Chapter 12: Behavioral and Collective Decisions
Behavioral Decisions
Warm-up: The Public Goods Game
Each round, four players get 10 tokens each and put any number into a common pool; the pool is multiplied by 1.6 and split equally among all four. Tokens not contributed are kept.
- In a group of four, how many tokens do you think are contributed on average in the first round? After ten rounds?
- If anyone contributing fewer than 3 tokens is fined 2 tokens (a punishment variant), how do contributions change?
Behavioral Decisions
Learning Outcomes
Behavioral Decisions
Are People Always Rational? Bounded Rationality
- Bounded rationality (Simon): information, time and computing power are limited; people look for "good enough", not the best.
- Deviations are systematic, not random: the same mistakes recur, so they can be modeled.
- Causes: missing information, time pressure, emotions, shortcuts (heuristics).
Behavioral Decisions
Prospect Theory
- Kahneman and Tversky (1979): outcomes are judged as gains or losses relative to a reference point, not as final wealth.
- The value function is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses:
v(x) = x0.88 (x ≥ 0); v(x) = −2.25·(−x)0.88 (x < 0) - x0.88 grows more slowly than x: v(200) ≈ 105.9, 1.84 times v(100), not 2. Concave: the curve flattens to the right.
- λ = 2.25 is the loss aversion coefficient (Tversky and Kahneman's 1992 estimate).
- Consequence (ignoring weights): risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses.
Behavioral Decisions
Loss Aversion: A Coin-Flip Bet
| Probability weighting w(p) | p = 0.01 | p = 0.50 | p = 0.99 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perceived weight | 0.055 | 0.421 | 0.912 |
The probability weighting function w(p) shows how a probability feels (Tversky and Kahneman's 1992 estimate): 1% feels like about 5.5%, 50% like about 42%, 99% like about 91%. Small probabilities are overweighted and large ones underweighted: the same person may buy both lottery tickets and insurance.
Behavioral Decisions
Code Trace: When Is a Bet Accepted?
Four coin-flip bets: win +G with probability ½, lose 100 TL with probability ½. Expected value (G − 100)/2; prospect value uses v.
G = 100: v(100) = 57.5 and v(−100) = −129.5 ⇒ ½·57.5 − ½·129.5 = −36.0. A bet with expected value 0 is rejected.
G = 200: v(200) = 105.9 ⇒ ½·105.9 − ½·129.5 = −11.8. Still rejected, although the expected value is +50.
G = 251: v(251) = 129.3 ⇒ ½·129.3 − ½·129.5 ≈ −0.1: right at the acceptance threshold (≈ 251 TL).
G = 300: v(300) = 151.3 ⇒ ½·151.3 − ½·129.5 = +10.9 > 0: now the bet is accepted.
A risk-neutral person takes the +200 / −100 bet (expected value +50) at once; with λ = 2.25 the loss weighs so much that the bet is rejected until the gain exceeds 251 TL.
def v(x): if x >= 0: return x ** 0.88 return -2.25 * (-x) ** 0.88 def prospect(G, K): # ½: +G, ½: −K return 0.5 * v(G) + 0.5 * v(-K) for G in [100, 200, 251, 300]: print(G, round(prospect(G, 100), 1))
Behavioral Decisions
A Trace of Loss Aversion: The Endowment Effect
- Experiment (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990): half the students were randomly given a mug. Owners' minimum selling price was about twice the maximum price buyers were willing to pay, and far fewer trades took place than expected.
- Explanation: giving up the mug is a loss from the reference point, getting it is a gain; the loss weighs λ times as much.
- Status quo bias: leaving the default also feels like a loss, which is why automatic enrollment raises pension plan participation.
The mug's use value is 20 TL, the value function is linear, λ = 2.25.
- Owner: giving up the mug feels like −2.25·20 = −45 ⇒ asks at least 45 TL.
- Buyer: getting the mug is +20 ⇒ pays at most 20 TL.
- Ratio 45/20 = 2.25 = λ: no trade at prices in between.
Behavioral Decisions
Framing: Same Option, Different Choice
Tversky and Kahneman (1981): two programs for an outbreak expected to affect 600 people.
Gain frame
- A: 200 people are saved.
- B: with probability 1/3, 600 are saved; with probability 2/3, no one is.
- 72% of participants chose A (the sure thing).
Loss frame
- C: 400 people die.
- D: with probability 1/3, no one dies; with probability 2/3, 600 die.
- 78% of participants chose D (the gamble).
Behavioral Decisions
Common Mistakes: Prospect Theory
Behavioral Decisions
Noisy but Smart: Quantal Response
- People choose the better option more often, but not always; the bigger the difference, the fewer the errors.
- Logit choice: P(a) = eλ·u(a) / Σb eλ·u(b) (e ≈ 2.718; ex grows fast in x). At λ = 0 choice is random; as λ → ∞ it becomes a best response.
- This λ has nothing to do with the loss-aversion λ = 2.25; it measures how "sharp" the choice is.
- With two options the formula simplifies: P(better) = 1 / (1 + e−λ·diff). With diff 2 and λ = 1, P ≈ 0.88.
- Quantal response equilibrium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995): every player gives a logit response to the others' noisy choices; as λ → ∞ it approaches a Nash equilibrium.
| λ | P(payoff 10) |
|---|---|
| 0 | 0.500 |
| 0.5 | 0.731 |
| 1 | 0.881 |
| 2 | 0.982 |
| ∞ | 1 |
Two options, payoffs 10 and 8 (diff 2): P = 1/(1 + e−2λ)
A different model, level-k thinking, limits depth of reasoning rather than adding noise: a level-k player treats the others as level k−1 (Nagel, 1995).
Behavioral Decisions
Quantal Response: Asymmetric Matching Pennies
| Left | Right | |
|---|---|---|
| Top | 320, 40 | 40, 80 |
| Bottom | 40, 80 | 80, 40 |
- p that makes Column indifferent: 40p + 80(1 − p) = 80p + 40(1 − p) ⇒ p = 1/2.
- q that makes Row indifferent: 320q + 40(1 − q) = 40q + 80(1 − q) ⇒ q = 1/8.
- Nash: whatever Row's own 320 is, the probability of Top stays 1/2.
| λ | p = P(Top) | q = P(Left) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| 0.02 | 0.83 | 0.37 |
| 0.1 | 0.71 | 0.15 |
| 1 | 0.52 | 0.125 |
| ∞ (Nash) | 0.50 | 0.125 |
The values come from solving the two logit equations jointly (by computer). With small λ, Row is drawn to the 320 and plays Top often (0.83). As λ grows, Row accounts for Column's shift to Right and returns to 1/2.
Social Preferences
Social Preferences: Is It Only About Money?
- Dictator game: one person splits 10 tokens between herself and a recipient, who can do nothing. Someone who cares only about money gives 0.
- In a meta-analysis of over a hundred studies the average share given is about 28%; a sizable fraction gives nothing (Engel, 2011).
- Ultimatum game: once the recipient can reject, offers rise to 40–50% and low offers are rejected.
Social Preferences
Inequity Aversion: The Fehr–Schmidt Model
- α: the pain of being behind (envy); β: the discomfort of being ahead (guilt). People mind being behind more: α ≥ β.
- α = β = 0 gives the classic player who cares only about money.
Social Preferences
Step by Step: The Ultimatum Acceptance Threshold (α = 1)
With α = 1 the responder gets u = s − 1·(10 − 2s) by accepting and 0 by rejecting. The proposer offers (10 − s, s).
s = 1: u = 1 − 8 = −7 < 0 ⇒ reject. One token does not make up for the pain of an 8-token gap.
s = 2: u = 2 − 6 = −4 ⇒ reject.
s = 3: u = 3 − 4 = −1 ⇒ still reject (barely).
s = 4: u = 4 − 2 = +2 > 0 ⇒ accept.
s = 5: u = 5, no gap ⇒ accept.
Threshold 10α/(1 + 2α) = 10/3 ≈ 3.33: the smallest acceptable whole-token offer is 4. A proposer who knows this offers 4 and keeps 6: rejecting low offers reflects a sense of fairness.
Social Preferences
Reciprocity: The Trust Game
- Trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995): the sender sends any part of $10, the amount is tripled, and the receiver returns any part of it. Played one-shot and fully anonymously.
- Theory (money only): the receiver returns nothing; knowing this, the sender sends 0.
- In fact senders sent $5.16 on average, and $4.66 came back.
- Reciprocity: responding to intentions: kindness for kindness, punishment for harm (Rabin, 1993). Inequity aversion looks at the distribution of outcomes, reciprocity at intentions.
Collective Decisions
Collective Decision Making: Individual vs Group Interest
- In group decisions, social influence, conformity pressure and shared interests all play a role.
- Communities decide by majority, by consensus or by voting rules.
- Individual interest maximizes one's own utility, collective interest the group's; the two often conflict.
Collective Decisions
The Tragedy of the Commons: A Numerical Model
4 herders graze animals on a common pasture. Each animal is worth 100 − G (G = total animals): the more crowded the pasture, the less each animal eats. Herder i's payoff is ui = gi(100 − G).
Social optimum: maximize G(100 − G) ⇒ G = 50, total 2,500. Shared equally, each herder has 12.5 animals and earns 625.
But while the other three graze 37.5 animals in total (12.5 each), herder 1 earns g·(100 − 37.5 − g). Setting the derivative 62.5 − 2g = 0 gives g = 31.25: a payoff of 976.6 > 625. The others' payoff falls to 390.6.
When everyone best-responds: g = (100 − 3g)/2 ⇒ g* = 20, G = 80. Check: with the others at 60, the best response is (100 − 60)/2 = 20. 400 per herder, 1,600 in total. Herders taking turns best-responding also converge to this equilibrium.
The tragedy: equilibrium total is 1,600, 64% of the optimum. Each herder feels only 1/4 of the damage his own animal does to the pasture (an externality).
Collective Decisions
More Herders, and Remedies
| n | g* (per herder) | G* | total | share of optimum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 50 | 50 | 2,500 | 100% |
| 2 | 33.33 | 66.7 | 2,222 | 88.9% |
| 4 | 20 | 80 | 1,600 | 64% |
| 10 | 9.09 | 90.9 | 826 | 33.1% |
| 100 | 0.99 | 99 | 98 | 3.9% |
In equilibrium g* = 100/(n + 1); as n → ∞, G* → 100 and the total → 0
Collective Decisions
State or Market? Ostrom's Third Way
Hardin's remedy: central control or privatization. Ostrom (1990) found shared principles in local arrangements lasting centuries (Nobel 2009).
Collective Decisions
Evaluating Collective Choices: The Veil of Ignorance
Public Goods and Punishment
Public Goods in the Lab: What Do We See?
- Each token contributed returns 0.4 to the contributor and 1.6 to the group; not contributing is dominant, and theory predicts zero contributions.
- Early rounds: about 40–60% of the endowment is contributed (Ledyard, 1995).
- Decay with repetition: contributions fall round by round and approach free-riding levels in the last rounds.
- Who? About half the subjects are conditional cooperators (they want to give as much as others do); about a third are free riders (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001).
- The mechanism of decay: conditional cooperators give slightly below the average, free riders pull the average down: contributions erode a little each round.
Public Goods and Punishment
Code Trace: conditional(c, rounds)
Model: P1 always gives 0; P2–P4 are conditional cooperators: each round they give the others' average from the previous round.
t = 0: for P2 the others' total is 20 ⇒ average 20 / 3 = 6.7 (same for P3, P4).
Round 1: contributions [0, 6.7, 6.7, 6.7]. The free rider P1 earns more than anyone.
t = 1: for P2 the others' total is 13.3 ⇒ average 13.3 / 3 = 4.4 (same for P3, P4).
Round 2: contributions [0, 4.4, 4.4, 4.4]. Each round contributions drop to two thirds of the previous value (a one-third decline).
t = 2: for P2 the others' total is 8.9 ⇒ average 8.9 / 3 = 3.0 (same for P3, P4).
Round 3: contributions [0, 3.0, 3.0, 3.0].
t = 3: for P2 the others' total is 5.9 ⇒ average 5.9 / 3 = 2.0 (same for P3, P4).
Round 4: contributions [0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0].
t = 4: for P2 the others' total is 4.0 ⇒ average 4.0 / 3 = 1.3 (same for P3, P4).
Round 5: contributions [0, 1.3, 1.3, 1.3].
In 5 rounds contributions fall from 10 to 1.3: a single free rider unravels the majority's cooperation (a simple model of the decay seen in the lab).
def conditional(c, rounds): history = [c] for t in range(rounds): new = [0] # P1 always free-rides for i in range(1, len(c)): others = sum(c) - c[i] new.append(others / (len(c) - 1)) c = new history.append(c) return history
Public Goods and Punishment
With and Without Punishment: Fehr and Gächter (2000)
Theory: money-only players never punish, so everyone still gives 0. In the lab people punished and contributions stayed high: both predictions failed.
Public Goods and Punishment
Code Trace: Does Punishment Make Free Riding Unprofitable?
Call punish(c, p): P1 free-rides, P2–P4 contribute fully. Each cooperator gives P1 2 punishment points.
share = 1.6 · 30 / 4 = 12. Before punishment u = [22, 12, 12, 12]: the free rider gets 10 more than the contributors.
i = 0 (P1) punishes no one. i = 1: P2 pays 2 for 2 points (12 → 10); P1 loses 2 · 3 = 6 (22 → 16).
i = 2: P3 also pays 2 (12 → 10); P1 16 → 10. The free rider's advantage is gone.
i = 3: P4 also pays 2 (12 → 10); P1 10 → 4.
return u: the free rider gets 4; by contributing (no punishment, everyone 10) he would have had 16. If the threat is credible, contributing pays, but each punisher also lost 2.
def punish(c, p): # p[i][j]: i's points to j n = len(c) share = 1.6 * sum(c) / n u = [10 - c[i] + share for i in range(n)] for i in range(n): for j in range(n): u[i] -= p[i][j] # costs 1 per point u[j] -= 3 * p[i][j] # target loses 3 return u
Public Goods and Punishment
Who Will Punish? Second-Order Free Riding
| Punishers (2 points each) | P1 | P2 | P3 | P4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No one | 22 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| P2, P3, P4 | 4 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| P2, P3 (P4 does not) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 12 |
Contributions [0, 10, 10, 10]; a punishment point costs 1, removes 3
- Punishment is itself a public good: the punisher bears the cost, everyone shares the benefit (higher contributions). P4, who does not punish, earns the most.
- Backward induction: in the last round punishing is pure cost ⇒ no one punishes ⇒ the threat is not credible.
In public goods experiments in 16 cities, including Istanbul, high contributors were also punished in some places, which could wipe out punishment's boost to cooperation. Antisocial punishment was more common where civic norms and the rule of law were weak (Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008).
The lesson: punishment is an institution, and how it works depends on the norms around it.
Public Goods and Punishment
Back to the Game: Public Goods
Each token returns only 1.6/4 = 0.4 to you: whatever others do, keeping it is 0.6 better. Giving 0 is dominant; all 0 → 10 each, all 10 → 16 each.
| Scenario | equilibrium | per player |
|---|---|---|
| Basic | 0 | 10 |
| Punishment (fine 2 if below 3) | 3 | 11.8 |
| Optimum (everyone 10) | 10 | 16 |
With punishment, giving 3 costs 3 · 0.6 = 1.8 but avoids the fine of 2: 3 becomes dominant.
In repeated experiments, contributions start at 40–60% of the endowment and decline (Ledyard, 1995). With costly punishment they stay high (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
Punishment is an institution that changes incentives, like the commons tax: it moves the equilibrium from 0 to 3, not to the optimum (10).
Threshold Projects
Threshold Projects: Contributing Becomes a Coordination Game
A threshold plus a refund (money returned when a crowdfunding goal is missed) removes the risk of "giving and losing" and makes coordination easier.
Threshold Projects
Step by Step: Which Contribution Profiles Are Equilibria?
(0, 0, 0, 0): if P1 gave 10 alone, the total would be 10 < 22 and her 10 tokens would be lost. No one wants to deviate: this all-zero profile is a Nash equilibrium; everyone gets 10.
(6, 6, 5, 4): total 21, threshold missed ⇒ payoffs (4, 4, 5, 6). If P4 gives 5, the total is 22 and she gets 10 − 5 + 12 = 17 > 6: not an equilibrium.
(6, 6, 5, 5): total 22 ⇒ payoffs (16, 16, 17, 17). If P1 drops to 5, the total is 21 and P1 gets 5 < 16. Giving more is wasted: a Nash equilibrium, total 66.
(7, 6, 5, 5): total 23. If P1 drops to 6, the threshold still holds and she gains 1 token: overcontributing is not an equilibrium.
The profile (10, 10, 2, 0) is also an equilibrium (if P3 withdraws, the threshold is missed). There are many efficient equilibria; who gives what is a bargaining and coordination problem.
Information Aggregation
Wisdom of Crowds
- Galton (1907): at a 1906 livestock fair, 787 guesses of an ox's weight were collected. The median guess was 1,207 lb, the true weight 1,198 lb: an error under 1%.
- Why? Independent errors cancel out.
- Diversity prediction theorem (Page, 2007): (average − truth)² = average squared individual error − diversity of the predictions. Diversity is the average squared deviation of the predictions from their own mean.
- The identity always holds; for a crowd to predict well it needs independence and diversity. If everyone copies everyone else, diversity collapses.
| guess x | individual error (x − 50)² | diversity (x − 54)² |
|---|---|---|
| 40 | 100 | 196 |
| 45 | 25 | 81 |
| 55 | 25 | 1 |
| 60 | 100 | 36 |
| 70 | 400 | 256 |
| avg 54 | 130 | 114 |
Truth 50: crowd error (54 − 50)² = 16 = 130 − 114
Information Aggregation
Information Cascades: Everyone Can Be Rationally Wrong
- Model (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992): an urn is chosen by a coin flip. In turn, each person privately sees one ball, hears the earlier people's guesses (not their balls) and guesses the urn. Each ball matches its urn's color with probability 2/3.
- Bayes: each a doubles the odds in favor of A: when a's outnumber b's by f, the odds are 2f to 1, i.e. P(A) = 2f / (2f + 1). On a tie (P(A) = 1/2) a person follows her own signal.
- Cascade: once the inferred difference is f = 2, a person who sees b has f = 1 and P(A) = 2/3 > 1/2: she ignores her own signal and says A. Those after her learn nothing from her guess.
- Fragility: a cascade rests on just two signals; a single piece of public information can break it. Fashion, product reviews, panics.
In the lab (Anderson and Holt, 1997), cascades in this urn experiment did form in most of the situations where they could.
Information Aggregation
Code Trace: How Does a Cascade Start?
Call cascade(signals); the true urn is B. The difference inferred from earlier guesses is f = 0.
Person 1, signal a: f = 0 ⇒ follows her signal, A. The guess reveals the signal: f = 1, P(A) = 2/3.
Person 2, signal a: f = 1 ⇒ with her own a, P(A) = 0.8, A. f = 2.
Person 3, signal b: f = 2 ⇒ even with her b, P(A) = 2/3 ⇒ A. The cascade has started; f no longer changes.
Person 4, signal b: same computation ⇒ A. Her guess carries no information either.
Person 5, signal b ⇒ A.
Person 6, signal b ⇒ A.
return: everyone said A, yet 4 of the 6 signals were b. Pooling the signals would give f = −2, P(A) = 0.2 ⇒ B. Everyone was rational; the information did not accumulate.
def cascade(signals): f = 0 # a − b inferred from guesses guesses = [] for s in signals: if f >= 2: t = 'A' # A cascade elif f <= -2: t = 'B' # B cascade else: t = 'A' if s == 'a' else 'B' f += 1 if s == 'a' else -1 guesses.append(t) return guesses
Information Aggregation
The Condorcet Jury Theorem: How Smart Is the Majority?
- Question: there is a right answer (is the defendant guilty or not?). How does majority voting change the chance of finding it? This is different from the Condorcet paradox, where preferences cycle.
- Theorem (Condorcet, 1785): if n (odd) voters vote independently and each picks the right answer with probability p > 1/2, the probability that the majority is right increases with n and tends to 1.
- If p < 1/2 it is the reverse: as the crowd grows, the majority is almost surely wrong.
- Pn = Σk > n/2 C(n, k)·pk(1 − p)n − k
| n | p = 0.6 | p = 0.4 |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.600 | 0.400 |
| 3 | 0.648 | 0.352 |
| 5 | 0.683 | 0.317 |
| 11 | 0.753 | 0.247 |
| 51 | 0.926 | 0.074 |
| 101 | 0.979 | 0.021 |
Probability that the majority decides correctly
Information Aggregation
Code Trace: A Five-Member Jury
Call jury(5, 0.6): the majority is right if at least 3 of the 5 voters vote correctly. k: number of correct votes.
k = 3: C(5, 3)·0.63·0.42 = 10·0.2160·0.1600 = 0.3456. Total 0.3456.
k = 4: C(5, 4)·0.64·0.41 = 5·0.1296·0.4000 = 0.2592. Total 0.6048.
k = 5: C(5, 5)·0.65·0.40 = 1·0.0778·1 = 0.0778. Total 0.6826.
return: P5 = 0.6826 > 0.6. Five independent, moderately competent voters decide better than one.
from math import comb def jury(n, p): total = 0 for k in range(n // 2 + 1, n + 1): term = comb(n, k) * p**k * (1 - p)**(n - k) total += term return total print(round(jury(5, 0.6), 4))
Information Aggregation
When Does the Jury Theorem Break Down?
Summary
Common Mistakes: Collective Decisions
Summary
Summary
Summary
Sample Problems
- With the prospect theory parameters, is a +300 / −150 coin-flip bet accepted?
- In the commons model with n = 9 herders, what are the equilibrium G* and the total payoff? What tax achieves the optimum?
- In the punishment variant of the public goods game, what would the equilibrium contribution be if the fine were 1 token instead of 2?
- In the Fehr–Schmidt model, at least how many of 10 tokens does a responder with α = 2 demand?
- In the Condorcet jury theorem with p = 0.7, with what probability is the majority of a 3-member jury right?
Show answers
- ½·3000.88 − ½·2.25·1500.88 ≈ −16.8 < 0 ⇒ rejected (threshold ≈ 377 TL).
- g* = 10, G* = 90, total 90·10 = 900; tax: (100 − t)/10 = 50/9 ⇒ t = 44.4.
- Contributing 3 tokens costs 1.8 but the fine is only 1: whatever the others give, not contributing is better by 0.8; the equilibrium contribution is 0.
- s ≥ 10·2/(1 + 4) = 4 ⇒ at least 4 tokens.
- P3 = 0.73 + 3·0.72·0.3 = 0.343 + 0.441 = 0.784.
Summary
References
- H. A. Simon, “A behavioral model of rational choice”, Quarterly J. Economics 69, 1955.
- D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk”, Econometrica 47(2), 1979.
- A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, “The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice”, Science 211, 1981; “Advances in prospect theory”, J. Risk and Uncertainty 5, 1992.
- D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, R. H. Thaler, “Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem”, J. Political Economy 98(6), 1990.
- R. D. McKelvey, T. R. Palfrey, “Quantal response equilibria for normal form games”, Games and Economic Behavior 10(1), 1995; J. K. Goeree, C. A. Holt, “Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions”, American Economic Review 91(5), 2001.
- E. Fehr, K. M. Schmidt, “A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation”, Quarterly J. Economics 114(3), 1999; C. Engel, “Dictator games: A meta study”, Experimental Economics 14(4), 2011.
- J. Berg, J. Dickhaut, K. McCabe, “Trust, reciprocity, and social history”, Games and Economic Behavior 10(1), 1995; M. Rabin, “Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics”, American Economic Review 83(5), 1993.
- G. Hardin, “The tragedy of the commons”, Science 162, 1968; E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Summary
References (2/2)
- J. O. Ledyard, “Public goods: A survey of experimental research”, in J. H. Kagel, A. E. Roth (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, 1995.
- U. Fischbacher, S. Gächter, E. Fehr, “Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment”, Economics Letters 71(3), 2001.
- E. Fehr, S. Gächter, “Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments”, American Economic Review 90(4), 2000; “Altruistic punishment in humans”, Nature 415, 2002.
- B. Herrmann, C. Thöni, S. Gächter, “Antisocial punishment across societies”, Science 319, 2008.
- F. Galton, “Vox populi”, Nature 75, 1907; S. E. Page, The Difference, Princeton University Press, 2007.
- S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, I. Welch, “A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades”, J. Political Economy 100(5), 1992; L. R. Anderson, C. A. Holt, “Information cascades in the laboratory”, American Economic Review 87(5), 1997.
- Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, 1785; D. Austen-Smith, J. S. Banks, “Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem”, American Political Science Review 90(1), 1996; T. Feddersen, W. Pesendorfer, “Convicting the innocent”, American Political Science Review 92(1), 1998.
- R. Nagel, “Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study”, American Economic Review 85(5), 1995.
- J. C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility”, J. Political Economy 63, 1955; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971.