Hawk–Dove
A conflict game with aggressive and peaceful behavior. It illustrates coexistence and evolutionary stability.
Watch successful strategies spread through a population and explore evolutionary stability.
Replicator dynamics models how strategies that earn above-average payoff become more common over time.
A conflict game with aggressive and peaceful behavior. It illustrates coexistence and evolutionary stability.
Strategies benefit from matching the population. Small initial advantages can become self-reinforcing.
Cyclic dominance can prevent a single strategy from permanently taking over.
Use the boost buttons to alter initial shares, then observe selection.
You may intervene after generations to see how shocks alter evolutionary paths.
The population evolves automatically without intervention.
Uses the first two strategies and emphasizes basic selection pressure.
Adds a third strategy, allowing richer population dynamics.
Adds small mutation and random fitness noise so extinct strategies can reappear and paths become less deterministic.