Chapter 4: Mechanism Design

Algorithmic Game Theory
Social choice functionsDirect mechanismsRevelation principleIncentive compatibilityMyerson's lemmaVCGGale–ShapleyMedian mechanismTTCBayesian games
Sercan KÜLCÜ · Giresun University · Computer Engineering

Basic Concepts

Warm-up Game: The Ultimatum Game

The rules

The proposer splits 10 tokens and offers the responder a share; if the responder accepts, the split goes ahead, and if not, both get 0.

Think about it
  • As the responder, would you accept an offer of 1 token?
  • As the proposer, how many tokens would you offer?
proposer 7responder 3Poffers x tokensRacceptreject(10 − x, x)(0, 0)

Basic Concepts

Learning Outcomes

Concepts

Explain social choice functions, direct mechanisms, the revelation principle and Bayes–Nash equilibrium.

Incentive analysis

Test whether a mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR).

Computing VCG

Compute the efficient outcome and each player's VCG payment from “what if they were absent” welfare.

Design without money

Find stable matchings with Gale–Shapley and exchanges with TTC; show why the median mechanism is strategyproof.

Basic Concepts

What Is Mechanism Design?

  • Game theory “in reverse”: the game is not given — we build it.
  • We design the rules (who gets what, who pays what) to reach a desired outcome.
  • The difficulty: players hold private information (values, preferences, costs) hidden from the designer.
  • Goal: reach the desired outcome even though players are selfish and strategic.
  • Examples: taxes, procurement, voting systems, school admissions, ad auctions.
AAyşev = 70b = ?BBorav = 55b = ?CCemv = 85b = ?Mechanism (rules)designer sees: ?, ?, ?outcome x (who gets it) · payments p
2007 Nobel Prize in Economics: Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson, “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory”. In 2012 Roth and Shapley were honored for stable matching and market design.

Basic Concepts

Game Theory and Mechanism Design

Game theory (analysis): given the rules, predict the outcomeRulesgame, payoffsBehaviorequilibrium strategiesOutcomewho got what?Mechanism design (synthesis): given the goal, find the rulesRules ?allocation + paymentBehaviorwhat do they do in equilibrium?Goal f(θ)desired outcomeQuestion: “Which mechanism yields this outcome in equilibrium?”
Game theory: Rules → Outcome.   Mechanism design: Outcome → Rules. The designer cannot force the players; it only chooses the rules.

Basic Concepts

Incentives

People respond to incentives

If the rules make some behavior profitable, players move toward it.

A good mechanism

Rewards honesty and deters strategic lying: incentive compatibility.

The free-rider problem

When funding a public good, everyone wants to understate their share and benefit from what others pay.

Strategic voting

Voters may back a candidate with a real chance instead of their true favorite.

Misaligned incentives → misreported information → inefficient or unfair outcomes.

Basic Concepts

Real-World Applications

Tax systems

Income is private information; audits and rates must encourage honest reporting.

Funding public goods

Parks, roads, libraries: who should pay how much, and should the project go ahead?

Procurement and auctions

Public procurement, spectrum licenses, artworks.

Online advertising

Ad auctions that run within milliseconds of every search query.

Matching markets

School admissions, medical residencies, dorm room swaps: no money, only rules.

Grading group projects

If students report their own contributions, the grading rule must deter exaggeration.

Direct Mechanisms

Social Choice Functions

  • Each player has a type θi ∈ Θi: a value, preference or cost. Types are private.
  • A set of possible outcomes O (e.g. who gets the item, which project is built).
  • A social choice function f : Θ1 × … × Θn → O assigns the “desired” outcome to each type profile.
  • The problem: the designer does not know θ; to implement f(θ), it must get the information from the players.
type profile θ = (70, 55, 85)Ayşe70Bora55Cem85“1000”?f = highest valueoutcome: Cem gets it

Efficient choice: f(θ) = the highest-value player → Cem. But what if everyone says “my value is 1000”?

The question of mechanism design: are there rules that implement f even when players pursue their own interests?

Direct Mechanisms

Direct Mechanisms

1θ1 (hidden)b12θ2 (hidden)b23θ3 (hidden)b3Mechanismx(b) allocation · p(b) paymentOutcome x andpayments piui = vi(x) − pi
  • In a direct mechanism, participants report their private information (types): bi (the report; it may be a lie).
  • From the reports, the mechanism computes the outcome x(b) and payments p(b). Quasi-linear utility: ui = vi(x) − pi (vi: the valuation of a player of type θi; for a single item vi = θi).
  • In an indirect mechanism, a strategy is something else: raising a hand in an auction, bidding in turn…

Direct Mechanisms

The Revelation Principle

Indirect mechanism M: each player plays their own equilibrium strategyθisi(θi)player's strategyMoutcome oDirect mechanism M*: players only report bᵢ, the designer plays the strategyM*bisi(bi)designer computesMsame outcome o
  • If an outcome can be implemented in equilibrium by some indirect mechanism, then under suitable conditions a direct mechanism in which truthful reporting is an equilibrium implements the same outcome.
  • Why? Lying amounts to playing an off-equilibrium strategy in M, and that was not profitable in equilibrium.
  • Example: in an English auction everyone stays in up to their value. If the designer says “write down your value and I'll stay in for you”, we get a direct mechanism (second price) where writing the truth is best.
  • The principle does not always make truth-telling a dominant strategy: the incentive condition depends on the equilibrium concept used (dominant strategy / Bayes–Nash).

Direct Mechanisms

Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rationality (IR)

Dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)

With true type θi, truth is at least as good as any lie bi, whatever others report:

ui(θi; θi, b−i) ≥ ui(θi; bi, b−i)
Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC)

If others are truthful, truth maximizes expected utility. DSIC ⇒ BIC.

Individual rationality (IR)

Participating is at least as good as staying out:

ui(θi; θi, b−i) ≥ 0   (truthful)
024681012-2024bid butility utruthfulb = 7 → 3second price: 4first price

Value 10, rival bid 6. Paying your own bid (first price): truth yields 0, a bid of 7 yields 3: not IC. Paying the rival's bid (second price): any bid above 6 yields 4.

Direct Mechanisms

Back to the Game: The Ultimatum Game

Theory's answer

A token-only responder gets x by accepting, 0 by rejecting: accepting any x ≥ 0 is a best response (IR); at x = 0 rejecting is too. The proposer offers “take it or leave it”. Two pure SPE with integer offers: (10, 0) and (9, 1) (rejects at 0).

In practice

Since Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982): the most common offer is 40–50%, and about half of offers below 20% are rejected (Camerer, 2003). People punish unfairness at their own cost.

ResponderSmallest offer acceptedProposer's payoff
Theory (tokens only)1 (0 if 0 is also accepted)9 (10 in that case)
Level 1: lenient19
Level 2: strategic37
Level 3: fairness-minded55
IC design needs the right utility: if players care about fairness, IR becomes “x reaches a fair share”, not “x ≥ 0”.

Direct Mechanisms

Step by Step: Is Proportional Cost Sharing IC?

AyşeBoraCemTotal
True value v30252075
Report————
Payment————
Utility u = v − payment————
Park built?—

A park costs 60 thousand TL. Rule: if the reports sum to ≥ 60, the park is built and the cost is split in proportion to the reports.

AyşeBoraCemTotal
True value v30252075
Report30252075
Payment24201660
Utility u = v − payment65415
Park built?Yes (total ≥ 60)

Everyone truthful: total 75 ≥ 60, the park is built. Payments 60·30/75 = 24, 20, 16; utilities 6, 5, 4. All ≥ 0 → IR holds.

AyşeBoraCemTotal
True value v30252075
Report3025560
Payment3025560
Utility u = v − payment001515
Park built?Yes (total ≥ 60)

Cem reports 5: the total is still 60 and the park is still built; Cem now pays 5 and his utility goes 4 → 15. Lying paid off → not IC.

AyşeBoraCemTotal
True value v30252075
Report1512.51037.5
Payment0000
Utility u = v − payment0000
Park built?No (total < 60)

If everyone halves their report by the same logic, the total is 37.5 < 60: no park, and total utility drops 15 → 0. Free riding causes inefficiency.

The fix: a report should affect its sender's payment only by changing the chosen outcome → VCG.

Direct Mechanisms

Criteria for Mechanism Design

  • Incentive compatibility (IC): revealing the truth is the best option.
  • Individual rationality (IR): participating is no worse than staying out.
  • Efficiency: the outcome maximizes social welfare SW(x) = Σi vi(x) (under truthful reports).
  • Budget balance: total payments ≥ 0 (weak: no outside funding needed) or = 0 (strong: no surplus either).
ICIREfficientBalancedVCGpublic project✓✓✓✗Proportionalpublic project✗✓✓✓Posted pricebilateral trade✓✓✗✓Midpointbilateral trade✗✓✓✓

Sample mechanisms: each gives up one criterion.

These criteria cannot always be met together: in bilateral trade with independent values and costs whose ranges overlap, efficiency + (Bayesian) IC + IR + budget balance are jointly impossible (Myerson–Satterthwaite, 1983). Design means choosing the trade-offs.

Direct Mechanisms

Implementation Theory: Is Truth-Telling the Only Equilibrium?

  • The revelation principle only says truthful reporting is an equilibrium; the same mechanism may have other, undesirable equilibria.
  • Rules can make a good equilibrium possible without guaranteeing that players coordinate on it. Mechanisms whose every equilibrium yields the desired outcome are studied by implementation theory (further reading: Maskin, 1999).
A bad equilibrium in Vickrey

Values: Ayşe 10, Bora 5. Ayşe bids 0, Bora bids 100: Bora wins and pays 0 (utility 5). To win, Ayşe would have to beat 100 and pay 100 (utility −90), so she does not deviate. Bora cannot gain by deviating either, so these bids form a Nash equilibrium — yet the item goes to Bora, the lower-value player.

Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy; this equilibrium rests on weakly dominated bids.

Lesson: under DSIC a player need not predict the opponent, which makes it more robust than designs relying only on Nash equilibrium. Still, it does not guarantee a unique equilibrium.

Direct Mechanisms

Single-Parameter Environments: Myerson's Lemma

  • Each player has one private number: a per-unit value vi. The mechanism chooses an allocation xi(b) and payment pi(b); utility is vi·xi − pi.
  • Myerson's lemma (1981): x can be used in a DSIC mechanism ⇔ x is monotone (xi does not decrease as the bid rises). The payment is then uniquely determined (with pi(0) = 0):

pi(b) = bi·xi(b) − ∫0bi xi(z, b−i) dz   = the shaded area left of the curve, between 0 and x(b) (the b × x(b) rectangle minus the area under the curve)

02040608010001bid zx(z)b = 85p = 70single item: critical bid = 700246800.41bid zx(z)b = 6p = 4.2payment = Σ jump × bid = 0.4·3 + 0.6·5 = 4.2
For 0/1 allocations, payment = critical bid (the lowest bid that still wins): exactly Vickrey's second price. If the payment is not the critical bid, IC fails: with threshold 50 and a fixed payment of 20, a player valued between 20 and 50 overbids past 50 and wins.

The VCG Mechanism

The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) Mechanism

  • Choose the outcome that maximizes social welfare under the reported values: x* = argmaxx Σi bi(x)  (bi(x): i's reported value for x).
  • Each player's payment is the externality their participation imposes on the others (Clarke pivot rule):
pi = maxx Σj≠i bj(x) − Σj≠i bj(x*)
= (others' best welfare without i) − (others' welfare with i)
Ayşe 40Cem 10without Borabest is Park50Cem 45with BoraGym chosen45p = 5

Bora's externality in the public project example.

  • A report affects the payment only through x*; so, under suitable conditions, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy.
  • A player's utility = social welfare − (a term independent of them): everyone wants to maximize social welfare.

The VCG Mechanism

Step by Step: Choosing a Public Project with VCG

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe4050——
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone———
(b) Σ without i———

Three residents, three projects. Each resident reports a value (thousand TL) for each project. Only one project will be built.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe4050——
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without i———

(a) Best choice with everyone: the sum of the three values (social welfare) is Park 50, Library 55, Gym 65. The highest is the Gym: x* = Gym, welfare 65.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe4050——
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Ayşe105065

(b) Without Ayşe: Bora's and Cem's values sum to Park 10, Library 50, Gym 65. Best is the Gym; the others' welfare is 65.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe4050——
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Ayşe105065

(c) With Ayşe the Gym is chosen. The others' welfare at the Gym: Bora 20 + Cem 45 = 65.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Ayşe105065

(d) Payment = (b) − (c) = 65 − 65 = 0. The Gym is chosen with or without Ayşe; she does no harm to the others.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Bora502545

(b) Without Bora: Ayşe's and Cem's values sum to Park 50, Library 25, Gym 45. Best is the Park; the others' welfare is 50.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora03020——
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Bora502545

(c) With Bora the Gym is chosen. The others' welfare at the Gym: Ayşe 0 + Cem 45 = 45.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora030205—
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Bora502545

(d) Payment = (b) − (c) = 50 − 45 = 5. Without Bora the Park would be chosen and the others would get 50; because of Bora the Gym is chosen and they get 45. Bora's harm to the others is 5.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora030205—
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Cem403520

(b) Without Cem: Ayşe's and Bora's values sum to Park 40, Library 35, Gym 20. Best is the Park; the others' welfare is 40.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora030205—
Cem102045——
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Cem403520

(c) With Cem the Gym is chosen. The others' welfare at the Gym: Ayşe 0 + Bora 20 = 20.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe40500—
Bora030205—
Cem10204520—
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓
(b) Σ without Cem403520

(d) Payment = (b) − (c) = 40 − 20 = 20. Without Cem the Park would be chosen and the others would get 40; because of Cem the Gym is chosen and they get 20. Cem's harm to the others is 20.

ParkLibraryGymPayment piUtility ui
Ayşe405000
Bora03020515
Cem1020452025
(a) Σ everyone505565 ✓2540
(b) Σ without i———

Utilities (value − payment): Ayşe 0 − 0 = 0, Bora 20 − 5 = 15, Cem 45 − 20 = 25. Everyone's utility is ≥ 0 (IR). The 25 collected is not returned to anyone: a budget surplus.

Payment pi = (b) − (c) = (others' best welfare without i) − (others' welfare with i): the harm i does to others.

The VCG Mechanism

Code Trace: vcg(v, A)

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)———
w(a, D)———

Build the player list. v[i][a]: i's reported value for project a.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D)———

Compute w(a, N) for each project; the largest is the Gym (65) → x = G.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D)———

The payment dict starts empty; now ask “what if they were absent?” for each player.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Ayşe105065

i = Ayşe: D holds everyone except Ayşe.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Ayşe105065

Without Ayşe, the best project is the Gym: w_out = 65.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Ayşe105065

With Ayşe the Gym is chosen; D's welfare there: w_in = 65.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Ayşe105065

p[Ayşe] = 65 − 65 = 0.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Bora502545

i = Bora: D holds everyone except Bora.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Bora502545

Without Bora, the best project is the Park: w_out = 50.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Bora502545

With Bora the Gym is chosen; D's welfare there: w_in = 45.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Bora502545

p[Bora] = 50 − 45 = 5.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Cem403520

i = Cem: D holds everyone except Cem.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Cem403520

Without Cem, the best project is the Park: w_out = 40.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Cem403520

With Cem the Gym is chosen; D's welfare there: w_in = 20.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D) · D = N − Cem403520

p[Cem] = 40 − 20 = 20.

ParkLibraryGym
w(a, N)505565
w(a, D)———

Result: the Gym is built; payments {Ayşe: 0, Bora: 5, Cem: 20}. Total 25.

def vcg(v, A):
  N = list(v)            # players
  def w(a, S):           # welfare of S at a
    return sum(v[i][a] for i in S)
  x = max(A, key=lambda a: w(a, N))
  p = {}
  for i in N:
    D = [j for j in N if j != i]
    w_out = max(w(a, D) for a in A)  # i absent
    w_in = w(x, D)                   # i present
    p[i] = w_out - w_in
  return x, p

The VCG Mechanism

Does Lying Pay in VCG?

CaseReport (P, L, G)ChosenPaymentTrue utility
Cem truthful10, 20, 45Gym2045 − 20 = 25
 
 
 

Baseline: Cem reports truthfully → the Gym is chosen, he pays 20, true utility 45 − 20 = 25.

CaseReport (P, L, G)ChosenPaymentTrue utility
Cem truthful10, 20, 45Gym2045 − 20 = 25
Cem overstates10, 20, 100Gym2045 − 20 = 25
 
 

Cem reports 100 for the Gym: the outcome is unchanged and so is the payment (it depends on the others' reports) → still 25.

CaseReport (P, L, G)ChosenPaymentTrue utility
Cem truthful10, 20, 45Gym2045 − 20 = 25
Cem overstates10, 20, 100Gym2045 − 20 = 25
Cem understates10, 20, 25Library520 − 5 = 15
 

Cem reports 25 for the Gym: totals 50, 55, 45 → the Library is chosen. Cem pays 5, but his true value there is 20 → utility 15 < 25.

CaseReport (P, L, G)ChosenPaymentTrue utility
Cem truthful10, 20, 45Gym2045 − 20 = 25
Cem overstates10, 20, 100Gym2045 − 20 = 25
Cem understates10, 20, 25Library520 − 5 = 15
Bora overstates0, 60, 20Library2530 − 25 = 5

Bora reports 60 for the Library: the Library is chosen, but Bora pays 25 → 30 − 25 = 5 < 15. No lie pays off.

Trying every report (0, 10, …, 100 for each project), no player ever beats the utility of truthful reporting.

The VCG Mechanism

Properties and Limits of VCG

Strengths

  • DSIC: truthful reporting is a dominant strategy.
  • Efficient: the welfare-maximizing outcome is chosen.
  • IR with the Clarke pivot and nonnegative values; payments ≥ 0.
  • For a single item, VCG = the Vickrey (second-price) auction.

Limits

  • No strong budget balance: the example leaves a surplus of 25 (never a deficit; weak budget balance holds).
  • Computing the argmax can be NP-hard in combinatorial problems.
  • Vulnerable to collusion and fake identities; revenue can be low.
  • Asking players to reveal all their values raises privacy concerns.
High computational cost and budget-balance issues can limit real deployments. Sponsored search ads mostly use GSP instead of VCG.

The VCG Mechanism

Code Trace: vcg() on a Single Item = Vickrey

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)———w(a, D)———

Single item: outcome a = who gets the item. v[i][a] = i's value if a = i, else 0.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)———

w(a, N) is just the recipient's value: 70, 55, 85 → x = Cem (highest value).

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)———

For payments, each bidder is asked “what if you weren't here?”

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)05585

i = Ayşe: Ayşe's row is grayed out; D = the others.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)05585

Without Ayşe the item would go to Cem: w_out = 85.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)05585

The item is with Cem; D's welfare there is w_in = 85. p[Ayşe] = 85 − 85 = 0 → losers pay nothing.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)70085

i = Bora: Bora's row is grayed out; D = the others.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)70085

Without Bora the item would go to Cem: w_out = 85.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)70085

The item is with Cem; D's welfare there is w_in = 85. p[Bora] = 85 − 85 = 0 → losers pay nothing.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)70550

i = Cem: Cem's row is grayed out; D = the others.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)70550

Without Cem the item would go to Ayşe: w_out = 70.

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)70550

The item is with Cem; D's welfare there is w_in = 0. p[Cem] = 70 − 0 = 70 = the second-highest value!

Ayşe70Bora55Cem85a = Ayşea = Boraa = Cemw(a, N)705585w(a, D)———

Result: Cem wins and pays 70; the losers pay 0. For a single item, VCG = Vickrey (second price).

def vcg(v, A):
  N = list(v)            # players
  def w(a, S):           # welfare of S at a
    return sum(v[i][a] for i in S)
  x = max(A, key=lambda a: w(a, N))
  p = {}
  for i in N:
    D = [j for j in N if j != i]
    w_out = max(w(a, D) for a in A)  # i absent
    w_in = w(x, D)                   # i present
    p[i] = w_out - w_in
  return x, p

Mechanisms Without Money

Mechanism Design Without Money

  • School admissions, dorm room swaps, voting: payments are either banned or inappropriate.
  • Without money, incentives cannot be fixed through payments; only the outcome rule can be designed.
  • Bad news for general preferences: with at least three alternatives, every onto, strategyproof rule (lying never helps) is a dictatorship — the same single person's preference always decides (Gibbard–Satterthwaite).
  • Ways out: exploit preference structure (single-peaked → median) or change the goal (stable instead of “best” → Gale–Shapley; exchange → TTC).
Designwithout moneyGeneral preferences, ≥ 3 optionsG–S: only dictatorshipSingle-peaked preferencesmedian: DSICTwo-sided matchingGale–Shapley: stableRoom / shift swapTTC: DSIC + Pareto

Mechanisms Without Money

The Stable Matching Problem

  • Two sides: students and capstone projects (each project takes one student). Each side ranks the other.
  • A blocking pair: a student and a project who prefer each other to their current partners.
  • A matching with no blocking pair is stable: nobody wants to break away.
Student1.2.3.
AXYZ
BXZY
CYXZ
Project1.2.3.
XBAC
YACB
ZABC
AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ Cstudentprojectbold: matching · dashed: blocking pair
Unstable example {A–X, B–Y, C–Z}: B prefers X to Y, and X prefers B to A → (B, X) blocks. By the same logic (B, Z) and (C, Y) block too (checking all 9 pairs finds no others).

Mechanisms Without Money

Gale–Shapley: Deferred Acceptance (Proposal Rounds)

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Start: everyone is free. Students propose in preference order; a project tentatively holds its best applicant and rejects the rest.

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 1 proposals: A→X, B→X, C→Y (each free student to their best project that has not yet rejected them).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference order✗AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 1 decisions — X: holds B, rejects A (B, ranked 1st, is better); Y: accepts C (tentatively).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 2 proposals: A→Y (each free student to their best project that has not yet rejected them).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference order✗AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 2 decisions — Y: holds A, rejects C (A, ranked 1st, is better).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 3 proposals: C→X (each free student to their best project that has not yet rejected them).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference order✗AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 3 decisions — X: holds B, rejects C (B, ranked 1st, is better).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 4 proposals: C→Z (each free student to their best project that has not yet rejected them).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Round 4 decisions — Z: accepts C (tentatively).

Student (proposes)Project (accept/reject)preference orderpreference orderAX ≻ Y ≻ ZBX ≻ Z ≻ YCY ≻ X ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ C ≻ BZA ≻ B ≻ C

Everyone is matched → stop. A–Y, B–X, C–Z. Check: A wants X, but X prefers B to A; neither X nor Y wants C → no blocking pair, stable.

Mechanisms Without Money

Code Trace: gale_shapley(stu, proj)

free (queue)ABCX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← —Y: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Everyone free, projects empty. proj[p][s]: p's rank for s (0 = best).

free (queue)ABCX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← —Y: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Each student's next choice is index 0 (their favorite project).

free (queue)BCA → XX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← —Y: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Pop A from the queue; A proposes to its next choice, X.

free (queue)BCA → XX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← AY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

X is empty (r = None) → A is tentatively accepted.

free (queue)CB → XX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← AY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Pop B from the queue; B proposes to its next choice, X.

free (queue)CAB → XX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —A rejected

X was holding A; X prefers B (rank 0 < 1) → B accepted, A rejoins the queue.

free (queue)AC → YX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← —Z: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Pop C from the queue; C proposes to its next choice, Y.

free (queue)AC → YX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← CZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Y is empty (r = None) → C is tentatively accepted.

free (queue)emptyA → YX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← CZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Pop A from the queue; A proposes to its next choice, Y.

free (queue)CA → YX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← AZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —C rejected

Y was holding C; Y prefers A (rank 0 < 1) → A accepted, C rejoins the queue.

free (queue)emptyC → XX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← AZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Pop C from the queue; C proposes to its next choice, X.

free (queue)CC → XX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← AZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —C rejected

X prefers the B it holds to C → C is rejected and rejoins the queue.

free (queue)emptyC → ZX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← AZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← —

Pop C from the queue; C proposes to its next choice, Z.

free (queue)emptyC → ZX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← AZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← C

Z is empty (r = None) → C is tentatively accepted.

free (queue)emptyX: B ≻ A ≻ CX ← BY: A ≻ C ≻ BY ← AZ: A ≻ B ≻ CZ ← C

The queue is empty after 6 proposals. Same result as the simultaneous rounds: A–Y, B–X, C–Z.

def gale_shapley(stu, proj):
  free, match = list(stu), {}
  nxt = {s: 0 for s in stu}
  while free:
    s = free.pop(0)
    p = stu[s][nxt[s]]         # next choice
    nxt[s] += 1
    r = match.get(p)           # p's holder
    if r is None or proj[p][s] < proj[p][r]:
      match[p] = s             # accept
      if r is not None: free.append(r)
    else: free.append(s)      # reject
  return match

Mechanisms Without Money

Properties of Gale–Shapley

Always stable

The algorithm terminates with a stable matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962). At most n² proposals → O(n²) (with a constant-time queue, e.g. deque).

Proposer-optimal

Proposers get their best partner among all stable matchings; the receiving side gets its worst.

DSIC for proposers

For the proposing side, reporting the true ranking is a dominant strategy. The receiving side can sometimes gain by lying.

Applications

The US medical residency match (NRMP), school choice in Boston and New York. 2012 Nobel: Roth and Shapley.

Our example has a single stable matching (checking all 3! = 6 matchings); even if the projects proposed, the result would be A–Y, B–X, C–Z.

Mechanisms Without Money

The Receiving Side Can Gain by Lying

AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBY ≻ X ≻ ZCX ≻ Y ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ B ≻ CZA ≻ B ≻ Cstudentproject

A new example. Students propose. The projects' true preferences: X: B ≻ A ≻ C; Y and Z: A ≻ B ≻ C.

AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBY ≻ X ≻ ZCX ≻ Y ≻ ZXB ≻ A ≻ CYA ≻ B ≻ CZA ≻ B ≻ Cstudentproject

With truthful reports the proposals are A→X, B→Y, C→X, C→Y, C→Z → A–X, B–Y, C–Z. X gets A, its 2nd choice.

AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBY ≻ X ≻ ZCX ≻ Y ≻ ZXB ≻ C ≻ AYA ≻ B ≻ CZA ≻ B ≻ Cstudentproject

X lies: it reports B ≻ C ≻ A (pushing A to the bottom).

AX ≻ Y ≻ ZBY ≻ X ≻ ZCX ≻ Y ≻ ZXB ≻ C ≻ AYA ≻ B ≻ CZA ≻ B ≻ Cstudentproject

Proposals A→X, B→Y, C→X, A→Y, B→X, C→Y, C→Z: rejecting A sets off a chain that brings B to X → B–X. X got its true first choice: the lie paid off.

This example has two stable matchings (checking all 3! = 6): the student-optimal A–X, B–Y, C–Z and the project-optimal A–Y, B–X, C–Z. X's lie moves the outcome to the project-optimal one. No stable mechanism is DSIC for both sides (Roth, 1982).

Mechanisms Without Money

Facility Location: Mean or Median?

0510152025303540ABCDE
CaseFacilityE's distance
 
 
 
 
 

Five villages along a road: 2, 5, 9, 14, 20 km. One facility (a hospital) will be built; each village wants it close to itself (cost = distance).

0510152025303540ABCDEmean = 10
CaseFacilityE's distance
Mean, all truthful1010
 
 
 
 

The mean mechanism: (2+5+9+14+20)/5 = 10. E is 10 km away.

0510152025303540ABCDEE “40”mean = 14
CaseFacilityE's distance
Mean, all truthful1010
Mean, E says “40”146
 
 
 

E lies and reports 40: mean (2+5+9+14+40)/5 = 14. E's distance drops 10 → 6. Lying paid off: the mean can be manipulated.

0510152025303540ABCDEmedian = 9
CaseFacilityE's distance
Mean, all truthful1010
Mean, E says “40”146
Median, all truthful911
 
 

The median mechanism: sort the reports and take the middle one → 9. E is 11 km away.

0510152025303540ABCDEE “40”median = 9
CaseFacilityE's distance
Mean, all truthful1010
Mean, E says “40”146
Median, all truthful911
Median, E says “40”911
 

E reports 40: sorted 2, 5, 9, 14, 40 → median still 9. An extreme report cannot pull the median.

0510152025303540ABCDEE “8”median = 8
CaseFacilityE's distance
Mean, all truthful1010
Mean, E says “40”146
Median, all truthful911
Median, E says “40”911
Median, E says “8”812

E jumps to the other side of the median and reports 8: the median becomes 8 and E's distance grows 11 → 12. Worse!

0510152025303540ABCDEmedian = 9
CaseFacilityE's distance
Mean, all truthful1010
Mean, E says “40”146
Median, all truthful911
Median, E says “40”911
Median, E says “8”812

Trying every report from 0 to 60 for every village, no lie pays off under the median. The median also gives total distance 27 versus 28 for the mean: it minimizes total distance too.

Mechanisms Without Money

Why Is the Median Strategyproof?

A 2B 5C 9D 14E 2005101520250510B's report rB's distancetruthful r = 5 → 4

1) xᵢ < m (B = 5, median 9): reports r ≤ 9 leave the median at 9 (distance 4); r > 9 pushes the median right, away from B. No r gets below 4.

A 2B 5C 9D 14E 2005101520250510D's report rD's distancetruthful r = 14 → 5

2) xᵢ > m (D = 14): the symmetric case. r ≥ 9 leaves the median unchanged (distance 5); r < 9 pulls it left, away from D.

A 2B 5C 9D 14E 2005101520250510C's report rC's distancetruthful r = 9 → 0

3) xᵢ = m (C = 9): the facility sits exactly at C, distance 0; any lie can only move the median away.

Conclusion: in every case truthful reporting is a dominant strategy → the median mechanism is strategyproof (Moulin, 1980). The same idea works for voting with single-peaked preferences (Black).

Mechanisms Without Money

Serial Dictatorship and the Boston Mechanism

Serial dictatorship

In turn, each takes their favorite of what remains. No one affects earlier picks → DSIC, Pareto optimal. Random order: random serial dictatorship (RSD).

Boston mechanism (immediate acceptance)

Each round, students apply to their next choice; schools fill free seats by priority, and seats are never taken back. Losing a first choice may mean the second is full.

Preferences A: X ≻ Y ≻ Z, B: X ≻ Y ≻ Z, C: Y ≻ X ≻ Z. Priorities at X and Z: A, B, C; at Y: B, A, C. One seat each.

RoundB truthfulB says “Y ≻ X ≻ Z”
1X: A, B → A; Y: C → CX: A → A; Y: B, C → B
2B → Y fullC → X full
3B → ZC → Z
OutcomeA–X, B–Z, C–YA–X, B–Y, C–Z

Ranking Y first, B gets Y instead of Z: lying pays.

Truthful Gale–Shapley gives A–X, B–Y, C–Z here. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) showed truthful ranking can hurt under Boston; in 2005 Boston switched to student-proposing deferred acceptance.

Mechanisms Without Money

Dorm Room Exchange: Top Trading Cycles (TTC)

  • Each student owns a dorm room, there is no money, and each ranks the others' rooms (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; the algorithm is credited to Gale).
  • TTC: everyone points to the owner of their favorite remaining room. A finite graph has at least one cycle; those in it trade and leave. Repeat.
  • Reporting true preferences is a dominant strategy (Roth, 1982); the outcome is Pareto optimal and in the core: no group can do better on its own (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977).
  • The same rule fits duty or shift swaps; in the real world it is used in kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez and Ünver, 2004).
PersonPreference (room owner)
AC ≻ A ≻ B
BA ≻ D ≻ B
CB ≻ A ≻ C
DC ≻ E ≻ B ≻ D
EA ≻ D ≻ E

Example: five students swapping dorm rooms. Rooms not listed are worse than the person's own room.

Mechanisms Without Money

Code Trace: ttc(pref)

ABCDEA: —B: —C: —D: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Everyone is still in the list; nobody has traded yet.

ABCDEA: —B: —C: —D: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Round 1: each remaining person points to the owner of their favorite remaining room (arrows).

ABCDEA: —B: —C: —D: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Add A to the path; its arrow points to C.

ABCDEA: —B: —C: —D: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Add C to the path; its arrow points to B.

ABCDEA: —B: —C: —D: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Add B to the path; its arrow points to A, already on the path → cycle found.

ABCDEA: —B: —C: —D: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Cycle: A → C → B → A. Everyone on it gets the room they point to.

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Trade: A ← C's room, C ← B's room, B ← A's room. They leave.

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Round 2: each remaining person points to the owner of their favorite remaining room (arrows).

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Add D to the path; its arrow points to E.

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Add E to the path; its arrow points to D, already on the path → cycle found.

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD: —E: —A: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Cycle: D → E → D. Everyone on it gets the room they point to.

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD ← E's roomE ← D's roomA: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Trade: D ← E's room, E ← D's room. They leave.

ABCDEA ← C's roomB ← A's roomC ← B's roomD ← E's roomE ← D's roomA: C ≻ A ≻ BB: A ≻ D ≻ BC: B ≻ A ≻ CD: C ≻ E ≻ B ≻ DE: A ≻ D ≻ E

Done: A, B, C traded in a 3-cycle, D and E in a 2-cycle. Trying every false list for every person never yields a better room (DSIC); the outcome is Pareto optimal.

def ttc(pref):
  left, assign = list(pref), {}
  while left:
    g = {i: next(j for j in pref[i]
             if j in left) for i in left}
    i, path = left[0], []
    while i not in path:         # follow arrows
      path.append(i); i = g[i]
    cycle = path[path.index(i):]
    for k in cycle:              # trade
      assign[k] = g[k]; left.remove(k)
  return assign

Bayesian Games

Incomplete Information: Bayesian Games

  • So far the designer did not know the types; often the players do not know each other's types either.
  • A Bayesian game: players, type sets Θi, a common prior π over types, payoffs ui(a, θ).
  • First, chance (Nature) draws each player's type; each player sees only their own (the Harsanyi transformation).
  • A strategy is now a rule: which action to take for each type.
  • Bayes–Nash equilibrium: every player, of every type, maximizes their expected payoff against the others' strategies.
NatureS · 1/2P1A · 1/2P1information set(P1 can't see type)CP2MP2CP2MP2P2 knows its type → acts by type

Example game: P2's type is S (wants to meet) or A (wants to avoid).

Link to mechanisms: the Bayesian revelation principle → any outcome implementable in Bayes–Nash equilibrium can also be implemented by a BIC direct mechanism.

Bayesian Games

Step by Step: Finding a Bayes–Nash Equilibrium

Type S · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 1)(0, 0)
P1: M(0, 0)(1, 2)
Type A · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 0)(0, 2)
P1: M(0, 1)(1, 0)
Candidate profileP1: C expectedP1: M expectedEquilibrium?
 
 

P1 picks a concert (C) or a match (M) and prefers C. P2 is either type S (wants to meet) or type A (wants to avoid); P1 does not know which, probabilities 1/2–1/2.

Type S · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 1)(0, 0)
P1: M(0, 0)(1, 2)
Type A · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 0)(0, 2)
P1: M(0, 1)(1, 0)
Candidate profileP1: C expectedP1: M expectedEquilibrium?
 
 

Candidate: P1 = C. P2's best response depends on its type: type S picks C (1 > 0), type A picks M (2 > 0) → s2 = (S→C, A→M).

Type S · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 1)(0, 0)
P1: M(0, 0)(1, 2)
Type A · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 0)(0, 2)
P1: M(0, 1)(1, 0)
Candidate profileP1: C expectedP1: M expectedEquilibrium?
P1 = C; S→C, A→M½·2 + ½·0 = 1½·0 + ½·1 = 0.5✓ yes
 

P1's expected payoff: C → ½·2 + ½·0 = 1; M → ½·0 + ½·1 = 0.5. C is best → (C; S→C, A→M) is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium.

Type S · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 1)(0, 0)
P1: M(0, 0)(1, 2)
Type A · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 0)(0, 2)
P1: M(0, 1)(1, 0)
Candidate profileP1: C expectedP1: M expectedEquilibrium?
P1 = C; S→C, A→M½·2 + ½·0 = 1½·0 + ½·1 = 0.5✓ yes
 

The other candidate: P1 = M. Then type S picks M (2 > 0) and type A picks C (1 > 0) → s2 = (S→M, A→C).

Type S · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 1)(0, 0)
P1: M(0, 0)(1, 2)
Type A · probability 1/2P2: CP2: M
P1: C(2, 0)(0, 2)
P1: M(0, 1)(1, 0)
Candidate profileP1: C expectedP1: M expectedEquilibrium?
P1 = C; S→C, A→M½·2 + ½·0 = 1½·0 + ½·1 = 0.5✓ yes
P1 = M; S→M, A→C½·0 + ½·2 = 1½·1 + ½·0 = 0.5✗ deviates to C

P1: C → ½·0 + ½·2 = 1; M → ½·1 + ½·0 = 0.5. P1 deviates from M to C → not an equilibrium. Unique pure Bayes–Nash equilibrium: (C; S→C, A→M).

Cells show (P1 payoff, P2 payoff). All 2 × 2 × 2 = 8 pure strategy profiles were checked.

Bayesian Games

Mechanisms Through a Bayesian Lens

Example: first price

A truthful bid leaves zero utility when it wins; in equilibrium everyone bids below their value. This equilibrium is Bayesian: it rests on beliefs about the rivals' values.

DSIC or BIC?

DSIC is robust and independent of others' beliefs. BIC is weaker but allows more goals: e.g. an efficient, strongly budget-balanced public-good mechanism (d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1979; Arrow, 1979).

Maximum revenue

The mechanism maximizing the seller's expected revenue is also a Bayesian question; when values are i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the answer is a second-price auction with a reserve price (a minimum below which the seller won't sell) (Myerson, 1981).

Poker and bluffing

The opponent's hand (type) is hidden; bluffing is part of a mixed Bayesian strategy.

Assessment

Discussion: Behavior, Fairness and Ethics

Do people always respond to incentives?
  • Theory: players maximize utility.
  • In reality, emotions, morals, habit and a sense of fairness matter too (e.g. low offers are rejected in the Ultimatum Game).
  • Incentives are powerful but not the only driver; simple, understandable rules matter.
Ethical issues in mechanism design
  • Manipulation and withholding information; powerful players gaining an advantage.
  • Unfair distribution of income; excluding those who cannot pay.
  • Ethical limits should be set by society and institutions: a good mechanism must be fair and ethical, not just efficient.

Assessment

Summary: This Chapter's Mechanisms

MechanismMoneyIncentive propertyWhat it achieves
Proportional cost sharingyesNot IC (free riding)—
VCG (Clarke pivot)yesDSIC, IREfficient outcome; may run a surplus
Vickrey (single-item VCG)yesDSIC, IRHighest value wins
Gale–ShapleynoDSIC for proposersStable matching, O(n²)
Median (facility location)noDSIC (strategyproof)Minimum total distance
TTC (house exchange)noDSICPareto optimal, in the core
Bayesian mechanismsyesBIC (Bayes–Nash)Expected goals (e.g. revenue)
Thanks to the revelation principle, it suffices to study direct, truthful mechanisms; but IC + IR + efficiency + budget balance cannot always be achieved together.

Assessment

Sample Problems

  1. Two identical items, three bidders (each wants one), values 10, 8, 5. Under VCG, who wins and who pays what?
  2. In the cost-sharing example (60; 30, 25, 20), if the others are truthful, what is Bora's most profitable report?
  3. Villages at 3, 7, 8, 12, 30: median and mean? Under the mean, what should the village at 30 report to pull the facility to itself?
  4. In the Gale–Shapley example, what would happen if the projects proposed?
  5. In the Bayesian example, if type S had probability 1/4, would (C; S→C, A→M) still be an equilibrium?
  6. TTC with preferences A: B ≻ C ≻ A, B: A ≻ C ≻ B, C: A ≻ B ≻ C. Who gets which room?
Show answers
  1. 10 and 8 win; each pays 5 (e.g. for 10: without them 8 + 5 = 13, with them 8 → 13 − 8 = 5).
  2. 10: the total stays at 60, his payment drops to 10, and his utility goes 5 → 15 (not IC).
  3. Median 8, mean 12. (3 + 7 + 8 + 12 + x)/5 = 30 → x = 120.
  4. The same: A–Y, B–X, C–Z (the example has a unique stable matching).
  5. No: C → ¼·2 = 0.5, M → ¾·1 = 0.75; P1 deviates. No pure equilibrium; a mixed one is needed.
  6. Round 1: A→B, B→A, C→A; the cycle A ↔ B trades. Round 2: C points to itself and keeps its own room.

Assessment

References

  • N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
  • T. Roughgarden, Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2016.
  • Y. Shoham, K. Leyton-Brown, Multiagent Systems, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
  • D. Gale, L. S. Shapley, “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”, American Mathematical Monthly, 1962.
  • H. Moulin, “On Strategy-Proofness and Single Peakedness”, Public Choice, 1980 · M. J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, 2004 (Bayesian games).
  • R. Myerson, “Optimal Auction Design”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981 · L. Shapley, H. Scarf, “On Cores and Indivisibility”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1974.
  • A. E. Roth, T. Sönmez, M. U. Ünver, “Kidney Exchange”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004.
  • A. E. Roth, A. Postlewaite, “Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods”, J. Math. Econ. 4(2), 1977 · C. d'Aspremont, L.-A. Gérard-Varet, “Incentives and Incomplete Information”, J. Public Econ. 11(1), 1979 · A. Abdulkadiroğlu, T. Sönmez, “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach”, AER 93(3), 2003.
  • E. Maskin, “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality”, Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 1999.
  • A. R. Karlin, Y. Peres, Game Theory, Alive, AMS, 2017 (mechanism design, stable matching) · D. Easley, J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Cambridge, 2010 (Chapters 10 and 15).
  • Course pages: Roughgarden CS364A · Shah CSC304 · Procaccia 15-896 · Dinitz AGT

The End

Chapter 4: Mechanism Design
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