
| Ranking | slots 1–3 | total clicks (per 1000 impressions) | revenue (TL) |
|---|---|---|---|
| By bid only | A, B, C | 340 | 1,880 |
| With quality scores (b·q) | B, A, C | 380 | 2,000 |
Here quality scores raised both clicks (340 → 380) and revenue (1,880 → 2,000): users see relevant ads, and the platform sells more clicks.
Sponsored Search
Back to the Game: The Sponsored Search Auction
With the “Search Ads” rates (12%, 7%, 3.5%), 1000 impressions give 120, 70, 35 clicks. Your click value is 8, rival bids 6, 4, 2, all qualities 1; GSP:
| Bid | Slot | Payment/click | Utility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 (truthful) | 1 | 6 | 120 × 2 = 240 |
| 5 | 2 | 4 | 70 × 4 = 280 |
| 3 | 3 | 2 | 35 × 6 = 210 |
Dropping to a lower slot pays more; a best-response search finds exactly this deviation.
Under first-price ad auctions, bids repeatedly ratcheted up and crashed (Edelman and Ostrovsky, 2007). Under the GSP used by Google, truthful bidding is not dominant either (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007).
Reputation and Competition
Reputation Systems and Information Asymmetry
- Buyers don't know a seller's quality in advance: information asymmetry. Buyers then offer an average price, good sellers exit, and only bad products remain (Akerlof's “market for lemons”).
- A reputation system does two jobs: selection (find good sellers) and discipline (punish bad behavior in the future, a repeated game).
Bought positive reviews, or negative ones for a rival.
With mutual ratings, bad experiences go unreported.
If everyone has 4.8+, ratings stop discriminating.
Moderately satisfied users stay silent; new sellers get no reviews at all (cold start).
Reputation and Competition
Step by Step: 5.0 from a Few Reviews or 4.7 from Many?
| Product | reviews | average | rank | Bayesian score | rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| X | 2 | 5 | 1 | ||
| Y | 200 | 4.7 | 2 | ||
| Z | 20 | 4.2 | 3 |
The average of a product with few reviews is very noisy; two fake reviews put it on top.
| Product | reviews | average | rank | Bayesian score | rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| X | 2 | 5 | 1 | 3.75 | 3 |
| Y | 200 | 4.7 | 2 | 4.64 | 1 |
| Z | 20 | 4.2 | 3 | 3.97 | 2 |
It is as if every product got 10 “average” virtual reviews: products with few reviews are pulled toward the mean. New ranking: Y > Z > X.
| Product | reviews | average | rank | Bayesian score | rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| X + 3 fake | 5 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| Y | 200 | 4.7 | 2 | 4.64 | 1 |
| Z | 20 | 4.2 | 3 | 3.97 | 3 |
Bayesian averages blunt fake reviews: producing the same effect takes many more of them.
Reputation and Competition
Step by Step: When Do Fake Reviews Pay?
Model the fake review as an investment decision: return, cost and expected penalty.
8 fake 5★ reviews lift the raw average to exactly 4.0.
Expected gain 600 − 120 − ρ·3000. If the platform's detection probability is below 16%, cheating pays.
Reaching the same threshold under the Bayesian score takes 13 fakes: cheating costs more, and the break-even drops to ρ < 0.135.
The mechanism-design view: the platform doesn't just ban cheating, it pushes the expected return of cheating below zero.
Reputation and Competition
Platform Competition and Regulation
- Winner takes all: through tipping, a single platform can capture most of the market.
- Switching costs: friends, past ratings, data → keep users locked in.
- Multi-homing: using several platforms at once (a driver on both Uber and a rival) weakens monopolization.
- Examples: Hepsiburada – Trendyol, Uber – Lyft, Instagram – TikTok.
- Data privacy and security.
- Monopolization risk and self-preferencing.
- Transparency of ranking and recommendation algorithms.
- Example: the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) imposes obligations on large “gatekeeper” platforms.
Reputation and Competition
Recommender Systems, Lock-in and Privacy
- Recommendation and ranking algorithms allocate visibility (who gets featured?): they are an allocation rule, and participants choose strategies accordingly.
Maximizing short-term engagement or revenue can conflict with users' long-term interest (clickbait, infinite scroll).
Creators and sellers compete for visibility and converge on whatever form the algorithm rewards (titles, tags): content can become uniform.
Loyalty points, paid memberships (e.g. fast shipping), gamification (badges, streaks): deliberately raise switching costs and reduce multi-homing.
The price of a “free” service is data: more data means better recommendations but also risks of leaks and misuse. Users choose strategically how much to share.
Reputation and Competition
Discussion: Growth, Behavior and Fairness
Critical mass and tipping: if expectations are above the threshold, feedback drives growth; below it, collapse. Ease of use, trust and early incentives help clear the threshold.
Bonuses and discounts boost specific behaviors (driver bonuses in busy areas); recommendation algorithms steer preferences; spam and fake-review policing limits manipulation.
Perfect fairness is hard: preferences differ, network effects favor large groups, and players manipulate strategically. Incentives, rules and regulation can improve things.
Assessment
Summary
| Concept | Explanation | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Network effects, tipping | F(x) = 1 − p/x; two stable equilibria with a threshold between them | p = 0.16: 0 and 0.8 stable, threshold 0.2 |
| Two-sided pricing | pA = nA − eBnB: the side that adds more value to the other pays less | pA = −5, pB = 50, Π = 2800 |
| GSP | Slot j pays the next bid down; truthful bidding is not dominant | revenue 3600 with the same bids; A bids 6 instead of 10 |
| VCG | Pays the loss imposed on others; truthful bidding is dominant | 1500 / 700 / 200, revenue 2400 |
| GSP equilibrium | The lowest locally envy-free equilibrium gives the VCG outcome | bids 10, 5, 3.5, 2 → 5 / 3.5 / 2 TL/click |
| Reputation | Bayesian averages make fake reviews more expensive | fake reviews needed: 8 → 13 |
Assessment
Sample Problems
- In the adoption model let p = 0.21. What are the equilibria and the critical mass?
- In the marketplace model let eA = eB = 0.5 (all else equal). What are the optimal prices? Is there a subsidy?
- Two slots (100 and 60 clicks), bids 6, 4, 1. Find the total GSP and VCG payments.
- In the GSP of problem 3, with the others truthful, should the advertiser valued at 6 bid truthfully?
- 10 reviews, average 4.0. How many fake 5★ reviews raise the raw average to 4.5?
- Two slots; A bids 6 (q = 0.5), B 4 (q = 1), C 1 (q = 1). In GSP with quality scores, what are the ranking and per-click payments?
Show answers
- x² − x + 0.21 = 0 → x = 0.3 and 0.7 (and 0). Critical mass 0.3; stable equilibria 0 and 0.7.
- nA = 40, nB = 60; pA = 40 − 0.5·60 = 10, pB = 60 − 0.5·40 = 40. No subsidy.
- GSP: 100·4 + 60·1 = 460. VCG: slot 2 → 60·1 = 60; slot 1 → (100 − 60)·4 + 60 = 220; total 280.
- No: truthful → slot 1, 100·(6 − 4) = 200; a bid between 1 and 4 → slot 2, 60·(6 − 1) = 300.
- (40 + 5k)/(10 + k) ≥ 4.5 ⟺ k ≥ 10.
- Scores A 3, B 4, C 1 → ranking B, A. B: 3/1 = 3 TL; A: 1/0.5 = 2 TL (both below their bids).
Assessment
References
- J.-C. Rochet, J. Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003.
- M. Armstrong, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets”, RAND Journal of Economics, 2006.
- B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction”, American Economic Review, 2007.
- H. Varian, “Position Auctions”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007.
- D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (Chapters 15 and 17).
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Chapters 27–28).
- T. Roughgarden, Stanford CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory lecture notes, 2013 (Lectures 2–3: sponsored search auctions).
- G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970.
- M. Luca, G. Zervas, “Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud”, Management Science, 2016.
Assessment
References: Ad Auctions
- H. Varian, C. Harris, “The VCG Auction in Theory and Practice”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 104(5), 2014.
- B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, “Strategic Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions”, Decision Support Systems 43(1), 2007. · M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, “Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment”, ACM EC, 2011.
- A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Vazirani, “AdWords and Generalized Online Matching”, Journal of the ACM 54(5), 2007.