Chapter 5: Auctions
Basic Concepts
Warm-up Game: The Vickrey Auction
Everyone writes a bid in a sealed envelope; the highest bidder gets the item but pays the second-highest bid, not their own.
- If the item is worth 70 TL to you, would you write less than 70, exactly 70, or more?
- Would your bid change if you knew the rivals' bids?
- If the winner paid their own bid (first price), would writing 70 still be a good idea?
Basic Concepts
Learning Outcomes
Find the winner and payment in English, Dutch, first-price and second-price auctions.
Show by case analysis that truthful bidding is weakly dominant in the Vickrey auction.
Derive the first-price shading b = (n−1)v/n; compute revenue equivalence (2 bidders → 1/3) and the effect of a reserve price (5/12).
Explain the winner's curse; find the matching and price in a double auction.
Basic Concepts
Why Auctions Matter
- Efficient mechanisms for allocating resources: the item tends to go to whoever values it most.
- Price discovery and market transparency: the price is found without knowing the buyers' values.
- The most widespread application of mechanism design: an allocation rule + a payment rule.
Ascending-price English auctions at auction houses.
Ad auctions run on every search.
Spectrum auctions; multi-item designs worth billions.
Sealed bids; government bond auctions.
Basic Concepts
Key Terms and the Model
The bidder's true value for the item; private information.
The number reported to the mechanism; it may differ from the value.
ui = vi − pi if they win (pi: payment), 0 if they lose.
Values are drawn independently and each bidder knows their own. The baseline model of auction theory.
Second-price example (Cem 85, second bid 70): quasi-linear utility.
Basic Concepts
Valuation Models
Each bidder values the item based on their own information (e.g. a painting for their own wall).
The item's true value is the same for everyone, but the bidders' estimates differ (e.g. an oil field).
Both private information and the other bidders' information affect valuations.
Four Basic Formats
Four Basic Auction Formats
| Format | How it works | Winner | Pays |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The price rises openly; bidders drop out one by one. | Last one standing | Price at which the last rival drops out |
| Dutch | The price starts high and falls; the first to say “mine” takes it. | First to accept | The current price |
| First-price sealed-bid | Bids are submitted secretly, once. | Highest bid | Their own bid |
| Second-price (Vickrey) | Bids are submitted secretly, once. | Highest bid | The second-highest bid |
Four Basic Formats
Step by Step: The English Auction (Ascending Price)
The price starts at 40 and rises. At 50, everyone's limit is above 50: all four are still in.
Once the price passes 55, Bora drops out (limit 55). Left: Ayşe, Cem, Deniz.
Once the price passes 60, Deniz drops out (limit 60). Left: Ayşe, Cem.
Once the price passes 70, the last rival, Ayşe, drops out → Cem wins and pays ≈ 70 (exactly 70 as the increment shrinks): the second-highest value.
Four Basic Formats
Step by Step: The Dutch Auction (Descending Price)
At 100 the price is above everyone's limit; nobody accepts, and it drops by 5.
At 95: still nobody accepts (the highest limit is 85).
At 90: still nobody accepts (the highest limit is 85).
At 85 the price reaches Cem's limit → Cem says “mine” and pays 85. The auction ends before anyone else can speak.
Four Basic Formats
Step by Step: First- and Second-Price Sealed Bids
Sealed bids: everyone bids once, in secret. Nobody sees the others' bids.
The envelopes are opened: 70, 55, 85, 60. Under both rules the highest bid wins: Cem.
First price: Cem pays his own bid → 85. If his value is 85, his utility is 0.
Second price (Vickrey): Cem pays the second-highest bid → 70. His utility is 85 − 70 = 15.
Four Basic Formats
Same Bids, Four Outcomes
| Format | Winner | Payment | Whose bid sets it? |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Cem | ≈ 70 | The last rival to drop out (Ayşe) |
| Second price | Cem | 70 | The second-highest bid (Ayşe) |
| Dutch | Cem | 85 | The winner's own |
| First price | Cem | 85 | The winner's own |
With private values, staying in up to your value is dominant; both charge the second-highest value.
Strategically equivalent: “at what price will I accept?” is the same as submitting a sealed bid.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
The Strategic Property of the Vickrey Auction
- The highest bidder wins and pays the second-highest bid.
- With independent private values and a single item, bidding your true value is a weakly dominant strategy (Vickrey, 1961).
- The idea: your bid determines only whether you win, not what you pay.
v = 70. Dashed red: the truthful bid. No bid beats it for any B.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
Step by Step: Proving Truthfulness in Vickrey
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
Your value is v = 70. B = max b−i, the others' highest bid (unknown to you). Bidding truthfully with B = 60, you win and pay 60 → 10.
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
Bidding truthfully with B = 80, you lose → 0. The truthful bid always makes the right call: win when there is a profit, lose when there would be a loss.
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
| Over b = 90 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | same |
Overbid b = 90, B = 60 (< v): you still win and still pay 60 → 10. No difference.
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
| Over b = 90 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | same |
| Over b = 90 | 80 | wins, pays 80 | −10 | worse |
b = 90, B = 80 (between v and b): you win but pay 80 → −10. Bidding truthfully you would get 0. A loss!
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
| Over b = 90 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | same |
| Over b = 90 | 80 | wins, pays 80 | −10 | worse |
| Over b = 90 | 95 | loses | 0 | same |
b = 90, B = 95 (> b): you lose → 0, same as truthful.
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
| Over b = 90 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | same |
| Over b = 90 | 80 | wins, pays 80 | −10 | worse |
| Over b = 90 | 95 | loses | 0 | same |
| Under b = 50 | 40 | wins, pays 40 | 30 | same |
Underbid b = 50, B = 40 (< b): you win and pay 40 → 30. Same as truthful (B, not b, sets your payment).
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
| Over b = 90 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | same |
| Over b = 90 | 80 | wins, pays 80 | −10 | worse |
| Over b = 90 | 95 | loses | 0 | same |
| Under b = 50 | 40 | wins, pays 40 | 30 | same |
| Under b = 50 | 60 | loses | 0 | worse |
b = 50, B = 60 (between b and v): you lose → 0; bidding truthfully you would have gained 70 − 60 = 10. A missed chance!
| Strategy | B (rival) | Outcome | Utility | vs. truthful |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Truthful b = 70 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | — |
| Truthful b = 70 | 80 | loses | 0 | — |
| Over b = 90 | 60 | wins, pays 60 | 10 | same |
| Over b = 90 | 80 | wins, pays 80 | −10 | worse |
| Over b = 90 | 95 | loses | 0 | same |
| Under b = 50 | 40 | wins, pays 40 | 30 | same |
| Under b = 50 | 60 | loses | 0 | worse |
| Under b = 50 | 80 | loses | 0 | same |
b = 50, B = 80: you lose, same as truthful. Conclusion: deviating is never better and sometimes worse → b = v is weakly dominant.
Trying all pairs b, B ∈ {0, …, 120} for v = 70, no b ever beats the truthful bid.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
Back to the Game: The Vickrey Auction
Opened envelopes: you 70, rivals 60 and 45. Bidding truthfully you win and pay 60: a gain of 10. Writing 65 or 100 you would pay the same 60; writing 55, the item goes for 60 and you miss the gain of 10.
Your bid only decides whether you win; the rivals' highest bid sets the price: truthful bidding is weakly dominant. Under first price, the same 70 leaves 70 − 70 = 0 even if you win; there you must bid below your value.
In lab experiments, overbidding in second-price sealed-bid auctions is common and does not easily disappear with repetition; the same subjects converge to equilibrium much faster in ascending English auctions (Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987).
In everyday life: in eBay's automatic (proxy) bidding, the winner pays one increment above the second-highest bid — very close to the second-price rule.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
Bid Shading in First-Price Auctions
- In a first-price auction, a truthful bid is pointless: even if you win, utility is v − v = 0.
- Lowering the bid raises the profit when you win but lowers the chance of winning:
- The equilibrium bid balances this trade-off and depends on how others bid → a Bayes–Nash equilibrium.
- The Dutch auction is strategically the same: “at what price will I accept?” = a shaded bid.
Two bidders, v = 0.8; the rival bids half their value.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
Step by Step: The Equilibrium Bid b = (n − 1)v / n
Assumption: rivals bid a fixed fraction of their values.
For each rival P(vj < b/β) = b/β; by independence these multiply.
Expected utility: profit when winning × probability of winning.
The derivative of (v − b) is −1 and that of bn−1 is (n − 1)bn−2; the product rule adds them and factors out bn−2. At the maximum the derivative is zero.
After simplifying, the solution does not depend on β.
My best response has the same form → a symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium. With two bidders: half the value.
Maximizing E[u(b)] on a grid (10,001 points) for n = 2, 3, 5, 10 and v = 0.3, 0.6, 0.8, the best bid matches (n−1)v/n.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
Code Trace: best_bid(0.8, 2)
Rivals bid b = v/2 (β = 0.5). Grid: b = 0, 0.1, …, 0.8.
b = 0: P(win) = 0, E[u] = (0.8 − 0)·0 = 0 → new best.
b = 0.1: P(win) = 0.2, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.1)·0.2 = 0.14 → new best.
b = 0.2: P(win) = 0.4, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.2)·0.4 = 0.24 → new best.
b = 0.3: P(win) = 0.6, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.3)·0.6 = 0.3 → new best.
b = 0.4: P(win) = 0.8, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.4)·0.8 = 0.32 → new best.
b = 0.5: P(win) = 1, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.5)·1 = 0.3 < 0.32: best unchanged.
b = 0.6: P(win) = 1, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.6)·1 = 0.2 < 0.32: best unchanged.
b = 0.7: P(win) = 1, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.7)·1 = 0.1 < 0.32: best unchanged.
b = 0.8: P(win) = 1, E[u] = (0.8 − 0.8)·1 = 0 < 0.32: best unchanged.
Result: b = 0.4 = v/2, E[u] = 0.32. Bidding low kills the chance of winning; bidding high kills the profit.
def best_bid(v, n, step=0.1): beta = (n - 1) / n # rivals bid beta*v best, b_best = -1, 0 b = 0.0 while b <= v: p = min(1, b / beta) ** (n - 1) # P(win) eu = (v - b) * p if eu > best: best, b_best = eu, b b = round(b + step, 10) return b_best, best
Sealed-Bid Strategies
More Competition, Less Shading
| n | b(v) | v = 0.8 → b | shading |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 1/2·v | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| 3 | 2/3·v | 0.53 | 0.27 |
| 5 | 4/5·v | 0.64 | 0.16 |
| 10 | 9/10·v | 0.72 | 0.08 |
With many bidders, winning requires bidding close to your value; as n → ∞, b → v.
Sealed-Bid Strategies
Bid Shading as the Number of Bidders Grows
As the number of bidders grows, competition reduces shading and bids approach values; expected revenue is the same under first and second price (revenue equivalence) and rises with n.
Revenue and Information
Step by Step: Expected Revenue with Two Bidders = 1/3
| Rule | Seller's revenue | Expected revenue |
|---|---|---|
Two bidders with independent values v1, v2 ~ U[0, 1]. Question: which rule earns the seller more?
| Rule | Seller's revenue | Expected revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | min(v1, v2) | E[min] = ∫01 (1 − t)² dt = 1/3 |
Second price: everyone is truthful and the seller gets the smaller value. The smaller of two values exceeds t only if both do: P(min > t) = (1 − t)·(1 − t). Using E[X] = ∫01 P(X > t) dt, the expectation is 1/3.
| Rule | Seller's revenue | Expected revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | min(v1, v2) | E[min] = ∫01 (1 − t)² dt = 1/3 |
| First price | max(v1, v2) / 2 | E[max] = ∫01 (1 − t²) dt = 2/3 → 1/3 |
First price: the equilibrium bid is b = v/2 and the higher value wins. P(max < t) = t², so P(max > t) = 1 − t² → E[max] = 2/3, revenue 1/3.
| Rule | Seller's revenue | Expected revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | min(v1, v2) | E[min] = ∫01 (1 − t)² dt = 1/3 |
| First price | max(v1, v2) / 2 | E[max] = ∫01 (1 − t²) dt = 2/3 → 1/3 |
| English | ≈ second price | 1/3 |
With private values the English auction gives the same result as second price → 1/3.
| Rule | Seller's revenue | Expected revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | min(v1, v2) | E[min] = ∫01 (1 − t)² dt = 1/3 |
| First price | max(v1, v2) / 2 | E[max] = ∫01 (1 − t²) dt = 2/3 → 1/3 |
| English | ≈ second price | 1/3 |
| Dutch | ≡ first price | 1/3 |
The Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to first price → 1/3. Four rules, the same expected revenue.
| Rule | Seller's revenue | Expected revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | min(v1, v2) | E[min] = ∫01 (1 − t)² dt = 1/3 |
| First price | max(v1, v2) / 2 | E[max] = ∫01 (1 − t²) dt = 2/3 → 1/3 |
| English | ≈ second price | 1/3 |
| Dutch | ≡ first price | 1/3 |
| Simulation | 200,000 draws | Second price 0.333 · first price 0.333 |
A Monte Carlo simulation confirms it: revenue differs auction by auction but is equal on average.
Revenue and Information
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
- With independent private values, risk-neutral symmetric bidders and the same allocation (highest value wins), standard auctions yield the same expected revenue (Vickrey 1961; Myerson 1981; Riley and Samuelson 1981).
- Why? Myerson's payment formula p(v) = v·x(v) − ∫0v x(z) dz fixes the payment from x(·) and the lowest type's payment (0): same x(·) → same revenue. For n = 2, U[0, 1]: p(v) = v² − v²/2 = v²/2; first price: bid v/2 × win probability v; second price: v × expected rival value v/2. All agree.
- Risk aversion, budgets, common values or asymmetry can break it.
| n | Theory: (n−1)/(n+1) | Second price (simulation) | First price (simulation) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 1/3 = 0.33 | 0.332 | 0.333 |
| 3 | 1/2 = 0.5 | 0.500 | 0.500 |
| 4 | 3/5 = 0.6 | 0.600 | 0.600 |
| 5 | 2/3 = 0.67 | 0.668 | 0.667 |
Revenue and Information
Change the Assumption: What If Bidders Are Risk-Averse?
Two bidders, values U[0, 1]. The winner's profit is x = v − price and their utility u(x) = xρ (0 < ρ ≤ 1). ρ = 1: risk-neutral; ρ < 1: risk-averse (ρ = ½ gives u(x) = √x).
| Expected revenue | ρ = 1 | ρ = ½ |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 |
| First price (E[max] = 2/3) | (2/3)·(1/2) = 1/3 | (2/3)·(2/3) = 4/9 ≈ 0,444 |
Two bidders, values U[0, 1]. The winner's profit is x = v − price and their utility u(x) = xρ (0 < ρ ≤ 1). ρ = 1: risk-neutral; ρ < 1: risk-averse (ρ = ½ gives u(x) = √x).
| Expected revenue | ρ = 1 | ρ = ½ |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 |
| First price (E[max] = 2/3) | (2/3)·(1/2) = 1/3 | (2/3)·(2/3) = 4/9 ≈ 0,444 |
Two bidders, values U[0, 1]. The winner's profit is x = v − price and their utility u(x) = xρ (0 < ρ ≤ 1). ρ = 1: risk-neutral; ρ < 1: risk-averse (ρ = ½ gives u(x) = √x).
| Expected revenue | ρ = 1 | ρ = ½ |
|---|---|---|
| Second price | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 |
| First price (E[max] = 2/3) | (2/3)·(1/2) = 1/3 | (2/3)·(2/3) = 4/9 ≈ 0,444 |
Revenue and Information
Revenue Maximization: Myerson and the Reserve Price
- What if the seller wants to maximize expected revenue rather than efficiency? (Myerson, 1981)
- Virtual value ψ(v) = v − (1 − F(v))/f(v). F(v): the probability that the value is below v; f(v): the density. For U[0, 1], F(v) = v, f(v) = 1 ⇒ ψ(v) = 2v − 1.
- Expected revenue equals the expected virtual value of the winner. The optimal mechanism: give the item to the largest ψ, and do not sell if ψ < 0.
- If ψ is increasing and bidders are symmetric, this is a second-price auction with a reserve price: ψ(r) = 0 ⇒ 2r − 1 = 0 ⇒ r = 1/2 (independent of n).
- With two bidders and reserve r, expected revenue is 1/3 + r² − 4r³/3; at r = 1/2 it rises from 1/3 → 5/12 ≈ 0.417. The cost: sometimes nothing is sold (an efficiency loss).
Revenue and Information
Code Trace: best_reserve()
Try reserve prices on the grid r = 0, 0.1, …, 1; revenue(r) averages the payment over a 100 × 100 grid of values.
r = 0: revenue(r) = 0.333 → new best. No reserve = second price: 1/3.
r = 0.1: revenue(r) = 0.342 → new best.
r = 0.2: revenue(r) = 0.363 → new best.
r = 0.3: revenue(r) = 0.387 → new best.
r = 0.4: revenue(r) = 0.408 → new best.
r = 0.5: revenue(r) = 0.417 → new best.
r = 0.6: revenue(r) = 0.405 < 0.417.
r = 0.7: revenue(r) = 0.366 < 0.417.
r = 0.8: revenue(r) = 0.291 < 0.417.
r = 0.9: revenue(r) = 0.171 < 0.417.
r = 1: revenue(r) = 0 < 0.417.
The best reserve is r = 0.5: revenue ≈ 0.417 = 5/12 > 1/3. A high r often leaves the item unsold.
def revenue(r, m=100): # 2 bidders, U[0.1] v = [(i + .5) / m for i in range(m)] total = sum(max(min(a, c), r) for a in v for c in v if max(a, c) >= r) return total / m**2 # mean payment def best_reserve(step=0.1): best, r_best = -1, None for k in range(round(1/step) + 1): R = revenue(k * step) if R > best: best, r_best = R, k * step return r_best, best
Revenue and Information
The Cost of a Reserve: Revenue Up, Efficiency Down
Two bidders, values U[0, 1], a second-price auction with reserve price r. If both values are below r, the item is not sold.
| r | Expected revenue 1/3 + r² − 4r³/3 | Probability of no sale r² | Expected welfare loss 2r³/3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 | 0 | 0 |
| 0.25 | 3/8 = 0,375 | 1/16 = 6.25% | 1/96 ≈ 0,010 |
| 0.5 | 5/12 ≈ 0,417 | 1/4 = 25% | 1/12 ≈ 0,083 |
| 0.75 | 1/3 ≈ 0,333 | 9/16 = 56.25% | 9/32 ≈ 0,281 |
- No sale: both values below r: r · r = r².
- Welfare loss: the item should go to the highest-value bidder; if that value is below r, it is lost. The highest value has density 2t: loss ∫0r t · 2t dt = 2r³/3.
- Welfare without a reserve: E[max] = 2/3.
Revenue and Information
All-Pay and Multi-Unit Auctions
The highest bid wins but everyone pays their bid: lobbying, R&D races, election campaigns.
Two bidders, U[0, 1]: in equilibrium b(v) = v²/2. Value 0.8 → bid 0.32 (0.4 under first price). Types with little chance of winning bid almost nothing.
Expected revenue is again 1/3 (revenue equivalence): a type-v bidder's expected payment is v²/2, as under first and second price.
With identical units (government bonds), winners pay either a uniform price per unit or their own bids; for items valuable together (spectrum licenses), package bids are used.
Further reading: Bulow and Klemperer (1996): attracting one extra bidder earns as much as the optimal reserve price, and often more.
Revenue and Information
The Winner's Curse
- In a common-value auction, the highest bid comes from the bidder who overestimates the value the most.
- If the winner ignores their estimation error, they may pay more than the item's true value.
- Even if estimates are right on average, the largest estimate is systematically too high.
- To reduce this risk, bidders bid below their signals and take the quality of their information into account.
- First documented in Gulf of Mexico oil-lease auctions (Capen, Clapp, Campbell, 1971).
Estimation errors U[−20, 20]: the winner's expected overestimate is 20(n−1)/(n+1). More rivals, bigger curse (simulation gives the same values).
Revenue and Information
Step by Step: An Oil Lease Auction
| Case | Winner / payment | Profit |
|---|---|---|
The field's true value is V = 100 (nobody knows it). Five firms estimate 82, 91, 96, 107, 124. The mean is 100: the estimates are right on average.
| Case | Winner / payment | Profit |
|---|---|---|
| First price, unshaded bids | F5 → 124 | −24 |
If everyone bids their estimate (first price), the most optimistic, F5, wins and pays 124 → profit −24.
| Case | Winner / payment | Profit |
|---|---|---|
| First price, unshaded bids | F5 → 124 | −24 |
| Second price, unshaded bids | F5 → 107 | −7 |
Even under second price F5 pays 107 → profit −7. Winning means answering yes to “am I the one who overestimated most?”
| Case | Winner / payment | Profit |
|---|---|---|
| First price, unshaded bids | F5 → 124 | −24 |
| Second price, unshaded bids | F5 → 107 | −7 |
| Expected largest error (n = 5) | 20·4/6 | ≈ 13.3 |
With errors U[−20, 20], the largest of five estimates is off by 20·4/6 ≈ 13.3 on average. Bidding your estimate under first price gives expected profit ≈ −13.3; under second price you pay the second-largest estimate, whose error averages 20·(n − 3)/(n + 1) = 20·2/6 ≈ 6.7, so ≈ −6.7.
| Case | Winner / payment | Profit |
|---|---|---|
| First price, unshaded bids | F5 → 124 | −24 |
| Second price, unshaded bids | F5 → 107 | −7 |
| Expected largest error (n = 5) | 20·4/6 | ≈ 13.3 |
| Simulation, first price, unshaded bids | mean | −13.3 |
| Simulation, first price, shaded by 13.3 | mean | 0 |
First-price simulation (100,000 auctions): bidding your estimate averages a profit of −13.3; shading by 13.3 brings it to ≈ 0. With 10 firms the required shading is 16.4: more rivals, shade more.
Two-Sided Markets
Double Auctions
- Many buyers and many sellers submit orders at once: buyers post bids, sellers post asks.
- Stock exchanges, electricity markets and carbon permit markets work this way.
- Matching: sort bids in decreasing and asks in increasing order; pairs match as long as bid ≥ ask.
- Price: a single market price is chosen from the interval between the last matched pair and the first unmatched pair (e.g. the midpoint).
- Total surplus (buyer + seller surplus) = Σ (bid − ask) over matched pairs → the largest possible value.
Two-Sided Markets
Step by Step: Matching in a Double Auction
Order book: buyers are willing to pay 70, 40, 90, 55, 80; sellers to accept 60, 85, 35, 75, 50.
Bids are sorted decreasing (the demand curve), asks increasing (the supply curve).
Pair 1: 90 ≥ 35 → match; this trade creates surplus 90 − 35 = 55.
Pair 2: 80 ≥ 50 → match; this trade creates surplus 80 − 50 = 30.
Pair 3: 70 ≥ 60 → match; this trade creates surplus 70 − 60 = 10.
Pair 4: 55 < 75 → the buyer won't pay what the seller asks; stop. 3 trades take place.
Price interval: [max(60, 55), min(70, 75)] = [60, 70]. The midpoint is price = 65; every matched trader trades at this price.
Buyer surplus (90−65)+(80−65)+(70−65) = 45, seller surplus (65−35)+(65−50)+(65−60) = 50; total 95 = the largest possible total surplus.
Two-Sided Markets
Code Trace: double_auction(bids, asks)
Sort bids from high to low: the most eager buyer first.
Asks from low to high: the cheapest seller first.
k: number of matched pairs; n: length of the shorter list.
Condition: b[0] = 90 ≥ s[0] = 35? Yes.
Pair matched → k = 1.
Condition: b[1] = 80 ≥ s[1] = 50? Yes.
Pair matched → k = 2.
Condition: b[2] = 70 ≥ s[2] = 60? Yes.
Pair matched → k = 3.
Condition: b[3] = 55 ≥ s[3] = 75? No. The loop ends.
k ≠ 0: at least one trade, so compute the price.
lo = max(s[k−1], b[k]) = max(60, 55) = 60: the last seller must not lose, and the excluded buyer must not want to buy.
hi = min(b[k−1], s[k]) = min(70, 75) = 70.
Result: 3 trades at price (60 + 70)/2 = 65.
def double_auction(bids, asks): b = sorted(bids, reverse=True) # buyers s = sorted(asks) # sellers k, n = 0, min(len(b), len(s)) while k < n and b[k] >= s[k]: k += 1 # pair matched if k == 0: return 0, None lo = max([s[k-1]] + b[k:k+1]) hi = min([b[k-1]] + s[k:k+1]) return k, (lo + hi) / 2
Two-Sided Markets
Incentives in Two-Sided Markets
With independent values and costs whose ranges overlap, bilateral trade cannot achieve efficiency + IC + IR + budget balance together (Myerson–Satterthwaite, 1983).
Efficient and budget-balanced, but not IC: the marginal buyer can shade their bid to pull the price down.
Let p0 be the average of the first excluded buyer and seller. If p0 falls between the last matched buyer and seller, everyone trades at p0; otherwise the last (least profitable) pair is dropped. Truthfulness is dominant; the cost is sometimes one trade.
p0 = (55 + 75)/2 = 65 ∈ [60, 70] → all three trades happen at 65; no trade is lost.
Two-Sided Markets
Code Trace: mcafee(bids, asks)
A new example (buyers 90, 80, 70, 40; sellers 30, 50, 65, 85): bids sorted decreasing, asks increasing; sentinels (−∞ and ∞) are appended.
b[0] = 90 ≥ s[0] = 30? Yes: an efficient pair.
k = 1: 1 efficient trade found.
b[1] = 80 ≥ s[1] = 50? Yes: an efficient pair.
k = 2: 2 efficient trades found.
b[2] = 70 ≥ s[2] = 65? Yes: an efficient pair.
k = 3: 3 efficient trades found.
b[3] = 40 ≥ s[3] = 85? No: the loop ends.
Candidate price from the first excluded pair: p₀ = (40 + 85)/2 = 62.5.
Is p₀ ∈ [s[2], b[2]] = [65, 70]? No (62.5 < 65): the 3rd seller would lose money.
Drop the weakest pair (70, 65): 2 trades; buyers pay 70, sellers receive 65. The leftover 2·5 = 10 stays with the market maker.
def mcafee(bids, asks): b = sorted(bids, reverse=True) + [float('-inf')] s = sorted(asks) + [float('inf')] k = 0 while b[k] >= s[k]: k += 1 # efficient trade if k == 0: return 0, None, None p0 = (b[k] + s[k]) / 2 # excluded pair if s[k-1] <= p0 <= b[k-1]: return k, p0, p0 # one price return k - 1, b[k-1], s[k-1] # two prices
Two-Sided Markets
Auctions and Market Design
- Market design decides who gets matched with whom, and under which rules.
- The core goals are efficiency, incentive compatibility, fairness, stability and practicality; rules should be strategyproof.
- Auctions are market-design tools that allocate scarce resources by prices and bids.
- Electricity markets, emission permits, procurement and spectrum licenses use prices; in markets without money, priority and matching rules take the place of prices.
- There can be trade-offs among revenue, efficiency, simplicity and strategyproofness.
Two-Sided Markets
From Theory to Practice: A Brief History
Herodotus describes auctions in Babylon in the 5th century BC. In AD 193 the Praetorian Guard auctioned the Roman throne to Didius Julianus.
Vickrey (1961) compared the four formats and found revenue equivalence; Myerson (1981) characterized the revenue-maximizing auction. Nobel: Vickrey 1996, Myerson 2007.
In 1994 the US FCC ran its first spectrum auction using the simultaneous multi-round ascending design proposed by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee. Milgrom and Wilson: Nobel 2020.
Roth and Shapley (Nobel 2012): stable matching and exchange rules for markets that do not use prices.
Assessment
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rarely Used?
- Trust: bidders must trust that the second-highest bid is reported honestly (risk of shill bids).
- Intuition: “pay the second price” feels unnatural to most people; overbidding is common in the lab.
- Model assumptions: with common or interdependent values, truthful bidding may no longer be dominant.
- Multiple items: budget constraints and complementary goods complicate the payment rule (VCG).
- Seller concerns: the risk of a low realized price or collusive bidding.
Assessment
Discussion: Which Auction, and How Fair?
- English: transparent, and seeing the price step by step is an advantage.
- Vickrey: truthful bidding is best; no need to strategize.
- Dutch / first price: fast, but you must guess how much to shade.
- The choice depends on personal strategy and appetite for risk.
- Rules are fixed in advance → predictability; manipulation can be reduced.
- But deep-pocketed players have an advantage; unequal access and information asymmetry matter.
- Seller revenue and equal opportunity are different goals; “perfect fairness for all” is not guaranteed.
Assessment
Summary: The Four Formats Side by Side
| Format | Pays | Equilibrium bid (IPV, U[0.1], n bidders) | Equivalent to |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | price at which the last rival drops out | stay in up to your value | second price |
| Second price | second-highest bid | b = v (weakly dominant) | English |
| Dutch | the accepted price | b = (n−1)v/n | first price |
| First price | own bid | b = (n−1)v/n | Dutch |
All four have expected revenue (n−1)/(n+1); 1/3 with two bidders.
With common values the winner may overpay; shade more as the number of rivals grows.
Match bids in decreasing and asks in increasing order; the price comes from [lo, hi].
Assessment
Sample Problems
- Limits 40, 65, 80, 90. Under the four rules, who wins and what do they pay (everyone bids their limit)?
- n = 4 bidders, values U[0, 1]. What is the first-price equilibrium bid of a bidder with value 0.6?
- Three bidders, U[0, 1]: what is the expected revenue of a second-price auction?
- In Vickrey your value is 50 and the rivals' highest bid is 55. What happens if you bid 60?
- Buyers 100, 70, 45; sellers 30, 60, 80. How many trades, and what is the midpoint price?
- Two bidders, U[0, 1], second price, reserve r = 0.4. What is the expected revenue? More than with no reserve?
Show answers
- The 90 wins. English ≈ 80, second price 80; Dutch 90, first price 90.
- b = (4 − 1)/4 · 0.6 = 0.45.
- (n − 1)/(n + 1) = 2/4 = 1/2.
- You win but pay 55: utility 50 − 55 = −5. Bidding truthfully gives 0.
- 2 trades (100–30, 70–60); interval [max(60, 45), min(70, 80)] = [60, 70] → price = 65.
- 1/3 + r² − 4r³/3 = 1/3 + 0.16 − 0.0853 ≈ 0.408 > 1/3 ≈ 0.333. (Best is r = 0.5: 5/12 ≈ 0.417.)
Assessment
References (1/2)
- V. Krishna, Auction Theory, 2nd ed., Academic Press, 2010 · P. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- T. Roughgarden, Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2016; course page: CS364A · N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Chapters 9 and 13).
- A. Karlin, Y. Peres, Game Theory, Alive, American Mathematical Society, 2017 (auction chapters) · D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (Chapter 9: Auctions).
- W. Vickrey, “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders”, Journal of Finance, 1961 · R. Myerson, “Optimal Auction Design”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981.
- J. G. Riley, W. F. Samuelson, “Optimal Auctions”, AER 71(3), 1981 · J. Bulow, P. Klemperer, “Auctions versus Negotiations”, AER 86(1), 1996.
- M. H. Rothkopf, T. J. Teisberg, E. P. Kahn, “Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?”, J. Political Economy 98(1), 1990 · L. M. Ausubel, P. Milgrom, “The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction”, Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006.
Assessment
References (2/2)
- R. P. McAfee, “A Dominant Strategy Double Auction”, Journal of Economic Theory, 1992 · E. Capen, R. Clapp, W. Campbell, “Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations”, Journal of Petroleum Technology, 1971.
- J. H. Kagel, R. M. Harstad, D. Levin, “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study”, Econometrica 55(6), 1987 · R. B. Myerson, M. A. Satterthwaite, “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading”, Journal of Economic Theory 29(2), 1983.
- Course pages: N. Shah, CSC304 (Toronto) · M. Dinitz (Johns Hopkins) · M. Hoefer (Frankfurt).