Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament

Compare reciprocal, punitive, forgiving, and exploitative strategies across repeated interactions.

Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament

Rounds0
A score0
B score0
Cooperation rate0%

How this teaches game theory

Complete scenario, mode, and level guide

Repeated interaction changes incentives because today's move influences how opponents behave tomorrow.

Strategy Duel

Compare two strategies directly over many rounds.

Round-Robin Tournament

Every strategy plays every other strategy; total payoff determines the leaderboard.

Evolutionary Tournament

Scores are converted into population shares, linking repeated games to evolutionary selection.

Strategies

Always Cooperate / Always Defect

Useful baselines that expose exploitation and the short-run temptation to defect.

Tit-for-Tat

Starts cooperative, then copies the opponent's previous move. It combines reciprocity and immediate forgiveness.

Grim Trigger

Cooperates until the opponent defects once, then defects forever.

Generous Tit-for-Tat

Usually reciprocates defection but occasionally forgives, making it more robust to noise.

Win-Stay, Lose-Shift

Repeats a move after a good outcome and switches after a poor one.

Levels

Level 1 — 20 Rounds

Short horizon for quickly understanding strategy logic.

Level 2 — 100 Rounds

Longer interaction makes reputation and retaliation more consequential.

Level 3 — Noise

One hundred rounds with accidental move flips, testing forgiveness and robustness.

What to observe: no strategy is universally best. Performance depends on the population of opponents, the horizon, and whether mistakes occur.